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  Chapter 1
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
This dissertation deals with Britain’s relative economic performance in industry 
during the period 1935-1973, a period commonly referred to as the Golden Age of 
economic growth (Crafts 1995a; Crafts & Toniolo1995). During those years the 
world experienced a unique episode of rapid economic growth, especially in 
Europe and Japan. West Germany had its economic miracle with rapid 
reconstruction and development, commonly referred to as the Wirtschaftswunder. 
Although the performance of Britain was quite favourable in terms of inflation and 
unemployment, it was disappointing in productivity and output growth when 
placed in a comparative international context (Bean & Crafts 1996; Crafts 1995b). 
GDP per capita in West Germany grew more than twice as fast as in the UK. 
Whereas the growth rate was 2.4 per cent per annum in the United Kingdom, it 
was 5.0 per cent in West Germany.
1 
There was also a remarkable difference in the 
growth of labour productivity in the total economy. Labour productivity, as 
measured by the output per hour worked, grew 3.0 per cent per year in Britain and 
5.2 per cent in West Germany (O’Mahony 1999, p.5).     
 In the literature Britain is commonly compared to West Germany in terms of 
its relative economic decline. The disappointing performance of Britain can also 
be seen in Table 1.1, which shows GDP per capita for selected years between 1900 
and 1970 for a selection of Western European countries and the United States. In 
1900 the United Kingdom had the highest GDP per capita, but by 1950 some 
countries already had surpassed the United Kingdom, and by 1970 West Germany, 
                                                   
1 Own calculations based on Conference Board 2011, Total Economy Database.  
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France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States had overtaken the 
United Kingdom.  






France Norway Sweden 
United 
States 
1900 4593 3134 2849 1762 2561 4096 
1910 4715 3527 2937 2052 2980 4970 
1920 4651 2986 3196 2529 2802 5559 
1930 5195 4049 4489 3377 3937 6220 
1940 6546 5545 4004 3718 4858 7018 
1950 6847 4281 5221 4969 6738 9573 
1960 8571 8463 7472 6549 8688 11193 
1970 10694 11933 11558 9122 12717 14854 
1980 12777 15370 14979 13755 14935 18270 
Source: Maddison (1995), Table D-1a, pp. 194-197. 





 The British economy allegedly failed in three areas: slow output 
growth as a result of sluggish demand; imperfect capital markets; and inept 
entrepreneurs (McCloskey 1970).
3
 Near the end of the 1950s and in the beginning 
of the 1960s a combination of factors, such as the Suez debacle, and the decline of 
the British empire, led to a climate of declinism (Tomlinson 1996). Especially in 
the political arena the idea that Britain suffered from profound economic, but also 
political, social and cultural malaise thrived (Tomlinson 2009). This negative view 
on Britain’s economic performance is picked up by historians and economists 
alike and particularly the post-war literature is very pessimistic about Britain’s 
economic performance in an international context.  
 The causes of the divergent growth experiences of Britain, other Western 
European countries and the United States during the Golden Age is an important 
topic in economic history. Most studies focus either on broad societal factors, such 
as the education system, or on economic theory to find an explanation for Britain’s 
alleged failure. Recently, the mainstream interpretation of Britain’s relative 
economic decline has crystallised around the Broadberry-Crafts view and, at its 
core, the manufacturing failure hypothesis. The most important explanations in 
                                                   
2 See McCloskey (1970) and Tomlinson (2009) for a detailed discussion on failure in the British 
economy. 
3 See the work of David Landes for discussions on the failure of British entrepreneurs in Victorian 
times (e.g. Landes 1965, 1969).  
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this view are that British industry failed in large-scale operations, Fordist 
technology, and Chandlerian forms of corporate organisation (Broadberry 1997; 
Broadberry & Crafts 1992, 1996, 2001, 2003; Broadberry & O’Mahony 2004; 
Crafts 1996). According to this view, Germany and the United States overtook 
Britain because of the emerging lead in the manufacturing sector. At the same 
time, this view hints at failure of the British economy in realizing its growth 
potential.  
 The debate on the divergent growth performances and failure of Britain as 
compared to other advanced countries has been heavily based on data for the 
aggregate economy, and the aggregate manufacturing sector. However, there are 
substantial differences in performance across industries. Moreover, failure can be 
the result of industry specific causes. To obtain an objective indication of whether 
there was failure in British industry we should investigate this at a disaggregate 
industry level. Existing disaggregate data on the performance of the manufacturing 
sector are all derived from extrapolations of distant benchmark years, which 
implies there can be large deviations from the actual levels of productivity attained 
in the year of comparison. The debate can continue indefinitely without new 
productivity data at a disaggregated industry level. We need new measurements of 
the productivity performance of Britain during the Golden Age, in order to 
establish which causes were important in British relative economic decline. This 
dissertation will provide new UK/West-German labour-productivity estimates for 
both the pre- and post-war period.  
 A clear definition of failure is needed in order to present a realistic reappraisal 
of the manufacturing failure hypothesis on relative economic decline. Relative 
economic decline can be the result of either supply and demand-side factors which 
make slow growth inevitable, or from failure. Three supply-side theories can be 
used in explaining British economic decline: (i) catch-up, (ii) reconstruction 
potential and (iii) structural change.  In this dissertation, failure is defined as that 
part of relative economic decline that cannot be explained by the catch-up 
potential, reconstruction potential, structural change or demand side factors. Thus, 
failure means that Britain could have grown faster given the underlying 
conditions. This failure can be due to institutional explanations, policies and the 
causes put forward in the manufacturing failure hypothesis. The Broadberry and 
Crafts view also focuses on the industrial relations system. The degree of 
competition is also mentioned as a powerful influence on the productivity outcome 
(Broadberry and Crafts 2003).      
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1.2 Aim of the dissertation 
The main aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the ongoing discussion on 
Britain’s relative economic decline in the first decades after the Second World 
War by evaluating Britain’s productivity performance in an international context. I 
provide a new labour-productivity estimate at the disaggregate industry level for 
Britain and West Germany, and I provide a substantially revised estimate for the 
pre-war period. I focus on the manufacturing sector, since this was the single 
largest sector of the economy, in terms of employment. More than one-third of all 
employees in Britain were employed in the manufacturing sector during this 
period. Important in this regard is how large the impact of the manufacturing 
sector was on the total economy. Some scholars have argued that the bad 
performance in manufacturing cannot be held responsible for the overall economic 
performance, since the sector accounted for ‘only’ a third of the total economy 
(Booth 2003a). In contrast, Kitson and Michie (1996) argue that even though 
manufacturing might be just a part of the economy, there is a substantial effect on 
the total economy, because of the importance of world trade in goods, and because 
of the symbiotic relationship between the manufacturing sector and the service 
sector. Manufacturing relies on transport, finance, insurance etcetera. Hence, the 
performance in the manufacturing sector will have substantial spill over effects on 
other sectors of the economy. Moreover, during the post-war period manufacturing 
contributed by far the largest share of export (Lee 1996). As Lee (1996) states 
‘domestic manufacturing is vital to Britain’s trade performance, the prosperity of 
her population, and the competitiveness of the non-manufacturing sectors of her 
economy’, (p. 33).        
 Another reason to focus on manufacturing is that productivity dynamics in the 
manufacturing sector will be of a different nature than productivity characteristics 
in other sectors of the economy. Moreover, it is possible to measure the 
productivity performance in this sector at the most disaggregate level, which 
enables me to undertake a detailed study. Whereas most research has focused on 
the aggregate manufacturing level, I use disaggregate information on industries 
within manufacturing to be able to pinpoint exactly which industries were poorly 
performing. I use state of the art techniques to compose my labour productivity 
estimates. By providing these new labour-productivity estimates, this dissertation 





1. Which industries contributed most to British relative economic decline?  
- How large was the labour-productivity problem in large-scale 
operations and Americanisation in British manufacturing? 
- What were the causes of the relatively poor labour-productivity 
performance in manufacturing and were there alternative 
trajectories available for British industry? 
 
2. How large were the effects of the British focus on trade with the 
Commonwealth nations on manufacturing labour-productivity levels?  
 
In the remainder of this chapter I provide a brief literature review on topics which 
are essential for the rest of this dissertation. First, I discuss the causes of relative 
economic decline which I label ‘inevitable’. These are catch-up, convergence and 
reconstruction growth, and structural change. Second, I discuss some causes which 
leave room for specific British failure, namely institutional explanations, 
macroeconomic policies, and the role of international trade.  
1.3 Inevitable causes for Britain’s relative economic decline 
In this section I discuss the sources of relative economic decline which I like to 
term ‘inevitable causes’. In my view, these causes might have influenced Britain’s 
performance, however, they are beyond reach of the British economic policies and 
entrepreneurs. As such, these causes explain the relative economic decline, but 
they do not indicate that Britain was failing.  
1.3.1 Catch-up, convergence and reconstruction growth  
An important potential source of British relative decline is lower scope for catch-
up growth. Several studies pointed out that the United Kingdom had a higher 
initial level of aggregate labour-productivity, and therefore lacked the potential for 
rapid catch-up and had much less to gain from the long boom than other European 
countries (Crafts 1995a, Feinstein 1994). The productivity gap hypothesis, based 
on the catch-up and convergence models of Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol 
(1986), states that a country that produces far inside the international technological 
frontier has more scope to implement innovations that are already in use in the 
economies of the productivity leaders.
4 
 Thus, productivity growth tends to be 
                                                   
4 The idea that economic backwardness may lead to fast catch-up growth goes back to Veblen (1915) 
and Gerschenkron (1962).  
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faster in these countries. Abramovitz noted that in the early post-war period all the 
elements required for rapid growth by catching up -large technological gaps, 
enlarged social competence and conditions favouring rapid realisation of potential- 
were in place (Abramovitz 1986, p. 395). Increasing international cooperation 
through trade and foreign direct investment opened opportunities for European 
countries to catch up with the United States, which is generally considered to be 
the world’s most productive economy and the productivity leader in virtually 
every industry after the Second World War (Nelson & Wright 1992). 
 In the neoclassical model, a country’s labour-productivity growth rate tends to 
be inversely related to its starting level due to diminishing returns to reproducible 
capital (Solow 1956). However, catch-up can also be considered in an endogenous 
growth context. In these models catch-up is based on international diffusion of 
technology and reduced technology gaps between countries. Catching up during 
the Golden Age was in part the result of technology diffusion. Possible 
mechanisms include licensing of process and product development, foreign direct 
investments, and straightforward copying (Dowrick & Nguyen 1989). An increase 
in technological competence is confirmed by quantitative research of Verspagen 
(1996), who used data on patents licensing and R&D expenditure to proxy 
technological advancement. His results indicate that for the United Kingdom the 
contribution of technology to labour productivity growth was not substantial. The 
average annual growth rate of labour productivity during the period 1960-1989 
was 2.46 per cent and the contribution of technology ranged from 0.01-0.21 per 
cent points (Verspagen 1996, p.233). For Germany on the other hand, the 
contribution of technology was quite high, ranging from 0.10-1.33 per cent point 
of the average annual labour productivity growth rate of 3.31. 
 Especially German studies ascribe the German Wirtschaftswunder to 
reconstruction growth (Cairncross 1951; Dumke 1990; Smolny 2000; Wallich 
1955). In this view, a part of West-German’s super-growth as compared with 
Britain might be the result of the setback Germany experienced as a result of the 
Second World War. To assess whether West Germany did indeed have more scope 
to catch up than Britain, a complete account of industrial performance at the 
disaggregate level is required. A couple of labour-productivity comparisons 
between Germany and the United Kingdom exist for the early post-war period. 
However, there is no consensus on the relative productivity levels of these two 
large economic players at the start of the Golden Age. According to Broadberry 
(1998) the two countries were almost on a par, whereas estimates by Van Ark 
(1990, 1993) and O’Mahony (1998) suggest that labour productivity levels in 
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Germany were much lower than in the United Kingdom. The existing estimates 
are all based on extrapolations from benchmarks in different years.  
 In this dissertation I construct a new industry-of-origin benchmark for the year 
1951 and I find that Germany’s labour productivity in manufacturing was around 
87 per cent of Britain’s productivity in terms of value added per hour worked. To 
assess whether the impact of catch-up and convergence and the reconstruction 
potential are important in explaining Britain’s relative economic decline, a labour-
productivity estimate for the pre-war period is needed. To obtain a methodological 
consistent estimate for the pre-war period, which is directly comparable with the 
1951 estimates, I modify the existing 1935 labour-productivity estimates of 
Fremdling, de Jong and Timmer (2007). My new labour-productivity estimates are 
the first ever constructed methodologically consistent, disaggregate estimates for 
West Germany and the United Kingdom for the pre- and post-war period. I find 
that West Germany was ahead of Britain by 11 per cent in manufacturing, as 
measured by value added per hour worked, in 1935. By 1951 West Germany was 
at 87 per cent of the British productivity level. Examining both the pre-and post-
war estimates reveals that West Germany lost some ground during the war period. 
This productivity gap indicates that West Germany had indeed much more scope 
for catch-up and reconstruction growth than Britain. Hence, the faster growth of 
West Germany compared with the British economy is not necessarily a sign of 
British failure.   
1.3.2 Structural change 
Several scholars, such as Kaldor (1966) and Denison (1967), have stressed the 
importance of growth of an abundant supply of labour, originating through the 
release of workers from the agricultural sector. According to Broadberry (1997) 
the overtaking by the United States and West Germany of the United Kingdom 
was mainly a result of sectoral shifts outside the manufacturing sector.  In West 
Germany still 22.2 per cent of the labour force was employed in agriculture after 
the Second World War (Maddison 1991, p.248). West Germany’s slow exit from 
peasant agriculture kept the economy away from the efficient frontier 
(Eichengreen & Ritschl 2009). The great reservoir of labourers could be 
transferred from the relatively low productive agricultural sector to the much more 
productive industrial sectors, leading to fast productivity growth (Temin 2002;
 
Temple 2001). In the United Kingdom however, the share of labour in agriculture 
was only 5.1 per cent at the start of the Golden Age, and hence there was much 
less potential for structural change (Maddison 1991, p. 248).  
8 British failure? 
 
 
 The industrial structure of the United Kingdom and the United States was very 
similar in the beginning of the 1950s. This is in line with the fact that both the 
United Kingdom and the United States made the transition from agriculture to the 
service sector at a much earlier date than in West Germany. Temple (2001) used 
growth accounting to quantify the importance of structural change in explaining 
the variation in productivity levels during the Golden Age for the United States 
and Western Europe. He estimated that labour reallocation typically accounted for 
one-tenth to one-seventh of growth in output per worker between 1950 and 1979. 
Structural change is thus capable of explaining part of the divergent growth paths 
of West Germany and the United Kingdom during the Golden Age.  
 According to Kaldor (1966), Verdoorn’s law, stating that labour productivity 
growth is a positive function of the growth in employment, operated in the 
manufacturing sector in the post-war period in Europe. Obviously, only countries 
which had a reserve of labourers could benefit from this type of dynamic 
economies of scale. This implied that Britain was bound to experience lower 
growth as compared with countries as West Germany, since it did not have a 
reservoir of labourers available. Kaldor found a statistically significant, positive 
relationship between productivity growth rates and employment growth in the 
manufacturing sector for the period 1953-1954 to 1963-1964. However, his results 
are far from undisputed. Rowthorn (1975) was able to show that it seems very 
unlikely that Verdoorn’s law operated in Europe in the post-war period. He argues 
that Kaldor used misleading statistical techniques, and chose his sample based on 
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Table 1.2 presents the sectoral shares of employment for Britain for the period 
1920-1965. This sectoral breakdown shows that the manufacturing sector in 
Britain did not change much in size in terms of employment. During the interwar 
period the sector became somewhat smaller, but after the Second World War it 
grew to over 35 per cent of total employment again. Although this means that 
almost two-third of all employees was not employed in manufacturing, 
manufacturing remained the single largest employer. Table 1.3 displays the share 
of manufacturing output in GDP in constant 1963 prices. The share of 
manufacturing output in GDP was higher in 1970 than in 1950. There was no 
deindustrialisation going on during this period.  
Table 1.3: Share of manufacturing output in GDP in constant 1963 prices (1950-1970) 
 
UK West Germany 
1950 29.1 39.7 
1951 29.2 41.4 
1952 28.2 40.7 
1953 28.7 40.6 
1954 29.5 41.1 
1955 30.3 41.7 
1956 29.7 41.4 
1957 29.8 41.1 
1958 29.3 41 
1959 29.9 41.2 
1960 30.8 42.2 
1961 29.9 42.4 
1962 29.8 41.2 
1963 29.7 41.4 
1964 30.6 42.1 
1965 30.9 41.3 
1966 30.9 40.5 
1967 30.3 41.9 
1968 31.3 42.7 
1969 32 42.7 
1970 31.4 41.4 
Source: Brown and Sheriff (1979), Table 6, p.8.  
 
Table 1.4 presents data on the growth in output per hour worked in different 
sectors of the economy. When we observe the growth rates for the United 
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Kingdom, it appears that utilities experienced the highest growth in output per 
hour worked. However, given the very small size of this sector, which employs 
less than two per cent of all employees, this will not add much to the growth of the 
total economy. Agriculture also shows higher growth rates than manufacturing, 
but this sector was also relatively small during the period 1950-1970. Growth rates 
in finance and services, important sectors, are relatively low, especially when 
compared with West Germany and France. 
Table 1.4: Growth in output per hour by sector in the UK, West Germany, the US and France 







Agriculture forestry and fishing 5.22 6.89 4.65 6.24 
Mining and quarrying 2.23 7.10 3.81 6.22 
Manufacturing 4.69 6.62 2.76 5.85 
Construction  1.72 4.17 0.80 2.98 
Utilities 6.09 7.02 5.49 9.55 
Transport and communication 3.22 4.75 2.86 5.54 
Distributive trades 2.76 4.80 2.29 3.20 
Financial and business  services 0.95 4.80 0.79 3.61 
Miscellaneous personal services 2.20 6.42 1.53 2.83 
Non-market services 0.04 3.40 0.39 2.32 
Total economy 2.99 5.18 2.34 4.62 
Market sectors 3.38 5.44 2.74 5.25 
Source: O’Mahony (1999), Table 2.2, p. 14. 
 Broadberry (1998, 2004) claims that the US and West-German overtaking of 
Britain, in terms of aggregate labour-productivity, was mainly the result of a shift 
from labour out of agriculture and of a comparative productivity increase in the 
service sector. Britain was very efficient in the service sector giving scope for 
West Germany and the United States to catch up. Broadberry (1998) also states 
that if manufacturing contributed to the overtaking, it was through the effects of 
structural change. This is in line with Abelshauser’s (2004) claim that West 
Germany over-industrialised in the early post-war period.
 
The reason why West 
Germany and the United Kingdom have a different size of industrial sector is 
because the specialisation structure of the countries is different. During the Nazi-
period and the post-war reconstruction West Germany’s specialisation in industry 
became even stronger. According to Germany’s official statistics the industrial 
sector -that is manufacturing, mining and utilities, and construction- accounted for 
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44.4 per cent of West-German GDP in 1950. This share grew to 51.4 per cent in 
1955 and 53.6 per cent in 1960 (Statistisches Bundesamt 1973; 1991). When we 
consider this high level of industrialisation of West Germany, Britain’s 
performance does not need to be considered as failure, since it was simply not able 
to grow at German rates because of a more service based economy over the 1950s 
and 1960s. Labour-productivity growth rates in the service sector have been lower 
than growth rates of labour productivity in the industrial sector throughout the 
Golden Age in every country (Maddison 1987, p. 684). 
Table 1.5: Growth rates in GDP per man-hour and GDP per capita in West Germany and the 
United Kingdom, 1938-1973 
 
West Germany United Kingdom 
Annual growth rate of GDP per hour worked 
1938-1950 -0.41% 2.25% 
1950-1960 19.47% 12.56% 
1960-1973 5.22% 3.88% 
Annual growth rate of GDP per capita 
1938-1950 -1.49% 1.13% 
1950-1960 7.05% 2.27% 
1960-1973 3.45% 2.62% 
Source: Own calculations based on Maddison (1995), Table D-1a and Maddison (1991) Table C.11.  
 The annualised average growth rates of GDP per capita and GDP per hour 
worked in the United Kingdom and West Germany are presented in Table 1.5. The 
difference between GDP per capita and GDP per hour worked is for a part the 
result of variance in the employment to population ratio in the two countries. 
Between 1950 and 1960 the difference in the growth rate of GDP per capita was 
much larger than the gap in the growth rate of GDP per man-hour. Thus, GDP per 
capita growth in West Germany in this period cannot be completely explained by 
productivity growth. A vital role is played by labour force expansion in West 
Germany stemming from immigration, increased labour participation and 
movement of labour out of agriculture.
5
 The idea that German super-growth is 
partly caused by labour force expansion, is in line with the idea of Kindleberger 
(1967). Kindleberger argues that labour-supply flexibility exerts downward 
pressure on the growth rate of real wages, thereby raising the level of investment 
                                                   
5 Germany’s unemployment rate was high in the beginning of the 1950s, 8.2 per cent of the total 
labour force was unemployed. In the United Kingdom unemployment was low with only 2.5 per 
cent. Around 1960 both Germany and the United Kingdom were at full employment. 
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and thus output. Quantitative work by Vonyó (2008) has shown that different rates 
of labour force growth indeed matter for economic growth.  
 Research by Crafts (1992) showed that the United Kingdom underperformed 
by 0.5 to 0.7 percentage points after allowing for the different scope in catch-up, 
reconstruction and the initial structure of employment. Hence, there is ample room 
for other explanations in the debate on Britain’s relative economic decline.  
 The contribution of my dissertation is that I evaluate the performance of 
British industry at the disaggregate industry level, which allows me to evaluate in 
detail which explanations are useful in explaining Britain’s performance at the 
industry level. Especially Americanisation and institutional explanations might be 
industry dependent. Hence, investigating the entire manufacturing industry as a 
whole will not reveal the impact of these causes.   
1.4 British failure  
A key element in this dissertation is the definition of failure. British economic 
history literature is filled with the alleged failure of Britain in economic 
performance. However, what is often lacking in these works is a clear definition of 
failure. I believe we cannot state that Britain failed in industrial output, simply 
because it is less productive than other countries. We should take supply and 
demand conditions into account to assess whether industrial choices made make 
economic sense. When we label the British performance as failure, this should 
mean that Britain had the option to take control over the causes of this failure. 
Below I discuss some potential causes of failure.  
1.4.1 Institutional explanations 
Some scholars have attributed the relative decline of the British economy to 
rigidities in social and economic institutions, or to the institutional framework. In 
the well-known view of Mancur Olson (1982) stable democracies accumulate 
sectional interest groups over time, whose actions as vested interests slow the rate 
of catch-up. The two World Wars and post-war trade liberalisation might have 
temporarily reduced the strength of the sclerotic tendencies and therefore might 
explain both the Golden Age and the different growth experiences during this 
period. Proponents of this ‘institutional view’ stress that in countries, such as the 
United States, West Germany and Japan, successful economic development has 
been based on the adoption of mass-production techniques and corporate forms of 
managerial coordination (Elbaum & Lazonick 1984). In Britain however, labour 
14 British failure? 
 
 
market organisations were traditionally decentralised with relatively weak central 
leadership and the adoption of these modern technological and organisational 
innovations were impeded by this rigid institutional structure inherited from the 
nineteenth century.    
 Olson’s hypothesis has been heavily criticised by two groups of scholars. The 
first group consists of those who deny the destruction of interest groups during the 
war (Grant, Nekkers & Van Waarden 1991). Paqué (1995) argues that in its most 
fundamental legal, political and economic characteristics, the Federal Republic of 
Germany was a descendent of Weimar, and Nazism and Allied occupation only 
represented a pause in an otherwise continued tradition. The impact of these latter 
two on the institutional framework of West Germany is not larger than the impact 
of the Weimar republic, since all great institutional transformations had happened 
in earlier times. Booth, Melling and Dartmann (1997) also claim that in German 
institutions significant continuities have been observed after the Second World 
War, partly caused by the fact that allied military authorities used local employer 
organisations to restart production, leaving little room for the hypothesis of 
institutional shake-up. Eichengreen and Ritschl (2009) share this view.  The 
second group of criticisers consists of those who included an ‘institutional 
sclerosis variable’ in standard convergence regressions and found no explanatory 
power of this variable (Castles & Dowrick 1990). 
 Eichengreen (2007) provides a full account of the episode of ‘coordinated 
capitalism’ in which institutions and especially neo-corporatist bargaining between 
employers, trade unions, and governments were an important factor in catching up. 
He argues that post-war European countries implemented institutional 
arrangements that promoted high investment by firms in return for wage restraint 
by workers, leading to high growth, which was advantageous to both sides. 
 Although the aim of this dissertation is not to add to the literature on 
institutional explanations of Britain’s relative economic decline, it will be 
important to take the institutional framework into account in the analyses I 
perform with my new labour-productivity estimates. When necessary I will mainly 
draw on secondary sources to discuss the importance of specific institutional 
factors which might have had an influence on the allegedly poor performance of 
certain industries.   
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1.4.2 Macroeconomic policies 
Macroeconomic policies can play an important role in economic growth via their 
influence on important economic determinants.
6
 In the early post-war period, 
economic policy in Britain relied heavily on direct control to cope with balance-
of-payment problems. Even in 1951, 54 per cent of imports and 41 per cent of 
industrial raw materials were still controlled, and 40 per cent of consumer 
spending was on price-controlled items (Broadberry & Crafts 1996, p.15). The 
main hypothesis about British economic policies is that although they were helpful 
in the short run in achieving lower inflation and unemployment, they inhibited 
productivity growth (Crafts 1995b).  Abramovitz (1986, p. 390) stated that catch-
up growth is not automatic, but ‘the pace at which potential for catch-up is 
actually realized in a particular period depends on factors limiting the diffusion of 
knowledge, the rate of structural change, the accumulation of capital and the 
expansion of demand’. In the early post-war period British industry was 
characterised by restrictive competition and collusion. Levels of concentration 
were very high (Hannah 1983). Domestic producers were protected by tariffs, 
there was no free trade and thus no perfect competition. The 1956 Restrictive 
Practices Act required that all collusive agreements were registered. The Act 
itemised six so-called ‘gateways’ through which a public interest exemption could 
be obtained. Elliot and Gribbin (1977) estimated that in 1958 over 54 per cent of 
output in manufacturing was subject to cartel regulations, and in sectors such as 
metal manufacturing, electrical engineering and construction materials this share 
was over 75 per cent.  
 Broadberry and Crafts (2001) find little support for the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between market power and innovation in 
1950s Britain. Competition policy appears to have been much too lenient but the 
productivity problems of British industry are best viewed as arising largely from 
difficulties of reaping the benefits of innovation. Broadberry and Crafts (1996) 
showed that concentration and cartelisation lowered productivity growth. In their 
2001 paper they find that concentration and collusion did not have a significant 
adverse effect on innovation. This suggests that the problems of British industry at 
                                                   
6 Labour market policies can affect economic performance through its impact on unemployment. 
Competition and trade policy influence the availability of rents to be appropriated via restrictive 
practices. However, in new endogenous growth models the effects of macroeconomic policy on 
national growth is thought to be only modest. See Easterly 2005 for an overview of economic models 
that predict strong policy results and an econometric approach estimating the effect of 
macroeconomic policies on economic growth. Easterly found that policies indeed affect economic 
growth, but only when policy variables take on extreme values.  
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this time arose largely not from failure to innovate, but rather from difficulties in 
converting those innovations into higher productivity. 
 Whereas in the British literature there is much critique on the decisions 
governments made, German literature is much more positive about the influence 
of West-German policies on the productivity performance. In Germany the 
impressive growth record in the 1950s and 1960s has been -until the 1980s- seen 
as a consequence of economic liberalisation and the introduction of the social 
market economy after 15 years of tight planning and state interventionism under 
the Nazi regime (Reichel 2002).  
 In my dissertation I will not bring up new evidence on the macroeconomic 
policies which affected labour-productivity during the post-war period. It is 
however, important to take the macroeconomic environment into account during 
the analysis which will take place in later chapters.  
1.4.3 The role of international trade in manufacturing productivity 
growth  
The final chapter of this dissertation will focus on the effects of openness and 
international trade on labour productivity in manufacturing. The Golden Age of 
economic growth was in essence a period of protectionism in Britain, tariffs 
remained at their 1930s level through the mid-1960s, and the median tariff in 
Britain was twice as high as in West Germany in the late 1950s (Crafts 2012). 
Britain did not become a member of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
and this is seen by some as an important setback in the field of competition. 
According to Broadberry and Leunig (2013) an important reason for Britain’s 
sluggish productivity growth in the post-war period, as compared with for example 
West Germany, was the isolation of British firms from foreign competition. 
European nations had relatively similar economic structures during this era, which 
means that firms in each country could compete with each other in a potentially 
vigorous manner. Britain however, was still trading with the Commonwealth, but 
these economies were complementary to each other, and hence intra-industry 
competitive pressure was lowered. Competition is traditionally an important topic 
in the British debate on relative economic decline.
7
   
                                                   
7 See for example Broadberry and Crafts 2001; Crafts 2012. 
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1.5 Outline of the chapters   
Chapter 2  
 
Chapter 2 contributes to the discussion in the literature by providing quantitative 
information of Britain’s relative position vis-à-vis Germany in the interwar period, 
in the post-Second World War period, and near the end of the Golden Age. In this 
chapter, I present new estimates of British-German comparative levels of labour-
productivity in manufacturing. I apply the so-called industry-of-origin approach, 
and by using industry-specific purchasing power parities I am able to convert 
German and British output values to a common currency. This method has been 
applied in an UK/German study for the year 1935 but not for the year 1951. I also 
adapt an existing labour-productivity estimate for the interwar period from 
Fremdling, de Jong and Timmer (2007), to make it methodologically consistent 
with the post-war estimates. Fremdling et al. compared the German Reich with the 
United Kingdom, whereas for the post-war period we can rely only on data for 
West Germany. I adjust their estimate so that it only takes West Germany into 
account. Moreover, I adjust for hours worked. It is important to take hours worked 
into account, since the length of the workweek and the number of holidays varied 
significantly between West Germany and the United Kingdom during this period. 
If we would not take this difference into account, we would overestimate the 
productivity level of the United Kingdom, since it reported significantly higher 
annual hours worked than West Germany. These two methodologically consistent 
benchmarks allow me to analyse how Britain was performing relative to West 
Germany over the course of the Second World War. Finally, I use an existing 
German/UK labour-productivity comparison for 1968 to analyse how the 
UK/German productivity race advanced over the Golden Age. I create a new and 
consistent view for the trans-World War Two period and the Golden Age. In the 
mid-1930s, West Germany commanded a respectable lead over the United 
Kingdom in industrial labour productivity. West Germany appeared to be 
especially productive in metallurgy. My data show that by the early 1950s, this 
pattern had been completely reversed. Relative to the corresponding British level, 
value added per hour worked in West Germany industry declined by thirty per cent 
between 1935 and 1951. But by 1968 West Germany had overtaken the United 
Kingdom and regained its position as local leader in manufacturing efficiency. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Chapter 3 deals with the question to what extent there was indeed failure in the 
British manufacturing sector. Utilizing the new labour-productivity estimates 
constructed in Chapter 2, I apply decomposition techniques to evaluate to what 
extent each industry within manufacturing was responsible for the aggregate gap 
between West Germany and the United Kingdom in manufacturing. This analysis 
provides new insights in the productivity dynamics in the manufacturing sector of 
the United Kingdom. My new findings shed more light on the big questions 
concerning the economic performance of Britain, and I am able to demonstrate 
that some arguments used in the literature should be rethought. My conclusions on 
the timing of the West-German overtaking of the British productivity level are 
different from what previously has been argued in the literature.   
 Shift-share techniques are applied to evaluate the effect of structural change 
within the manufacturing industry. I find that the structure of industry is 
remarkably similar in Britain and West Germany.  
  Although the reconstruction thesis is often  mentioned in the German 
literature as an important explanation for the West German Wirtschaftswunder, it 
obtained much less attention in the British literature. In this Chapter I focus on the 
role of the reconstruction thesis for West German growth. I show that West 
Germany was bound to achieve higher growth rates as a result of the war induced 
gap in productivity.      
 In the second part of Chapter 3 I focus on the presumed failure in large scale 
operations and Americanisation. Britain has been criticised for failing in large-
scale operations and plants, and in this chapter I evaluate at a disaggregate level in 
manufacturing the size of establishments and relative productivity. The data I have 
used here reveal that in many cases the large plants were more productive than 
average-sized plants. This is in line with the conclusion of Booth (2003a), who 
argued that there is not really any failure in large-scale operations.  
 
Chapter 4  
 
In Chapter 4, I examine to what extent international openness and trade have 
contributed to disappointing labour-productivity growth rates in the United 
Kingdom after the Second World War. Although trade and openness are discussed 
in the literature as potential explanations for Britain’s relative economic decline, 
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not much quantitative evidence is available. This chapter attempts to fill this 
lacuna by creating new data which can be used to investigate the effect of trade on 
labour-productivity in manufacturing.  
 Britain was once the major trading country of the world. Until the First World 
War tariffs were so low that there was virtually a situation of free trade. In 1937, 
just before the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain was still the number 
one exporting country in the world. However, after the war it lost this position to 
the US, and by 1958 West Germany took the second position. In the literature on 
trade and openness there have been many debates on the effect of trade 
characteristics on productivity growth. Although theoretically the links are not 
completely clear, and causality might run from trade to growth and vice versa, 
there is an overwhelming amount of empirical literature that has shown that trade 
can indeed have a pronounced effect on the growth rate of a country. In this 
chapter I evaluate whether trade had an effect on the labour-productivity growth 
rate in British manufacturing at a disaggregate level. I find that more trade indeed 
would have led to higher labour-productivity growth. This implies that if Britain 
would have been more open during this period, it could have achieved higher 
labour-productivity growth rates in manufacturing. Hence, Britain’s choices 
towards international trade liberalisation have played a role in its relative 
economic decline.      
 In the second part of this chapter I evaluate the evolution of Britain’s trade 
pattern over the course of the Golden Age. I examine whether the geographical 
origin of trade has affected labour-productivity growth rates. I distinguish between 
the Sterling area, which included the Commonwealth countries, and more 
advanced nations such as the United States. I find that indeed trade with more 
advanced countries had a more pronounced effect on labour-productivity growth 
rates than trade with less advanced countries. This indicates that the British 
productivity performance might have been better should Britain have traded more 









Chapter 2  
Measuring long term productivity 
patterns: comparative labour-
productivity benchmarks for 




2.1 Introduction  
The notion of relative economic decline has long pervaded British historiography, 
to the extent that Tomlinson (1996) called this strand of the literature ‘declinism’. 
The previous chapter introduced British relative economic decline during the 
Golden Age of economic growth, and discussed the various theories and 
hypotheses brought up in the debate. The growth record of the United Kingdom 
during the post-war Golden Age of economic growth has been studied most 
frequently in a West-German comparison. The inability of British industry to 
achieve anything close to West-German super-growth in the 1950s and its 
worsening market position in the face of surging West-German exports was often 
linked to Olsonian arguments about the punishment of wartime victors with the 
legacy of bad institutions inherited from the interwar period (Elbaum & Lazonick 
1984; Kirby 1992; Olson 1982). More recently, the mainstream interpretation of 
Britain’s relative economic decline has crystallised around the Broadberry-Crafts 
view and, at core, the so-called manufacturing failure hypothesis. The most 
                                                   
 I greatly acknowledge the extremely helpful discussions with Tamas Vonyó. 
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important explanations for manufacturing failure in these view are that British 
industry failed in large-scale operations, Fordist technology, and Chandlerian 
forms of corporate organisations (Broadberry 1998; Broadberry and Crafts 1996; 
idem 2003; Broadberry and O’Mahony 2004; Crafts 1996).  Clearly, the United 
Kingdom was bound to achieve more modest growth rates in industrial 
productivity, as it was already closer to the productivity frontier, which is 
generally assumed to be the US, after the war. However, as shown by Crafts 
(1995), annual growth rates were still substantially lower than what could have 
been realised based on the convergence hypothesis.  
 German scholars put great emphasis on the role of the war-induced gap 
between actual and potential output that, according to many, was the chief catalyst 
of the Wirtschaftswunder. According to the reconstruction thesis West Germany 
was bound to have higher productivity growth rates, since destruction of physical 
capital and underinvestment in new equipment and plants during the war induced a 
mismatch between labour and capital after the war.
1
 As long as West Germany 
was not back on its pre-war growth trajectory the super-growth experienced does 
not imply that Britain was failing, since growth rates there were substantially 
lower. The reconstruction thesis is confirmed econometrically in cross-country 
investigations.
2
         
 In my reassessment, I quantify both factors, catch-up and reconstruction 
growth, and discuss their contribution to the relative decline of British industry 
during the Golden Age. This approach requires additional data that go beyond the 
currently available time-series evidence on productivity growth. We need 
information on how much West Germany was lagging behind Britain in industrial 
labour productivity at the start of the Golden Age and how large the impact of 
World War II was on the relative productivity position of both economies. To 
quantify this process I construct two methodologically consistent labour-
productivity benchmarks for the industrial sector in Britain and West Germany for 
the mid-1930s and the early 1950s.       
 My 1951 benchmark is the first direct disaggregate comparison of industrial 
labour productivity levels between the two economies at the start of the Golden 
Age. All existing estimates have been derived by extrapolation from distant 
                                                   
1 The reconstruction thesis is attributed to Jánossy 1969. On its implication for West-German 
economic growth in the 1950s, see Abelshauser 2004, and Eichengreen & Ritschl 2009. The low 
initial capital-labour ratio leads to high returns on capital, inducing high levels of investment and 
thus securing rapid productivity growth. As long as the capital to labour ratio is not restored to its 
optimal long run level, capital accumulation does not experience diminishing returns. Countries will 
experience rapid growth until they are back on their potential growth path.   
2 See Dumke 1990, and Vonyo 2008. 
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benchmarks using time-series data, which cannot take account of inter-temporal 
changes in relative prices and product weights.
3
 Moreover, these estimates are not 
as disaggregated as the one I construct. As for the mid 1930s, the currently 
available benchmarks all report relative levels of labour productivity for Britain 
and Germany within interwar borders, and thus are not directly comparable with 
post-war productivity data. I present a substantially revised benchmark for 1935, 
drawing on the work of Fremdling, de Jong and Timmer (2007) while assuring 
territorial and methodological consistency with my 1951 benchmark.
4
  I use the 
same industry classification for both the 1935 and 1951 benchmarks to make them 
fully comparable. Moreover, I add coal mining to the comparison. Lacking in 
virtually all other basic raw materials Germany was much more dependent on coal 
than most other industrialised nations. More than 90 per cent of the energy 
consumed in Germany in 1937 was derived from coal. Therefore, this is an 
important branch to include in the comparison. Additionally, I use an existing 
1968 labour-productivity estimate from Smith, Hitchens and Davies (1982) to 
evaluate how Britain and West Germany were performing relative to each other 
near the end of the Golden Age.      
 Perhaps the weakest point common to most scholarly contributions to the 
debate on Britain’s relative economic decline and its failure has been the absence 
of a clear definition of failure, or at least its meaning in a theoretical framework. I 
argue that the concept of growth failure is difficult to interpret at the macro level; 
it needs to be specific to particular industries where particular technologies or 
modes of labour organisation need to be adopted to improve productivity. This 
implies that one can only provide for an adequate account of British 
manufacturing performance at the industry level. To serve this purpose, my two 
benchmarks are significantly more disaggregated than all previous estimates.  A 
richer data set also allows me to better test for the existing explanations of German 
super-growth and Britain’s relative economic decline after 1950.   
 In this chapter I am solely concerned with productivity, especially labour 
productivity. I define labour productivity as value added per working hour. This is 
known as single factor productivity or partial productivity (Van Ark 1990, p.5). 
Labour-productivity differences between countries can occur for a variety of 
reasons. The most obvious reasons for differences are that countries might use 
different amounts of other inputs or factors of production, such as capital. Labour 
                                                   
3 Estimates for aggregate manufacturing are provided (based on extrapolations) by Broadberry 1998; 
O’Mahony 1999; Van Ark 1990; and Van Ark 1993. 
4 I kindly thank Fremdling, de Jong and Timmer for granting me access to their database, without 
being able to use their product matches this work would have been very difficult.   
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quality can also greatly differ between countries. Moreover, countries might differ 
in their degree of efficiency.        
  A valid question would be why I focus on productivity only when I want to 
investigate a country in relative decline. One might argue that to get a complete 
picture of how the British economy was performing after the Second World War 
and throughout the Golden Age, I would want to look at indicators of standards of 
living, such as perhaps indicators of the quality of life. According to Nobel 
laureate Paul Krugman (1994, p.13) ‘Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long 
run it is almost everything. A country’s ability to improve its standard of living 
over time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its output per worker’. 
Krugman claims that the only sustainable way of achieving long-term growth in 
living standards is via increased productivity. Other options to raise output, such 
as employing a larger part of the population, or investing less, are only short-term 
solutions to achieve higher consumption. In the long-run, we need productivity 
growth to achieve higher living standards. Thus, in this chapter the focus will be 
on productivity, in an attempt to resolve some of the issues in the debate on British 
relative economic decline.        
  In the next section I will discuss the methods available for constructing 
labour-productivity benchmarks and I explain the methodology I use. Section 2.3 
discusses the data utilised in the construction of the labour-productivity 
benchmarks. I will first present and discuss the 1951 benchmark, and after that the 
1935 estimates. For 1951 I construct a complete new labour-productivity estimate, 
which allows me to discuss all the steps needed in the construction. For 1935 I 
revise on an existing estimate. Section 2.4 presents the results of the 1951 
benchmark, and in Section 2.5 the revised 1935 benchmark is presented. Section 
2.6 introduces an existing 1968 productivity estimate. The productivity estimates 
allow me to present a detailed case-study of the relative performance of the 
engineering sector in the United Kingdom and West Germany in Section 2.7. The 
engineering sector provides a good example of how labour-productivity estimates 
can be used to evaluate the performance of an industrial sector between two 
countries. Section 2.8 summarises and concludes.   
2.2 Methodology for the construction of labour-productivity 
estimates  
Productivity comparisons are closely related to the core of economics and have a 
long history.  Already at the end of the seventeenth century Sir William Petty  
(1690) constructed a study which compared wealth between the leading nations, 
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France, England and Holland. A few years later a study based on expenditure and 
production information from national accounts was published (King 1696). The 
most well-known work on productivity comparisons across countries is probably 
the work of Angus Maddison (1995, 2001), which covers a wide range of 
countries and has a long time span. Multiple methodologies have been applied in 
the construction of labour-productivity estimates. In the next section I will explain 
the merits and drawbacks of the different methods and I argue that the so-called 
industry-of-origin approach is most suited for the historical comparisons I make.  
2.2.1 Different approaches to construct productivity comparisons   
The first step in conducting a productivity comparison is finding an appropriate 
converter to translate the value of output in different countries into a common 
currency. An obvious candidate would be the exchange rate. However, exchange 
rates might not reflect the correct overall purchasing power parity (PPP) between 
the currencies under consideration; therefore, they are not suitable for a 
productivity comparison. Exchange rates fail to take into account that the 
purchasing power of a currency will normally differ for different products, and 
usually only hold for the tradable part of the economy. Moreover, capital 
movements can play a key role in the determination of official exchange rate 
levels and can lead to fluctuations. Even for output as a whole the exchange rate 
can be off by a factor of three or more according to Kravis and Lipsey (1991, 
p.437); for individual products the deviation may be even more severe. Another 
obvious candidate for the purpose of converting values of output into one currency 
would be the Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) as calculated by the International 
Comparison Program (2005). However, these PPPs are designed for expenditure 
comparisons and will lead to biased estimates when applied to constructing 
comparative productivity levels. Expenditure PPPs include relative transport and 
distribution margins and foreign prices, moreover, they are usually expressed at 
market prices. The problem with market prices is that these are influenced by the 
level of value added taxes and excise duties, which are difficult to subtract from 
the sales price unless very detailed data on these items is available. Thus, 
expenditure PPPs are not suited for a sectoral-productivity comparison as I wish to 
make.
5
 Rostas (1948) was the first to compare real output and productivity from 
the production side of the economy. He provided a comparison of productivity for 
                                                   
5 ICP’s PPPs have been used for productivity comparisons of the total economy, most notably in the 
work of Angus Maddison, see e.g. 1991.  
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the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany for 1936.
6
 He applied the so-
called ‘industry of origin’ approach. This approach aims at comparing levels of 
output by industry, rather than comparing expenditure categories.
7
   
 Most of the existing pre-1945 benchmarks are based on a direct comparison of 
physical output per worker. The post-1945 benchmarks are generally obtained 
using the methodology laid out by Paige and Bombach (1959). The major novelty 
of the Paige and Bombach study was the use of data on net output available in 
national census data. Net output is defined as gross output minus the costs of 
materials and fuel used and the amount paid to industrial services. Production 
censuses usually provide data on both the quantity of sales in physical units and 
the value of these sales. Hence, the factory-gate price or unit value of a product 
can be obtained through dividing the value of sales by the quantity sold. Paige and 
Bombach converted values in different currencies by using derived unit values 
from national production census data. Both the direct comparison method and the 
method of Paige and Bombach offer a solution for the problems that plagued 
earlier research, which used the exchange rate to convert values of output in 
different currencies.
8
         
 Recently two studies on comparative labour-productivity in the early twentieth 
century, based on the industry-of-origin approach, were published (see Veenstra 
2014; and Woltjer 2013).  
2.2.2 The industry-of-origin approach  
In this study, I employ the industry-of-origin approach that uses unit values to 
convert values of output into a common currency. A unit value represents the 
average price for a product, or a group of similar products. Product prices are 
usually not available in production censuses, hence they have to be derived on the 
basis of data on the produced value and the quantity of products. This implies that 
the unit value is based on the price of products averaged throughout the year and 
over all producers. Unit value ratios are the most appropriate indicator for price 
comparisons in manufacturing (Van Ark 1990). An advantage of using the unit-
value method is that production censuses also provide data on sectors that produce 
mainly intermediate inputs. Important and large industries such as for example 
blast furnaces, paper and pulp, and basic chemicals do not produce for final 
                                                   
6 Germany is only included in the comparison for mining, railways and agriculture. 
7 The expenditure approach concentrates on the categories of private consumption, government 
consumption and capital formation. 
8 See for example Flux, 1933.  
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consumption, but mainly produce intermediate inputs for other industries. If I 
would use expenditure prices to obtain a benchmark, these sectors would be 
insufficiently covered. Unit values are obtained by dividing the ex-factory sales 
value, i.e. total turnover (v) by the corresponding quantity, or volume of output, 







               [2.1]
 
Products with similar characteristics can be matched, and the ratio of the unit 





value ratio (UVR) of the two countries represents the relative producer price of 









               [2.2] 
A comparison of unit values provides the basis of the industry-of-origin 
purchasing power parities (industry PPPs), which I use to compare the value of 
output per head and per hour worked in West Germany and Britain both in 1935 
and in 1951.
9
 By aggregating UVRs, I can derive a conversion factor for gross 
output and value added in a given industry. Because only part of the products 
produced in an industry are matched the UVRs are weighted several times to 
obtain a reliable total manufacturing PPP. In the construction of an industry PPP, 
UVRs are weighted according to their share in gross output. The resulting industry 
PPPs are then aggregated using the weights of their share in manufacturing gross 
output to obtain a conversion factor for larger industry groups. Finally these PPPs 
are weighted according to their branch shares in total manufacturing in order to 
obtain a PPP for the aggregate manufacturing industry.
10
 Instead of using gross 
output to determine the weights of industries it is possible to use value added in 
weighting the importance of sub-branches in an industry. I will use both 
approaches.  In the following formula, (i) represents the matched product in 
                                                   
9 The name PPP can be slightly misleading, since the actual term is not a real purchasing power 
parity. It is the weighted average of unit value ratios, which are relative producer prices. However, 
the term PPP has been used in the existing literature on industry-of-origin benchmarks and will thus 
be used here as well.  
10 In this work I focus mainly on value added comparisons, I do show the results obtained when gross 
output is used to weight industries.  
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industry (j), whereas (wij) is the share of product (i) in the gross output of industry 
(j).      
𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗





                        [2.3] 
There are alternative techniques to weight individual industries within industry 
groups and the latter within total manufacturing. By using the weights of the base 
country A, I obtain the Laspeyres gross-output PPP.      





                                                            [2.4] 
Where 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝐴(𝐴)
 is the output weight of product i in base country prices and 
quantities. By contrast, the Paasche PPP is obtained when using the weights of the 
other country B. 





            [2.5] 
Where 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝐴(𝐵)
 is the quantity weight of the other country valued at base country 
prices.In general, it is expected that the Laspeyres PPPs are higher than Paasche 
PPPs because of the negative correlation between prices and quantities of products 
on the same market. The quantity weights of the other country B are, therefore, 
relatively large. The Laspeyres PPP [4] is constructed by using the weights of the 
base country A, hence, the valuation of gross output at foreign quantities will tend 
to inflate its aggregate value. This is known as the ‘Gerschenkron effect’, named 
after Alexander Gerschenkron who described this effect in detail in 1955. The 
conversion factor which can be used in constructing a labour-productivity 
comparison is most commonly obtained by taking the geometric average of the 
Paasche and Laspeyres PPPs, known as the Fisher PPP.  






















                        [2.6]  
The Fisher index has several favourable properties over the above alternatives. 
The most important for my study is that it satisfies the country reversal test, thus 
changing the denominator and numerator does not alter the results (Van Ark 1990, 
p.30). Moreover, a Fisher price index times a Fisher quantity index gives the 
Fisher value index. When the price indexes are extrapolated, the Fisher index 
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shows a smaller margin of error from the true year of extrapolation than the 
Paasche and Laspeyres index (Krijnse Locker and Faeber 1984).  
 Output-based productivity comparisons are subject to distortions caused by 
differences in product quality, as UVRs are computed on the basis of sheer 
quantities.
11
 Quality differences are especially important in consumer durables and 
investment goods and somewhat less import in intermediates such as steel, cement, 
paper, and timber (Van Ark 1993). Another important advantage of the price 
approach is that, as Van Ark (1993) argues, there is a general consensus in the 
literature that the representativity of measured prices for unmeasured prices is 
better that that of measured quantities for unmeasured quantities. The underlying 
idea is that products which are closely related in terms of either inputs or the used 
production technique are likely to exhibit similar movements in prices (Van Ark 
1993).  
 In the existing literature, most labour-productivity benchmarks have been 
constructed on the basis of measuring labour input by employment. However, due 
to significant differences in the length of the working week and the number of 
vacation days, real hours worked in a man-year vary substantially between 
countries. Therefore, a comparison based on man-hours is preferred whenever 
reliable data on labour hours are available. In this investigation, I report 
benchmarks both based on man-year and man-hour worked, since this will show 
the importance of the distinction. In my analysis I will focus mainly on the latter.   
2.2.3 The year of comparison  
Ideally one would prefer a labour-productivity comparison after the Second World 
War at the beginning of the high growth period which is known as the Golden Age 
of economic growth. Both West Germany and Britain have production statistics 
available for the end of the 1940s. However, a productivity comparison is only 
relevant if the rate of unemployment and capacity utilisation in the two countries is 
relatively similar (Rostas 1948).  
 In 1948/9 Germany’s economic climate was marked by deflationary pressure, 
and the average monthly decrease of the price level was around half a per cent in 
1949, and even as large as one per cent in the first months of 1950 (Giersch, Paqué 
                                                   
11 However, it has been argued by Broadberry and Fremdling (1990, p. 408) that in the early post-
war period, this problem was not as severe as it is today. Broadberry and Crafts (1990, pp. 376-377) 
demonstrated that the productivity performance of Britain relative to the United States in 1948 
appears to have been remarkably similar whether the comparison is based on net output converted by 
relative unit value ratios or on a physical-output benchmark, as in Frankel (1955).  
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and Schmieding 1992, p. 46). This was partly the result of the business cycle, and 
partly the result of the tightening of liquidity by the Bank deutscher Länder.
12
 The 
United Kingdom also faced problems related to the war. Most notably was the 
existence of a rationing system. Due to the high dependency on imported 
foodstuffs and the attempts of the Germans to hinder the inflow of goods into 
Britain during the war, a system of rationing had to be installed.
13
 On 8 September 
1939 the Ministry of Food, which was to be responsible for the allowance of food, 
was formally established in Britain (Alcock 2008; Chalmin 1990). From 1940 
onwards food and other consumer goods became subject to rationing or 
distribution schemes (Zweiniger-Bargielowska 1994; 2000). Rationing of food 
was not done by means of price control, but by means of distribution (Alcock 
2008).
14
 After the war the rationing was not ceased, furniture remained rationed 
until the end of 1948, and the rationing of clothes came only to an end in March 
1949 (Zweiniger-Bargielowska 1994). More important for industrial output was 
probably the raw material allocation, of which the most relevant were coal, steel 
and timber (Cairncross 1985, p. 336).
15
 Therefore, the pre-1950 period is not 
suitable for a comparison, many prices were not signalling equilibria.  
 For both the United Kingdom and West Germany detailed data on production 
is available for 1951. The United Kingdom was experiencing low unemployment, 
between 1 and 1.6 per cent in the first half of the 1950s. Germany’s 
unemployment rate was close to ten per cent at the beginning of the 50s.
16
 
However, Germany’s high unemployment is partly the result of the large inflow of 
refugees and thus not an indication of failing labour market institutions or cyclical 
factors. By 1951 most of the controls and rationing schemes also came to an end 
                                                   
12 The Bank deutscher Länder was founded on March 1 1948 and was a predecessor of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. The main task was to manage the currency policy. 
13 Immediately before the Second World War,  two-thirds of the calory intake of Britain originated 
from imported foods (Olson, 1963, p. 117).  
14 The Ministry used the term allowance instead of rationing. 
15 Aluminium, wool and rubber ceased to be allocated in 1947, tin cotton and most hardwoods in 
1949. 
16 Calculated on the basis of Feinstein1972, p. 126 and Eichengreen and Ritschl, 2009, p. 213. 
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(Cairncross 1985). Therefore, productivity levels in 1951 for West Germany and 
the United Kingdom can safely be compared.
17
   
2.2.4 Double deflation  
Although most existing benchmark studies rely on single deflation, another 
method exists to obtain benchmarks: the so-called ‘double deflation’ method. 
Paige and Bombach (1959) were the first to apply the concept of double deflation, 
although they called it the ‘double indicator method’. 
 Fremdling et al. (2007) provide a thorough discussion on the advantage of 
applying the double deflation method. According to them the theoretically correct 
way to obtain a benchmark would be to use data on gross output and intermediate 
inputs in both countries, and convert them to a common currency using two PPPs, 
one for output and one for intermediate inputs. The results of using single 
deflation are especially biased when there are large differences in the technical 
input-output coefficients of an industry between two countries. That is, when the 
two countries use a different production technique, different types of materials, or 
they use different amounts of imported materials. Moreover, when relative prices 
of output and input differ across countries, single deflation might also lead to 
misleading results (Fremdling et al. 2007).
18
   
  The double deflation method has been mainly applied in studies on 
productivity in agriculture, since in this sector the input structure is relatively 
simple.
19
 However, recently some studies have been published that use this 
methodology for a manufacturing comparison (Fremdling et al. 2007; De Jong & 
Woltjer 2011). When relying on quantity data or average value added data there is 
a risk that quality variations identified in the output comparison will be ignored in 
                                                   
17
 One potential problem in using the administered prices for coal is that in Britain the price was still 
fixed in 1951. This implies that the prices recorded for products produced in do not necessarily signal 
true equilibrium prices. However, the crucial question is to what extent my productivity estimation 
would be different is the distortion would not appear. If we hypothetically assume that prices in 
country A are controlled, and as a result lower than what the free market would dictate, the result 
will be that labour productivity in country A is undervalued in comparison to country B,  since 
simply less value added is produced in country A as compared to country B. It is difficult however, 
to estimate the exact size of the distortion. The problem is that in terms of labour productivity the 
British case in undervalued, but when we evaluate the effect of the productivity of a certain sector on 
the total economy, we should take into account the actual prices for which products were sold.  For 
the total contribution of individual industries to British relative economic decline we should take into 
account actual prices. However, we should be careful to conclude that a relatively poor British 
performance is the result of malfunctioning in the production process or failure.  
18 Fremdling et al. (2007a, pp.360-361) provide a very simple and clear numerical example to 
illustrate the effect of applying double deflation. 
19 See e.g. Van der Meer and Yamada 1990; Maddison and Van Oostroom 1993. 
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the input comparison and the other way around. A country might be credited with 
a net output that is too high in a particular industry because its higher quality 
output was the result from better quality materials, but that was not reflected in the 
measure of material inputs. For example, when a price comparison for the clothing 
industry takes account of all quality differences, but inputs of fabrics can only be 
deducted in rather crude quantity terms, this problem can occur. In most cases the 
census will provide information on either weight units or the number of products, 
but not on both. Thus, these problems cannot be circumvented.  
 Van Ark (1993, p.41) spelled out some methodological objections against the 
double deflation method. Firstly, the Paasche and Laspeyres unit value ratios can 
differ substantially when the share of intermediate inputs in gross output differs 
between the countries under comparison. Secondly, relatively small measurement 
errors in the price ratios of outputs or inputs tend to become magnified in the unit 
value ratio when intermediate inputs make up a large part of output.    
 Since there is a lack of reliable data on intermediate inputs in the German and 
British census in many sub-industries, and given the problems in applying double 
deflation in a consistent manner combined with the statistical problems which 
arise when using the double deflation technique, I will rely on single deflation 
throughout this work. This means that I implicitly assume that the relationship 
between the average costs of inputs in the two countries under comparison is 
identical with the output price index. However, this does not mean I assume 
identical technical input-output factor coefficients for similar industries in the two 
countries; this would manifest itself in similar value added to gross output ratios 
and I find that  in most cases this ratio is not exactly the same for two similar 
industries. Variations can occur as a result of a difference in production method, 
different types of intermediary goods used, the amount of imported materials, or 
due to a difference in the industry classification between the two countries 
(Fremdling et al. 2007). The correlation between the ratio of value added over 
gross output between the United Kingdom and West Germany is 87.35 per cent, 
and statistically significant even at the one per cent level. Hence, there is ample 
reason to believe that there is no substantial difference in the technical input-
output structure in the two economies.  
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2.3 Constructing a benchmark for 1951   
2.3.1 Data on output, value added and employment for 1951  
The data necessary for the construction of the labour-productivity benchmark for 
1951 have been drawn from official production data. For the United Kingdom, 
detailed figures on both output and labour input are presented in The Report on the 
Census of Production for 1951, published by the Board of Trade (1954). For West 
Germany, I derived my data from two different series in the annual industry 
statistics published by the Statistisches Bundesamt (1956b; 1956c).
20
 
 The British industry classification system lists 24 main industry groups, which 
are subdivided into 148 industries. The West-German nomenclature is based on 
five core industry groups broken down into 44 industries, which are split up into 
sub-branches in some cases. I harmonised these classifications and I was able to 
cover 24 main industries, which cover most of, although not the entire, industrial 
sector. I also classified the industries in 12 main industries, since this facilitates 
comparisons with other labour-productivity benchmarks which usually stick to a 
higher level of aggregation. Table A-1.1 in the Appendix provides a detailed 
account of my reclassification work. Since the British census reported data at a 
much more disaggregated level than West Germany, I followed the West-German 
nomenclature as much as possible. Following the classification system used in 
German industrial statistics is not only a choice of convenience. The German 
system closely resembles the United Nations International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), which has been widely used in the literature. Even more 
importantly, it is the most appropriate classification to apply when constructing 
industry-of-origin benchmarks. To accept the matched products within an industry 
to be a representative sample, we need to assume that the sub-branches within the 
particular industry operate with a similar production function. The British industry 
classification groups industry branches together which use the same type of input 
materials but at different levels of processing. This is extremely problematic for 
the above assumption because industries producing intermediary products, such as 
iron and steel or timber, are typically capital intensive, whereas the engineering 
branches, or light manufacturing substitute skilled labour for capital, and thus 
achieve significantly lower levels of labour productivity. By contrast, the German 
nomenclature groups industries into one class which operates at the same level of 
the vertical production chain.        
                                                   
20 Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe 4, Die Industrielle Produktion 1950/55 (1956b). 
Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe 4: Sonderveröffentlichungen, No. 12. (1956c). 
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 In some industries, and in particular in the smaller establishments, it might be 
expected that family workers play an important role. However, since both the 
British and West-German sources provide only information on large industrial 
establishments -establishments with ten or more employees- the problem of 
uncounted family workers will be relatively small.    
 In the British census of production both data on gross output and value added 
are presented. The German source provides only information on gross output for 
1951. Value added for 1950 is available in a separate publication though 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 1956d). I used the value added/gross output ratio of 1950 
to calculate what value added in 1951 would have been. This means that I 




2.3.2 Hours versus working years  
All previous benchmarks comparing British and German industrial labour 
productivity in the mid twentieth century have been constructed on the basis of 
raw employment data. In order to provide an appropriate measure of labour 
productivity, employment levels need to be adjusted for differences in the average 
working hours. The length of the workweek and vacation varied significantly 
between countries. O’Mahony (1999) has constructed estimates of annual hours 
worked by all engaged personnel for several countries at a disaggregated industry 
level.
22
 Table A-1.2 in the Appendix provides data on the annual hours of work 
and number of vacation/holiday days per worker. The West-German workweek 
was considerably longer than the workweek in Britain. Figure 2.1 below shows the 
average annual hours worked in the manufacturing sector of Germany and Britain 
for the period 1870 to 2000.  
                                                   
21 This assumption would be problematic if the gap between the years would be larger, or when there 
are notable technological developments in the period under consideration.  
22 The industry classification in O’Mahony, Table C, p. 102. reflects a higher level  of aggregation 
than my benchmark. However, I could match my 24 industries to 18 industry groups reported by 
O’Mahony. I assumed that standard working hours were uniform across sub-industries. O’Mahony 
based her estimates of hours worked per week for Britain on data available in ‘British Labour 
Statistics: Historical Abstract, 1886-1968’ and ‘British Labour Statistics, Year Book’. Data on 
average weeks worked per year were taken from Oulton and O’Mahony 1994. For Germany she 
relied on an unpublished series from the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. Weeks worked 
per year is calculated by taking into account paid holidays, public holidays and days lost due to 
sickness, maternity leave and strikes.  
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Figure 2.1: Annual hours worked in Germany and Britain (1870-2000) 
 
Source: Huberman and Minns (2007), Table 3, p. 548. 
 During the late nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth 
century, employees in Germany worked significantly more hours per year than 
their British counterparts. Before the Second World War the German workweek 
was shorter than the British workweek. In 1948 the workweek was on average 42 
hours in Germany, but after repair investments it returned to the normal level of 
48.2 hours a week in 1950 (Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding 1992, p. 46-47).
23
 Part 
of the longer working hours in West Germany is explained by the fact that West 
Germany had very high ‘extra hours’ in the beginning of the 1950s. Schudlich 
(1987, pp. 158-167) reports that these additional hours worked were more than 
two hours per week per person. Thus there was a substantial deviation between 
British and West-German manufacturing in this regard in the early 1950s. This 
yields substantially different estimates for relative productivity levels depending 
on which definition of labour input is used. If we fail to take into account this 
difference we will underestimate Britain’s productivity level relative to West 
Germany. Besides the fact that the hours worked differed between West Germany 
and Britain, there are also pronounced differences in the annual hours worked 
between industries within these countries. Hence, without correcting for the annual 
                                                   
23 Due to repair investments and recovery, a good part of the capital stock which had been damaged, 
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hours worked it would be difficult to directly compare the productivity level 
between industries. 
2.3.3 The matching of products  
To construct my labour-productivity benchmark, I matched in total 186 products 
or product groups. Some problems emerged in the matching of products. 
Commodities under the same label are often not homogenous while similar 
products are frequently attributed different names in the production statistics of the 
two countries. Furthermore, the West-German and British data sources did not use 
the same units of measurement. Therefore, the British data had to be converted 
into metric units. In certain cases, the matching of products was not possible as the 
units of measurement were incomparable. Whereas German industry statistics 
almost always specify the volume of production in tons, the British census often 
reports the number of products instead. Without reliable data on average product 
weights in the respective industries, it is impossible to convert volume into 
quantities, or vice versa. This problem was particularly severe in the engineering 
sector, where product groups often included several heterogeneous products 
measured in incomparable units. For example in refrigerator production it will be 
very difficult to decide on the average weight of a refrigerator, since there are 
many different types and sizes. To solve this problem, I draw information from the 
British trade statistics (Board of Trade 1951), where trade volumes are specified in 
tons. This procedure is described in more detail in Table A-1.3 in the Appendix.  
 Another problem is that certain products were only manufactured in one 
country and, therefore, could not be matched. Data on production was not reported 
for reasons of confidentiality in the German industry statistics in industries that 
incorporated a very small number of firms. In quite a few instances there was only 
information on either quantity or value and not on both in the German production 
statistics; hence, it was impossible to match these products. Finally, in the food, 
beverages and tobacco industry, the German production statistics do not provide 
disaggregate information for the year 1951. Therefore, I calculated the unit values 
for food products based on the 1953 production statistics and extrapolated back to 
1951, using an index of export prices calculated from the foreign trade statistics 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 1953, pp. 311-314; 1956a, p.4). For timber and musical 
instruments I only had information on production in 1952 and I used the same 
procedure as for food.         
 I omitted two industries from my benchmark, where a labour-productivity 
comparison between the two countries in the early 1950s would not have made 
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practical sense. Aircraft manufacturing was shut down in West Germany after 
World War II, in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, and was only re-
established after 1955, when the Federal Republic had joined NATO. In 1951, 
only 188 employees were engaged in the aircraft industry, carrying out repairs on 
existing civilian airplanes (Gareau 1961, p. 522; Statistisches Bundesamt 1956d).
24
 
The building of sea-going vessels was also severely restricted until the lifting of 
the occupation statutes in 1951, and the product composition in shipbuilding was 
also markedly different than it had been before the war, or from what it was in the 
United Kingdom (Gareau 1961, p. 522).     
 The final challenge was that the widespread price controls that remained in 
place all over Europe until the early 1950s could affect input and output prices 
very differently in the two countries. Certain food products were still rationed in 
1951. For example the controls over distribution, use, and price of sugar in Britain 
was only removed in September 1953.
25
 Sugar, syrup and molasses are important 
inputs into other foodstuff industries, such as the chocolate and sweets industries, 
jams and preservatives, cake and flour confectionary, biscuits, and soft drinks. The 
jam and preservatives industry in the United Kingdom was already meeting 
consumer demand for some time, hence, the abolition of the rationing should not 
have affected this industry, but for the chocolate industry it was expected that 
there would still be a rise in production.
26
 Unfortunately I could not solve this 
problem completely, since I do not know the prevailing prices if the rationing 
system would not be operating. But given that some of these food industries were 
already meeting consumer demand, I assume that the impact was not too big. 
However, caution must be taken in interpreting the results of the estimates for 
these particular industries.      
 Price movements caused sharp deviations in the ratio of value added to gross 
output between West Germany and Britain in two branches of light manufacturing, 
textiles and leather, leading to unrealistic productivity estimates. To overcome this 
problem, I had to assume that the value added to gross output ratio in textiles and 
the leather industry remained constant between 1935 and 1951 in both countries. 
                                                   
24 In comparison, in  1936 almost 48000 people were employed in this industry (electronic database 
of Sleifer 2003).  
25 Foreign news in the Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, vol. 1, no. 15, 1953, p. 919. 
Britain was highly dependent on sugar imports and at the same time exports from the 
Commonwealth member countries decreased and exports from South Africa also came to a standstill 
due to the growing domestic demand in Africa. Britain became dependent on imports from Cuba and 
Santo Domingo (the dollar zone) but she did not possess enough foreign currency to meet the 
purchase quota of Cuban sugar. Hence, sugar remained under control (Chalmin 1990, pp. 228-232).  
26 Information drawn from Foreign news in the Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, vol. 1, 
no. 15, 1953, p. 919. 
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Table A-1.3 in the Appendix provides more detail on the adjustments I made.  
 Despite the difficulties in the matching of similar products in West Germany 
and the United Kingdom I was able to match a substantial amount of products, 
Table A-1.4 in the Appendix presents the list of matched products, the 
corresponding values and the unit value ratios.  
2.4  Labour-productivity estimates for 1951 
2.4.1 Purchasing Power Parities 
Table A-2.5 in the Appendix presents the number of matched products, the 
coverage ratios and the Fisher PPPs for the 12-industry classification, the 24-
industry classification and for industry as a whole. The 186 matched products or 
product groups cover 26 per cent of British industry and 33 per cent of German 
industry. The coverage ratio varies considerably across industries, which reflects 
the above mentioned difficulties in the matching of products. However, having a 
low number of product matches does not necessarily lead to unreliable results. In 
certain industries one product can cover a very substantial part of total output. In 
coal mining for example the coverage ratio is very high, even though there is only 
one matched product. Implicitly I assume in my methodology that the price ratio 
for the non-covered items will be similar to the price ratio of the matched 
products.
27
 When products are produced with similar production functions, or 
similar inputs, I can expect that they exhibit similar price movements.   
  The Fisher PPP for total manufacturing is 11.88, which is actually close to 
the official exchange rate, which was 11.67 Deutschmark (DM) to the pound in 
1951. However, for several industries, the industry-specific PPP deviates strongly 
from the exchange rate. Such discrepancies occur because the exchange rate fails 
to take account of the fact that the purchasing power of a currency will normally 
differ between different products. This problem was particularly severe in the 
early 1950s, still marked with quantity controls and other trade restrictions under a 
fixed exchange rate regime. 
                                                   
27 This assumption will be more problematic when comparing two countries in a different state of 
development (Van Ark 1993). In general it can be expected that it is easier to match products with 
low quality content, since these are more homogenous. When the countries are in a different state of 
development, it might be expected that the less developed country produces less high quality 
products, which will be relatively higher priced. 
Measuring long term productivity patterns 39 
 
2.4.2 Labour-productivity estimates 
I used the PPPs reported in Table A-1.5 in the Appendix, to convert gross output 
and value added per employee and per man-hour worked in West-German industry 
from DM to Pound Sterling. Table 2.1 below reports my estimates for labour 
productivity in West Germany relative to the corresponding British levels for 24 
industrial branches, Table A-1.6 in the Appendix provides the resulting labour 
productivity levels when I use the more aggregated 12-industry classification.
28
 
Table 2.1 presents the estimates for total manufacturing and total industry, where 
the latter consists of total manufacturing and coal mining. In the remainder of this 
dissertation I will focus mainly on the total industry estimate.   
In terms of gross output per employee, West Germany was lagging almost sixteen 
per cent behind the United Kingdom at the aggregate level. In gross output per 
hour, we see that West Germany is performing even worse, 25 per cent below the 
British level. Hence, the difference in working hours has a substantial effect. We 
indeed undervalue the British performance if we do not take working hours into 
account. Only in coal mining Britain reported a larger amount of hours worked per 
annum than Germany.
29
 There is a substantial difference between the gap in gross 
output per hour, and the gap in value added per hour for certain industries. This is 
the result of a different value added over gross output ratio in West Germany and 
the United Kingdom. In value added per man-hour worked, the German 
performance was somewhat better at 84 per cent of the British level. However, 
large difference across industries can be observed. In the remainder of this section, 
I discuss the estimates for value added per hour worked.  
  
                                                   
 
29 Caution has to be taken in interpreting the results when taking hours of work into account in coal 
mining, since it might be that there is a difference in the way hours worked are reported in West 
Germany and in Britain. This difference can occur depending on whether the time a miner arrives at 
work is seen as the start of the working day, or whether the time the actual mining work in the pit 
starts is counted.   
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Table 2.1: Comparative labour productivity in manufacturing in the UK and West Germany 
1951 (UK=100) 
Sources: own calculations, see text for the underlying sources.  
British firms achieved higher levels of labour productivity than their West-German 
counterparts did in the majority of industries, but their lead was especially striking 
in fabricated metal products, building materials, beverages and tobacco 
manufactures. West Germany was lagging behind most in the tobacco industry, 
where its productivity was less than one-sixth of the British level. This massive 
 Per worker Per hour 








Textiles  90 114 83 105 
Leather  75 103 66 91 
Footwear 93 108 83 96 
Clothing  97 95 86 84 
Iron and Steel  99 136 89 122 
Non Ferrous Metals  63 92 57 83 
Fabricated Metal Products 82 51 72 45 
Vehicles  82 106 74 96 
Mechanical Engineering  90 109 79 95 
Electrical Engineering  84 89 76 81 
Optical and Precision Engineering 90 115 78 99 
Tobacco 19 18 16 15 
Beverages  54 62 44 51 
Food Products   126 192 104 158 
Chemicals    98 120 85 104 
Glass 122 136 107 119 
Building Materials 60 76 53 67 
China and Earthenware  84 90 74 79 
Woodworking   74 100 63 86 
Timber  129 144 110 122 
Paper and Board 100 138 87 120 
Rubber and Asbestos  54 87 50 80 
Miscellaneous 52 84 46 73 
Total Manufacturing  84 94 75 83 
Coal Mining 82 81 89 88 
Total Industry  84 93 75 84 
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gap reflects the fact that the industry is composed of two sub-branches: the 
manufacturing of cigarettes is highly capital intensive and thus features high levels 
of labour productivity, whereas the production of cigars relies heavily on manual 
labour and, thus, generates considerably less output per worker. Table 2.2 shows 
the production volume of cigars and cigarettes in both the United Kingdom and 
West Germany.  












112296 652622 36295 880066 
Cigars 102 3408 4388 417854 
a) The production and value refer to 1953, since no information is available in the production 
statistics for 1951. 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (1956d), ‘Die Industrielle Produktion’, sonderheft 11, p. 73. Board 
of Trade (1954), ‘The report of the census of production for 1951’,  p. 9/N/5.  
 Whereas cigarettes represented the overwhelmingly dominant component in 
Britain, cigars still had a large share in the German tobacco industry in the early 
1950s. West Germany was producing 43 times as many cigars as Britain, whereas 
it was producing only one third of the amount of cigarettes Britain produced. In 
Germany cigars have always been more popular than in Britain, cigars were 
smoked by a wide variety of people, ranging from lower to upper class (Prais 
1981, p.99). Prais (1981) estimated that in Germany as much as three-quarters of 
the employment in the tobacco industry was involved in cigar making in 1950. 
Unfortunately I do not have separate employment information for the cigarettes 
and cigar branch in Britain, which prohibits me to split the industry into two sub-
branches. It is important to realise the difference in the nature of the two tobacco 
industries, which explains the difference in productivity performance.  However, 
we do have to take the performance of this industry into account, since it plays a 
role in the total manufacturing gap. Britain is not extremely productive, nor is 
West Germany failing in productivity. Instead, I conclude that the Germans had a 
bigger taste for a different product, which was less efficient, in terms of labour-
productivity, to produce. Broadberry (1997) found a similar taste difference in the 
biscuits industry. Britain’s labour-productivity level is less than a third of the US 
labour-productivity level in the late 1960s. Part of this massive difference in 
productivity levels can be explained by the bigger taste of the British for a large 
variety of products. In the United States production was standardised, which led to 
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higher efficiency. In the next chapter, I will apply shift-share analyses and 
decomposition techniques to evaluate to what extent individual industries 
contributed to the aggregate productivity gap.  
 Thanks to a long-established superiority in steel making and the major steel-
processing industries, West Germany retained its productivity lead in iron and 
steel, and stayed very close to British productivity levels in the engineering sector; 
with the exception of electrical engineering. In the chemical industry, West 
Germany also preserved a small productivity lead. It is interesting to see that 
West-German manufacturers also outperformed their British rivals in the textiles, 
glass, timber and paper industries, where they had never been particularly 
competitive. Under the Nazi war economy, light manufacturing was deprived of 
labour, which pushed up the capital-labour ratio and urged firms operating in these 
industries to economise on labour. This forced wartime rationalisation combined 
with the post-currency reform consumer boom that emerged in the second half of 
1948 placed these industries into a favourable position in terms of labour 
productivity. In the food industry, the large German productivity advantage 
contrasts a similar British lead in beverages. Both are to a large extent the outcome 
of discrepancies in product composition, meaning that sub-branches with different 
levels of labour productivity had very different weights in the two countries. In 
West Germany the grain and dairy industry accounted for a larger percentage of 
output in the food industry than in Britain. In Britain preserved meat and bread 
making were substantially more important than in West Germany.  
 As mentioned earlier there are alternative estimates in the existing literature 
for comparative labour-productivity levels of West Germany and the United 
Kingdom in manufacturing and in the economy as a whole for 1950. Table 2.3 
below summarises the results. As I have explained in the Introduction, all previous 
estimates were derived by extrapolation from distant benchmark years. Each of 
these benchmarks is sufficiently far away in time for the time-series projections to 
generate biased estimates for the early 1950s. Relative prices may change over 
time and thereby render distant industry PPPs obsolete. To be able to compare my 
new 1951 labour-productivity estimate with the existing 1950 estimates I have 
extrapolated my estimate backwards to 1950. This step is important because there 
was a substantial difference between the rate of productivity growth in British and 
West-German industry from 1950 to 1951. I used time-series evidence to project 
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Table 2.3: Alternative estimates of labour-productivity in the UK and West Germany in 1950 





Description Data source 
Van Ark 
(1990) 
74 - Comparison Germany/UK 
on the basis of market 
prices instead of factor 
costs. Gross value added 
per person hour. 
Extrapolated from the 
1967/1968 benchmark of 





89 - Value added per hour 
worked. 
Based on an extrapolation 
of 1987 benchmark. 
O’ Mahony 
(1999) 
74 72 Value added per hour 
worked. 
The total economy estimate 
is based on output per hour 
worked. 
Extrapolation of output per 





96 72 Gross output per person 
employed. 
Extrapolation of  1935 
benchmark of Broadberry 
and Fremdling (1990). 
My new 
benchmark  
79 - Value added per hour 
worked derived from 1951 
production censuses and 
labour statistics. 
See text. 
Sources: Broadberry (1998), p. 382; O’Mahony (1999), p.16; Van Ark (1990), p. 345, Van Ark 
(1993), p. 90. 
 The aggregate manufacturing productivity gap I report can be explained in two 
ways. First, Germany always demonstrated higher productivity relative to other 
advanced nations, and particularly the United Kingdom, in manufacturing than in 
agriculture or services. Data from the Conference Board on GDP per capita and 
GDP per man-hour worked indicate that the West-German economy was one-third 
less productive than the British in 1951.
31
 My benchmark indicates a notably 
smaller gap in manufacturing, but one large enough to support the above pattern 
for the economy as a whole. Second, my estimates are directly derived from 
                                                   
30 Data is drawn from: Statistisches Bundesamt, Lange Reihen, pp. 74-75; Statistisches Bundesamt 
(1975), p. 7; Central Statistical Office (1958); Department of Employment and Productivity (1971) 
Tables 25-26, and Table 138.  
31 Based on data from the Conference Board, http://www.conferenceboard.org/data/economy-
database. 
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current-price data on industrial production in 1951, and thus are unaffected by 
distortions that arise from changing relative prices in time-series extrapolations.  
 It stands out that my benchmark is closer to the estimates derived by backward 
projection from recent benchmarks. There is a substantially bigger gap between 
my estimate and that of Broadberry, which was constructed by forward projection 
from a 1935 benchmark and which measures gross output per person employed. 
Using the same specification, my benchmark for 1951 is 84, which is almost ten 
per cent below the level Broadberry has estimates for one year earlier. This finding 
suggests that changes in relative prices and the shifting weights of different 
industries were much more significant across the 1940s than during the post-war 
Golden Age that has been characterised by unprecedented macroeconomic 
stability. My estimate is also significantly different from the estimate of Van Ark, 
based on the 1967/1968 benchmark. This can be explained by the fact that he used 
market prices. As explained before, this is usually not a reliable converter.  
2.5 The revision of labour-productivity estimates for 1935  
Fremdling et al. (2007a) constructed an industry-of-origin benchmark for value 
added per worker in British and German manufacturing for the mid-1930s. They 
used the 1935 UK industry census and the archival records of the census of 
German industry, which was carried out in 1936 and published in 1939 by the 
Imperial Office of Economic Planning for Warfare.
32
 Albeit certainly the most 
meticulously constructed study on the subject to date, the estimates Fremdling and 
associates provide are inappropriate for my investigation for three reasons. One, 
they cover the German Reich within its interwar territory, and thus it cannot be 
directly compared with my 1951 benchmark. Second, the industry classification 
does not match the post-war German nomenclature that I have used. Third, the 




 In a comparative study of East and West-German labour productivity, Sleifer 
(1999) computed values for gross output, value added, employment, and labour 
productivity for all industries reported in the 1936 German industry census 
according to post-war borders. Sleifer has kindly granted me access to his data set. 
                                                   
32 Although this labour-productivity estimate is a 1935/1936 estimate I will refer to it 1935 in this 
text.  
33 In their Appendix Fremdling et al. made an estimate of the potential bias in measured productivity 
levels, where they concluded that the nr. of hours worked in the United Kingdom was 47 hours, 
versus 45 hours in Germany, which means that the labour productivity in the United Kingdom is 
overstated by roughly 4 per cent in their estimate for total manufacturing.  
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I was able to use the product matches of Fremdling et al. and the specific West-
German data on gross output, value added and employment from the Sleifer data 
set. This allowed me to calculate new industry PPPs, using the same method as for 
the 1951 estimates, and to generate a new labour-productivity benchmark for West 
Germany and Britain. Since the product matches are derived from the census that 
covered the whole of Germany, I had to assume that the average value of similar 
products in East and West Germany did not differ.   
 In total I used 229 matched products from Fremdling et al. and I was able to 
match 57 industries. Table A-1.7 in the Appendix provides more detail on the 
sources used and the adjustments I made. Table A-1.8 in the Appendix provides 
detailed information on the classification of industries. I grouped industries 
together to correspond to my 1951 benchmark, which lists 24 industry branches. In 
the process, I have excluded the aircraft industry and shipbuilding, as they do not 
appear in the 1951 benchmark for reasons explained above. Table A-1.9 in the 
Appendix provides details on the number of matched products, the coverage ratio 
and the Fisher PPP for all industries included.
34
 The number of industries 
presented in this table is substantially larger than my 24-industry classification. I 
choose to calculate the PPPs at the most disaggregate level possible, and I 
calculated the PPPs for the 24-industry classification on the basis of these 
underlying PPPs. 
 To adjust the re-estimated relative labour-productivity levels for hours 
worked, I use average weekly hours as reported in the International Labour Office 
Yearbook (International Labour Office 1939, p.44) and in the British Labour 
Statistics (Department of Employment and Productivity 1971, pp. 96-97, and pp. 
104-107), and the statistical yearbook of the German Reich (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 1940, p. 384).
35
 These data are differentiated by industry. I adjusted for 
the number of sick days and holidays; for which data are available from Huberman 
and Minns (2007, pp. 546-568). Since I do not have regionally disaggregated data 
on working hours for Germany I had to make the simplifying assumption that 
average annual hours per worker within individual industries did not differ across 
regions of the German Reich. Table A-1.10 in the Appendix presents the data on 
hours worked for 1935.      
                                                   
34 For a list of the products and UVRS used see Appendix 3 pp. 32-33 in the reseach memorandum of 
Fremdling et al. ‘Censuses compared. A new benchmark for British and German manufacturing 
1935/1936’, Groningen Growth and Development Centre.  
35 British industry was operating on a six-day workweek. In Germany, there were some variations, so 
I adjusted for daily hours from Wirtschaft und Statistik 1938, vol. 18, 5, p.187.  
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2.5.1 Labour-productivity estimates for 1935    
My revised labour-productivity estimates for the 24-industry classification is 
reported in Table 2.4. Table A-1.11 in the Appendix provides the estimates for the 
12-industry classification. In the mid-1930s West Germany had an eleven per cent 
lead over Britain in terms of value added per hour worked in manufacturing. For 
total industry the lead was even higher, since West Germany had a substantial lead 
in coal mining. The German superiority was most marked in the metallurgical 
industries, engineering and chemicals. As in 1951, the two industries where 
German manufacturers performed poorly in terms of productivity were tobacco 
and beverages. The German tobacco industry was dominated by cigar 
manufacturing which employed little capital and relied heavily on the use of 
labour, whereas cigarettes were already the dominant item in the product mix in 
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Table 2.4: Comparative labour productivity in manufacturing in the UK and West Germany 
1935 (UK =100) 
 Per worker Per hour  
Industry  Gross output Value added Gross output Value added 
Textiles  85 109 97 124 
Leather 58 84 64 93 
Footwear 77 70 83 76 
Clothing  94 102 98 106 
Iron and steel   149 135 152 138 
Non Ferrous Metals  126 144 129 146 
Fabricated Metal Products 99 112 105 119 
Vehicles  104 118 110 125 
Mechanical Engineering  111 122 109 120 
Electrical Engineering  121 143 127 150 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering 
91 104 96 109 
Tobacco  20 18 22 20 
Beverages  49 43 54 47 
Food Products  98 130 106 141 
Chemicals    116 111 121 116 
Glass 84 94 86 96 
Building Materials 76 85 78 87 
China and Earthenware  113 132 123 144 
Wood 128 143 135 151 
Timber  163 170 172 179 
Paper and Board 188 175 203 189 
Rubber and Asbestos  93 103 102 113 
Miscellaneous 63 77 70 84 
Total Manufacturing   98 107 105 115 
Coal Mining 159 119 158 119 
Total industry  101 108 109 115 
Sources: the adjustments to the  Fremdling et al. (2007a) estimate are partly based on the electronical 
database of Fremdling et al, and the Sleifer (2003) electronic database. Data on hours worked is 
obtained from the following sources: International Labour Office (1939), ‘Yearbook of labour 
statistics’, p. 44; Department of Employment and Productivity (1971), ‘British labour-statistics: 
historical abstract 1886-1968’, pp. 96-97, 104-107; Statistisches Reichsamt (1940), ‘Statistisches 
Jahrbuch 1939/1940’, p. 384; Wirtschaft und Statistik (1938), vol. 18, 5, p.187; Huberman and 
Minns (2007), pp. 546-568. 
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 When I compare my revised benchmark with the estimates of Fremdling et al., 
a few findings stand out. First, for most industries, I report higher levels of labour 
productivity. This can be explained by the higher productivity levels in West-
German industry as compared with the whole German Reich. Sleifer (2006, p. 78) 
found that East Germany was at 88.9 per cent of the West-German productivity 
level in manufacturing. Since industrial valued added for West Germany makes up 
roughly two-thirds of German industrial output in 1936, I can expect a difference 
between the benchmark for West Germany and the whole of Germany. Moreover, 
my classification is constructed to match as precisely as possible my 1951 labour-
productivity estimate. This means that I deviate in some industries from the 
classification of Fremdling et al., therefore, the results of my West-German 
estimate, and their estimates for the whole of Germany cannot directly be 
compared.  
 At the industry level, more substantial differences emerge. In textiles, 
Fremdling et al. estimate that the German Reich was at 96.7 per cent of the British 
level in terms of value added per worker. I find that West Germany was nine per 
cent more productive than the United Kingdom. This is partly the result of a 
slightly different classification of the textiles industry. Moreover, West Germany 
was more productive than East Germany in some textiles manufacturing 
industries, which also explains part of the difference.
36
 Furthermore, my PPP is a 
bit lower than the PPP calculated by Fremdling et al. This is due to the weighting 
of industries which is done with either gross output or value added. The West-
German weights are different from the weights for the complete German Reich. 
Hence, the weighting of industries in my work differs slightly form the weighting 
in the work of Fremdling et al.   
 According to my new estimates, the engineering sector reported a West-
German productivity lead of 20 per cent in terms of value added per worker. 
Fremdling et al. report a smaller gap of 12.3 per cent. This difference can be 
explained by the fact that West Germany was 12.6 per cent more productive than 
East Germany in this sector.
37
 Engineering also presents a powerful example for 
how important it is to disaggregate further than previous studies have done. 
Although I find that in the engineering sector West Germany commanded a 22 per 
cent lead in value added per man-hour worked over Britain, this average figure 
disguises substantial differences at the industry level. The gap was as large as fifty 
                                                   
36 East Germany was more productive in some of the textile branches, e.g. wool washing, flax and 
hemp roasting, and felt, however, these were all relatively small branches.  
37 Based on the electronic database of Sleifer 2003. 
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per cent in electrical engineering, but only nine per cent in optical and precision 
instruments. 
2.5.2 Time series extrapolation  
The ability to compare relative productivity levels in British and West-German 
industry in the mid-1930s and the early 1950s based on two methodologically 
consistent benchmarks enables me to assess the consequences of World War II for 
the British-German productivity race. As argued in the Introduction, an important 
added value of my work is that it does not rely on time-series extrapolations, 
which has been a major caveat of previous studies. In fact, my two benchmarks 
can be used precisely to demonstrate how much distortion time-series 
extrapolations can introduce. Distortions can be very substantial in a period 
characterised by marked structural shifts between and within industry groups and 
equally significant changes in relative prices. Generally, direct benchmark 
comparisons and time-series extrapolations should arrive at similar estimates at the 
aggregate level where inter-temporal shifts tend to balance out. However, this only 
holds when comparisons are consistent, or transitive, across time (Dalgaard and 
Sørensen 2002). 
 I expect to find much larger differences for disaggregated comparisons. To test 
this hypothesis, I apply historical time-series data on net industrial production and 
employment statistics to determine relative labour-productivity levels in British 
and West-German industry in 1951. I derive these alternative estimates by 
extrapolation from my revised 1935 benchmark. Times-series on industrial value 
added are drawn from Feinstein (1972) for the United Kingdom and from official 
industry statistics for West Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 1956c, p. 17).
38
 I 
rely on Feinstein’s estimates, which do not take into account hours worked. 
Therefore, I also do not adjust for working hours in this exercise. The time series 
constructed by Feinstein only disaggregate into seven major industry groups, I 
recalculated my benchmarks according to this classification and aggregated the 
data from the other sources up to this level. Table 2.5 reports output, employment, 





                                                   
38 Feinstein used the index of industrial production constructed by Lomax (1959). 
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Table 2.5: Index numbers for employment, value added and labour productivity in the UK and 
West Germany 1951 (1936 = 100) 
 United Kingdom West Germany 
 Y L Y/L Y L Y/L 
Mining and Quarrying 91.8 98.9 92.8 114.3 147.3 77.6 
Chemicals  205.6 188.6 109.0 147.0 169.1 86.9 
Metal Manufacturing  153.8 123.8 124.2 100.4 99.9 100.5 
Engineering and Vehicles 184.9 170.0 108.8 146.0 141.2 103.5 
Textiles, Leather & 
Clothing  
94.8 90.6 104.6 130.2 127.2 102.4 
Food, Drink and Tobacco  133.2 105.0 126.9 121.1 92.1 131.6 
Other Manufacturing  140.8 114.9 122.5 118.9 113.1 105.2 
Total Industry  147.4 123.5 119.4 129.2 121.0 106.7 
Sources: own calculations, see text for the underlying sources.  
Manufacturing value added grew much faster in Britain than in West Germany, 
where the impact of wartime destruction and war-induced dislocation was more 
extensive and more prolonged. In West Germany the labour force expanded 
rapidly due to the influx of refugees from the East to the West. The labour force in 
the Bizone area (the combination of British and American occupations) increased 
spectacularly with 17.7 per cent from 1936 to 1948 (Abelshauser 1975, p. 104). 
However, as Dumke (1990) explains, unemployment remained relatively high 
until the mid-1950s. A large number of refugees fled to the agrarian areas, whereas 
jobs were located in industrial areas.
39
  
 In both the United Kingdom and West Germany, the major war industries - 
chemicals and the engineering sector - recorded the most impressive growth rates. 
Metal manufacturing in West Germany could not surpass the 1936 production 
level until 1951, which is not surprising given the severe output targets and 
dismantlement policy prevailing in this industry until the late 1940s.
40
 
Interestingly, the mining sector expanded faster in West Germany than in Britain, 
which was primarily the effect of Allied efforts to boost coal extraction in the 
Ruhr from the early days of the occupation by expanding employment even at the 
cost of declining productivity (Abelshauser 1983, pp. 36-43). In the United 
Kingdom, despite demobilisation, employment growth remained the highest in 
                                                   
39 A shortage of housing in the industrial areas prevented an efficient reallocation of the labour force, 
which resulted in structural unemployment. From the 17.1 million houses 3.4 have been destroyed 
and another 30 per cent was severely damaged (Braun, 1990) 
40 On Allied industry plans and reparations policy in West Germany, see Plumpe 1999, pp. 31-46. 
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heavy industry. It was much more modest in light manufacturing and the food 
industries, which thus reported the highest growth rates in labour productivity.  
 The productivity figures reported in Table 2.5 are used in the next step to 
estimate relative levels of labour productivity in 1951 by extrapolation from the 
1935 benchmark. Table 2.6 compares the thus derived productivity gaps to the 
ones determined by my new post-war benchmark. As expected, the two procedures 
yield very similar results for total industry. A residual of -3.16 per cent is well 
within the margin of error. However, time-series extrapolations introduce vastly 
larger distortions at the disaggregate level. With the exception of metal 
manufacturing, I obtain double-digit percentage differences between the 
alternative estimates. West Germany remained much more productive relative to 
Britain after the war in chemicals and light manufacturing, but performed much 
worse than predicted by time-series projections in mining and the metal processing 
industries.  
Table 2.6 Alternative UK/West-German labour-productivity estimates for 1951 (UK = 100) 
 Extrapolation Benchmark Error (%) 
Mining and Quarrying 100 81 -18.79 
Total Industry  96 93 -3.16 
Chemicals and Allied Products 88 120 31.78 
Metal Manufacturing  104 97 -6.86 
Engineering and Vehicles 115 88 -28.01 
Textiles, Leather & Clothing  99 110 11.03 
Food, Drink and Tobacco  67 89 21.35 
Other Manufacturing  92 109 17.64 
Note: The benchmark figures are based on value added per person. The classification of industries 
is adjusted to match the classification of the industries in the value added and employment data. 
Thus, e.g. textiles, leather and clothing are taken together.   
Sources: own calculations, see text for the underlying sources.  
Obviously, changes in relative prices between two benchmark years will imply 
that the position of West Germany and the United Kingdom in the two 
benchmarks will differ from what is implied by the extrapolation. The time-series 
extrapolation relies on indices of output, which measure the growth rate of the 
United Kingdom and West Germany in constant prices, with a fixed underlying 
year. The two benchmark estimates I constructed are based on current prices.  
 Another issue is the reliability of the time series. First, over the course of the 
Second World War remarkable change occurred in the nature of produced items. 
Hence, comparing baskets of goods over time might be difficult. Second, there can 
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be differences in the method used in the construction of the time series for the two 
countries. For Britain I used the Feinstein index of industrial production. Feinstein 
compiled this series using different sources. He used data from the Census of 
Production for 1935 and 1948. He extrapolated 1935 to 1938 using an index of 
industrial production constructed by Lomax (1959).
41
 To extrapolate to 1964 
Feinstein used the official indices compiled by the Central Statistical Office. 
However, tying these indices together might lead to some error. The weighting of 
sub-industries is also not the same as the weighting in the German time series.  
 Another possible source of deviation can be found in the benchmarks 
themselves. In some industries the coverage of products is relatively low. 
Especially in industries that produce heterogeneous products, it is not always the 
case that a low coverage in terms of price information leads to a reliable estimate 
for the whole industry (Paige and Bombach 1959). I find the biggest deviation 
between the benchmark estimates and the time series extrapolation in the 
engineering and chemicals sectors. These are sectors that underwent considerable 
technological change over the course of the Second World War, and hence it 
might be that the time series were not sufficiently adjusted to incorporate these 
changes. Considering the construction of the time series industries, and 
considering my work to try to estimate the labour-productivity level in a consistent 
way before and after the war, I believe that my new 1951 benchmark makes an 
important addition to the currently available quantitative evidence. 
  
                                                   
41 First, Lomax does not provide the weighting system used for the different census years. Second, 
Lomax has used the output of ‘principal products’ instead of the total output of an industry. Third, in 
allowing for the output of small firms Lomax assumes the same ratio of ‘principal products’ to total 
output as for the larger firms. This assumption might be very unrealistic, as small firms tend to be 
more specialised in general.  
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2.6 A labour-productivity comparison for 1968 
In this section I will introduce a labour-productivity estimate for West Germany 
and the United Kingdom near the end of the Golden Age. Smith, Hitchens and 
Davies (1982) provide a West-German/UK productivity estimate. They report 
comparative labour productivity levels for 70 manufacturing industries for 1968.
42
  
There are a few caveats in this study that prohibit direct comparison of the 
estimates to the 1951 and 1935 estimates. The main difference between this work 
and that of Smith et al. (1982) is that they rely on British weights and prices in 
constructing their benchmark, whereas my results were obtained by using the 
Fisher index, which is the geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche index. 
Smith et al. argue that the difference between using the Laspeyres and Paasche 
index leads at the aggregate manufacturing sector only to a difference of 7 per cent 
in the productivity ratio. Using the UK prices and weights gives a larger 
productivity advantage for West Germany as compared to using German prices 
and weights. This is in line with the Gerschenkron effect described earlier. 
Although the difference might seem to be small, In sub-industries the difference 
might well exceed 7 per cent. This is a severe problem when sub-industries have a 
different product mix.        
 A second problem is that instead of using gross output and/or value added to 
weight industries, Smith et al. use employment shares. Although I expect a high 
correlation between employment shares and value added shares, there is no one-
by-one relation between these two. For 1951 for example the clothing industry 
would become twice as important in the aggregate manufacturing gap when I 
would use employment shares instead of value added shares. The importance of 
tobacco and beverages, industries with high value added in relation to employment 
would become much smaller in the aggregate. This will have profound impact on 
the aggregate gap, especially when the gaps between industries deviate 
substantially.  This implies that it will not be possible to directly compare the 1968 
labour-productivity comparison with the two estimates provided in this chapter. 
Nonetheless, given that this is the best available source near the end of the Golden 
Age, I do present the result for the 12-industry classification, however, we need to 
be cautious in interpreting the results.   
 
  
                                                   
42
 The data for Britian is derived from the 1968 census, whereas for Germany information on 1967 is used. 
Although this estimate is a 1967-1968 estimate, I will refer to it as a 1968 estimate.  
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Table 2.7: Comparative labour productivity in manufacturing industries, West Germany/UK 
1968 
 
Value added per worker Comparative 
productivity 
UK=100    
 
UK (£) Germany (£) 
Food, Drink and Tobacco  4461 4128 93 
Chemicals and Allied industries 3371 4641 138 
Metal Manufacture 1950 2702 139 
Mechanical Engineering  2011 2581 128 
Instrument Engineering 1748 1900 134 
Electrical Engineering 1826 1710 94 
Vehicles 1998 2808 141 
Textiles 1434 1748 122 
Leather 1508 1626 108 
Clothing and Footwear 1087 1062 98 
Building Materials 1957 3153 161 
Timber 1735 2773 160 
Paper and Printing 2050 3075 150 
Miscellaneous  1877 2122 113 
Total Manufacturing 2173 2678 123 
Note: the comparative productivity is calculated on the basis of UK prices. If German prices are 
used the Germany/United Kingdom aggregate manufacturing gap in labour productivity is 1.15. 
Smith et al. do not provide a Fisher index. 
Source: Smith et al. (1982), Table 10.2, pp. 122-124.  
Although a direct comparison is difficult, a few findings stand out. First, at the 
aggregate manufacturing level West Germany is 23 per cent ahead of the United 
Kingdom when UK prices are used in constructing the estimate and 15 per cent 
ahead when German prices are used. That means that Germany indeed forged 
ahead during the Golden Age and managed to command a respectable lead over 
the United Kingdom. Secondly, the lead is especially large in chemicals, metal, 
vehicles, building materials, and timber. Chemicals, metals and engineering are 
industries in which West Germany traditionally had a comparative advantage. In 
the interwar period West Germany was also outperforming the United Kingdom in 
these industries. In 1951 West Germany had lost some ground, but by 1968 West 
Germany had managed to overtake the United Kingdom and regain its position as 
leader. West Germany outperformed Britain already before the Second World War 
in the timber industry. After the war this lead became smaller, but it was still 
respectable. By 1968 the United Kingdom was outperforming West Germany in 
food, drink and tobacco, electrical engineering, and clothing and footwear.  
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Figure 2.2: Relative levels of West-German/UK labour productivity (UK = 100) 
Sources: my own labour-productivity estimates for 1935 (see Table 2.4); for 1968 estimates from 
Smith et al. (1982) pp. 122-124 are used. 
The scatter diagram in Figure 2 plots the labour-productivity levels defined as 
value added per worker of West Germany relative to Britain in 1968 relative to the 
benchmark estimates for 1935. Obviously, we should take into account that there 
are methodological differences in the two estimates, but we can assume that the 
1968 estimate provides a decent proxy for the labour-productivity level near the 
end of the Golden Age. There is a clear correlation for most industries. Electrical 
engineering is a clear outlier, in the sense that the performance of West Germany 
was much worse in 1968 as compared to 1935. If I exclude electrical engineering I 
obtain a coefficient of correlation of 0.687, which is significant at the 1 per cent 
level. Given the small sample size this is a statistically very robust finding. 
Whereas in 1935 West Germany commanded a respectable lead over the United 
Kingdom in the electrical engineering sector, this lead was lost by 1968. My 
estimates for 1951 already showed that West Germany lost some ground after the 
Second World War. But even though Britain performed very well in a comparison 
with Germany, in the literature the description of the performance of this industry 































60 80 100 120 140 160
LP1935
56 British failure? 
 
 
margin. Broadberry (1997) shows that the gap is the biggest for those industries 
that flourish under mass production techniques, such as radios and electrical 
lamps.
43
 Whereas the United States used these techniques intensively, the nature of 
British demand did not allow for this. In those industries which produced more 
customised goods Britain was performing somewhat better and the gap was 
smaller. The reason that the West-German productivity is below the British level is 
that West Germany was restricted by a small home market (Broadberry 1997). In 
the next section I will explore the relative labour-productivity developments in the 
engineering sector in more detail.  
 Another surprise might be that the food industry in West Germany is lagging 
behind only a bit. In the literature the food industry has traditionally been seen as a 
relatively well performing industry in Britain (Broadberry 1997). Broadberry 
concluded that over the interwar period British firms followed a successful 
strategy of adopting mass production techniques. Germany’s demand patterns 
prohibited the adoption of the American mass production techniques, and hence, 
Britain commanded a respectable lead in the food, drink and tobacco industry. I 
estimated that the labour productivity level of West Germany, defined as value 
added per person, was at 65 per cent of the British level by 1935. For 1951 I found 
that West Germany improved its position, and its productivity level was at 89 per 
cent of the British level. The estimates of Smith et al. (1982, p.122) suggest that by 
1968 West Germany’s productivity was at 94 per cent of the British level.  
 In 1968 the United Kingdom is performing especially well, as compared with 
West Germany, in sugar, grain milling, and biscuits.
44
 In the sugar industry Britain 
was already much more productive than West Germany before the war.
45
 The 
British Tate and Lyle pursued a vertical integration strategy and became an 
international player in the global sugar market in the early post-war period 
(Broadberry 1997, p. 366). West Germany was out-competing Britain in animal 
and poultry foods, the dairy industry, and the vegetable, animal fats and margarine 
industry. The productivity advantage for West Germany in these industries was 
respectively 47 per cent, 82 per cent and, 21 per cent (Smith et al. p.122). Whereas 
both before and after the Second World War Britain had a very respectable lead in 
the tobacco industry, it has lost this advantage by 1968. Smith et al. (1982, p.122) 
report a productivity level of 1.14 in the advantage of West Germany. This is 
                                                   
43 See Broadberry (1997) Table 12 and Table 15 on p. 317 and p. 335. 
44 The comparative productivity ratio of Germany over the United Kingdom is 0.49 for sugar, 0.66 
for grain milling, and 0.82 for biscuits.  
45 I calculated that Germany was at 35 per cent of the British level in terms of value added per 
person. 
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mainly the result of a composition effect. The highly-labour intensive cigar sector, 
which was very large in West Germany, declined and cigarettes became more 
important (Broadberry 1997, p. 363). Hence, West Germany was able to overtake 
the British productivity level. At the same time however, Britain’s performance in 
this industry was disappointing. According to Prais (1981) this was the result of 
the poor performance of Imperial Tobacco.  
 When I consider the massive gap in labour productivity in tobacco for the pre-
and post-war period, I must conclude that Britain is performing relatively very 
well in the other food industries by 1968. In 1951 Britain was more than 5 times as 
productive as West Germany in the tobacco industry. Considering the relative 
importance of this industry in total value added this had a substantial impact on the 
total gap in food, drinks and tobacco.  
 Although West Germany almost closed the gap in the food industry near the 
end of the Golden Age, I can conclude that Britain did not lose ground in the 
productivity performance of the food industry. The food industry remained one of 
only a few industries in which its relative productivity level is higher than in West 
Germany.   
 The new labour-productivity estimate for 1935, 1951 and the estimate of 
Smith et al. for 1968 reveal some interesting developments of the labour-
productivity gaps. In Chapter 3 I will discuss the potential underlying causes of 
these gaps in more detail. In the next section, however, I will already discuss one 
important industry, the engineering sector. The reason for this is that the relative 
labour-productivity performance of this sector might have come as a surprise.   
2.7 Engineering: Germany’s top performer or the shining light 
of British industry?  
If we evaluate the productivity performance of West Germany in the engineering 
sector, we observe that by 1968 it was not outperforming Britain to the same 
extent as in some other industries, such as chemicals, or metal manufactures. At 
first, this may seem striking as West-German engineering firms were fiercely 
competitive and had been forcing their British rivals out of world markets since 
the early 1950s. German historiography provides ample material to unravel this 
paradox. In the post-war reconstruction phase, West-German engineering firms 
had no incentive either on the supply or on the demand side to strive for technical 
innovation. First, large efficiency gains could be achieved through a more efficient 
allocation of available factor endowments and through the elimination of stringent 
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market regulations and state-sponsored monopolies that characterised the economy 
of Nazi Germany. Therefore, manufacturers had no incentive to increase their 
production costs by boosting their R&D expenditure and hence became less 
competitive in the short run. Second, after two decades of depressed consumption, 
the war-torn German society had an insatiable thirst for traditional manufacturing 
goods, particularly consumer durables. In 1950, three out of four households had 
coal heating and only 7 per cent of them were equipped with an electrical stove. 
By 1958, only every fifth family owned a refrigerator, and there was substantial 
pent-up demand for simple household appliances as well as furniture and textile 
products (Weimer 1998, p116). The life of the average working class family 
during the 1950s did not, in any way, mirror a matured consumer society (Wildt 
1993).          
 Stokes (1991) argues that although some technological systems were relatively 
new after the war, the actual machinery was often worn out and most firms were 
unable to invest in new machinery as a result of Allied restrictions and limited 
availability of machinery. However, companies succeeded in using these older 
technologies and machines to capture export markets, and the proceeds from sales 
were gradually invested in new technologies.     
 The restocking of industrial plants in countries plundered under German 
occupation during the war meant that the engineering industries could also thrive 
on external markets by effectively producing at the technological level of the 
1930s. In heavy equipment, firms were still exporting old coal furnaces and steam-
powered locomotives.         
 The darling of the automobile industry remained the Volkswagen ‘Beetle’. 
Volkswagen provides a clear example of how West-German manufactures held on 
to old technologies directly after the Second World War. Volkswagen’s managers 
used existing technology and pre-war machinery to rebuild the Beetle, of which 
the design changed hardly from the pre-war version. Volkswagen was able to take 
advantage of the explosion of demand, both in Germany and abroad, during the 
1950s (Turner 1985, pp. 293-299).
46
 After the war Volkswagen experienced a 
shortage of labourers, since during the war many people from occupied nations 
were set to work in the factories, and they left when the war ended in 1945. After 
the war the refugees from the former Ostgebiete were employed (Turner 1985). 
 Finally, in metal products, mechanical and precision engineering, production 
scale was generally insufficient for standardised mass production (Radkau 1993). 
                                                   
46 It must be noted that after the sales success of the early 1950s Volkswagen started to invest heavily 
in new plant and technical improvement, which did not lead to rises in the price of the cars (Seherr-
Thoss 1979, as cited in Stokes, 1991, p.12). 
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In these strongly export-oriented industries, West Germany had long specialised in 
skilled-labour intensive, high value-added differentiated products, which were 
flexibly designed to customer needs (Berghoff 2006). Firms continued to 
concentrate on product rather than process innovation. Since quality engineering 
goods sold under the lucrative ‘Made in Germany’ label faced highly income 
elastic demand in both domestic and international markets, their producers 
managed to maintain high profitability without having to make significant real 
efficiency gains (Ambrosius 1993). This can be illustrated by observing the import 
structure in the machinery and vehicle industry in the US. Between 1948 and 1952 
the share of imports from a group of European countries (including: Austria, 
Denmark, France, Great Britain, Norway, Italy and Switzerland) declined from 
almost 40 per cent to 26 per cent, and at the same time the share of West-German 
exports rapidly increased from 4 to almost 25 per cent.
 47
    
 The majority of West Germany’s export goods are represented by 
sophisticated traditional investment goods, such as machinery and electrical 
equipment, automobiles and chemicals and pharmaceutical products (Fischer 
1978). These are the products in which West Germany had already a long-
established comparative advantage. The strength of Germany’s manufacturing 
sector in the post-war period, and specifically those industries in which it was 
exporting heavily, was not so much its technological superiority, but its capability 
to produce a wide variety of products and the flexibility of the supply.   
 A possible explanation for Germany’s disappointing performance in the 
engineering sector at the end of the Golden Age is that it has been heavily affected 
by the coal crisis of 1958. From the end of the Second World War until the mid-
1950s Germany’s mining sector expanded rapidly. Coal production almost 
quadrupled during this period.
48
 However, after the 1958 coal crisis there was a 
transition of European fuel consumption from coal to liquid hydrocarbons. The 
coal crisis was the result of multiple factors. The price of imported coal, and 
specifically coal from the US, was substantially lower than the price of 
domestically produced coal (Storchmann 2005). Furthermore, the rapid 
development of the oil industry in the Middle East, combined with the fall in 
transportation costs as result of the reopening of the Suez-Canal, resulted in fierce 
competition from oil. Coal demand declined as a result.  This development was 
detrimental for heavy equipment manufacturers in West Germany as it depressed 
demand for several of their key products, such as coal furnaces, railway 
                                                   
47 Data taken from Buchheim 1993, pp.80-81. 
48 In 1945 production was 38.9 million tons of oil equivalents, and by 1956 this was over 150 million 
tons of oil equivalents (Storchmann 2005, p. 1472). 
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locomotives and rolling stock, and coal mining equipment. As the most capital 
intensive and thus most productive segment of mechanical engineering was 
shrinking throughout the 1960s, labour-productivity growth for the industry as a 
whole was bound to slow down.       
 Britain also experienced a transition in energy usage. Before the First World 
War the coal industry was the single biggest employer in the United Kingdom 
(Dintenfass 1992). Coal was an energy source of major importance and used in 
factories, the iron and steel industry, electric power stations, households, 
steamships and so on (Turnheim & Geels 2013). However, after the First World 
War there was a decline in coal usage until demand increased again during the 
reconstruction boom after the Second World War, when coal was designated a 
strategic fuel (Turnheim & Geels 2012). During the second half of the 1950s 
demand for coal dropped as a result of competition from other fuels such as 
petroleum.
49
 After 1957 markets further declined, with an increase in this process 
after 1965 when the White Paper on Fuel Policy was presented. Obviously, this 
had some pronounced effects on British industry and the type of machinery used.   
2.7.1 The engineering sector: the shining light of British industry? 
Now that we have seen that West Germany was not performing as well in 
engineering as usually assumed it is time to evaluate how Britain performed. As 
Edgerton (1994) claims there is a long tradition of declinist historiography that 
insists that Britain is characterised by a lack of enthusiasm for science and 
technology since the end of the nineteenth century. According to Edgerton, British 
relative economic decline cannot be blamed on failure in research and 
development in civil technologies, as R&D spending in the United Kingdom was 
higher than in other countries in the 1960s.      
 In the literature on Britain’s economic decline the car industry is often used as 
an example of an industry that performed very well in the early post-war year. 
Britain was the leading car exporter in the world in the late 1940s (Millward 
1994). During the 1950s the British car industry was booming (Edgerton 1994; 
Nickell & Van Reenen 2001). The industry was dominated by three domestically 
owned companies, British Motor Corporations, Rootes and Standard. Additionally 
Ford and Vauxhall, American owned, played an important role. 
 Government policy after the Second World War was geared towards 
increasing export in cars, because there was a fragile balance of payment position 
(Broadberry 1997). An example of this is the control on steel supply. Firms who 
                                                   
49 Petroleum usage tripled between 1960 and 1973 (Turnheim and Geels 2012, p. 41)  
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exported a large part of their production could obtain access to steel. One 
important difference between Austin, Leylands and Rover, and Standard Motors, 
is that Austin, Leyland and Rover maintained a diversified model range, and they 
only selected mass production to generate larger variety, whereas Standard Motors 
focuses on standardised vehicles, using only one type of engine (Zeitlin 2004). By 
1958 the British Motor Corporation managed to produce half a million vehicles 
with the same value of net assets as Ford, who used American production 
techniques, but only produced 300.000 vehicles (Milward 1984).
50
 After the war 
the United States could quickly increase its production once the steel shortage in 
the United States was solved, and also in continental Europe the production was 
increased again (Broadberry 1997). Moreover, Britain’s failure to become a 
member of the European Economic Community resulted in considerable trade 
barriers for exactly that part of the world which was the fastest growing mass car 
market in the world (Nickell & Van Reenen). So if there was failure in this 
industry, we should not only look for it in the manufacturing process itself, but 
rather in the policy decisions made by the government.     
 Even though Britain could not match productivity levels of the United States, 
Booth (2003) still considers engineering to be the shining light of British industry 
since it was the industry that was very successful in closing the gap with the 
United States. According to the labour-productivity estimates of Smith et al. 
(1982, p.119) the US/UK comparative labour-productivity level was 2.26 for 
mechanical engineering, 3.66 for instrument engineering, and 2.66 for electrical 
engineering in 1968. For overall manufacturing they report a ratio of 2.76. Hence, 
mechanical engineering and electrical engineering are performing a bit better than 
average as compared to the US. Paige and Bombach (1959) reported for 1950 a 
US/UK labour productivity level of 3.22. Although we should be careful in 
directly comparing the results of Paige and Bombach and Smith et al., we can see 
that there was clearly some catch-up in the engineering sector throughout the long 
boom. The engineering sector provides a clear example of why it is crucial to 
evaluate manufacturing performance at the industry level. Only by examining 
productivity changes at the level of the industry are we able to investigate the 
deeper causes of productivity differences.  
                                                   
50 British Motor Corporation was a merger of Austin and Morris.  
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2.8 Summary and conclusions  
In this chapter I presented new labour-productivity comparisons which are 
superior to other labour-productivity comparisons for these periods for several 
reasons. All existing estimates for these two countries have been derived by 
extrapolation from distant benchmarks using time-series data, which do not take 
account of inter-temporal changes in relative prices and product weights. As for 
the mid 1930s, the currently available benchmarks all report relative levels of 
labour productivity for Britain and Germany within their interwar borders, and 
thus are not directly comparable with post-war productivity data. I use real values 
to calculate my productivity levels. This method is preferred over methods where 
for example physical output is used. I report a substantially revised benchmark for 
1935, drawing on the work of Fremdling et al. (2007a), but assuring territorial and 
methodological consistency with my 1951 benchmark. I use a consistent industry 
classification throughout the pre- and post-war benchmark which makes them 
directly comparable.  This enables me to adjust my estimates for hours worked, 
which is of substantial importance in the period after the Second World War when 
there was a substantial difference in the amount of hours worked between West 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Finally, I present the most disaggregate 
benchmark, which allows me to reveal productivity differences at a lower level of 
aggregation.        
 In the mid-1930s, West Germany commanded a respectable lead over the 
United Kingdom in industrial labour productivity. West Germany appeared to be 
especially productive in metallurgy.  By the early 1950s, this pattern has been 
completely reversed. Relative to the corresponding British level, value added per 
hour worked in West Germany industry had declined by thirty per cent between 
1935 and 1951. Britain overtook the lead in almost all industries; however, West 
Germany was still more productive in the iron and steel industry. The labour-
productivity estimates which entail pre- and post-war Britain and West Germany 
allow me to analyse the causes of the productivity gap and the impact of the 
Second World War in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
 
  Chapter 3
Winning the war, losing the peace? 
A comparative analysis of labour 
productivity in British and West-
German industry
 
3.1 Introduction  
The allegedly poor performance of British manufacturing is seen by some as a 
major cause of the relatively disappointing economic performance of Britain in the 
second half of the twentieth century (See Broadberry and Crafts 1992, 1996, 2001, 
Crafts 1996). Britain is commonly compared to West Germany in economic 
history studies, and there has been disagreement on the popular notion of Britain’s 
relative economic decline vis-à-vis West Germany after 1950. While German 
scholars have emphasised the role of the post-war output gap in German super-
growth, the recent British literature crystallised around the manufacturing failure 
hypothesis of Broadberry and Crafts.  
 In this chapter I offer a comprehensive reassessment of the relative 
productivity performance of Britain relative to West-German industry both before 
and after the outbreak of the Second World War, and in the subsequent decades, 
which are well-known as the Golden Age of economic growth for Westerns 
Europe. Clearly, as discussed in Chapter 1, the United Kingdom was bound to 
achieve more modest growth rates in industrial productivity as compared with 
West Germany, as it was closer to the productivity frontier after the war. However, 
                                                   
 I greatly acknowledge the extremely helpful discussions with Tamas Vonyó. 
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annual growth rates were still substantially lower than what should have been 
feasible based on the convergence hypothesis (Bean and Crafts 1996; Crafts 
1995a; Crafts 1992).
 
De Jong and Woltjer (2011) showed that at the end of the 
nineteenth century the United States has a labour productivity lead of around twice 
the level of the United Kingdom. By 1950 the United States had only increased 
this lead, and De Jong and Woltjer did not find a narrowing of the gap before the 
Second World War.    
 I argue that an important reason which made British productivity growth look 
inevitably inferior in a West-German comparison is the war-induced gap between 
actual and potential output, which is greatly emphasised by German scholars who 
argued that it was the chief catalyst of the Wirtschaftswunder.
1
 The so-called 
reconstruction thesis was confirmed econometrically in cross-country 
investigations by both Dumke (2000) and Vonyó (2008).   
 It is important to distinguish between decline and failure. Whereas an 
industry’s decline can be measured by a decreasing share in employment, and 
lower output, failure is much more subjective. My dissertation makes an important 
contribution to the literature on Britain’s relative economic decline by clearly 
distinguishing between these two terms, which are sometimes used 
indistinguishably in the literature.      
 In this reassessment, I take into account both catch-up and reconstruction 
growth, and discuss their contribution to the relative economic decline of Britain 
during the Golden Age. My approach requires additional data that go beyond the 
currently available time-series evidence on productivity growth. In the previous 
chapter, I constructed two new methodologically consistent disaggregated labour-
productivity comparisons for West Germany and the United Kingdom. These 
estimates allow me to evaluate how far West Germany lagged behind Britain in 
industrial labour productivity at the start of the Golden Age and how large an 
impact World War II made on the productivity race between the two economies.  
 The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
changing fortunes in industry. The first part of this section focuses on the 
comparative productivity performance of the United Kingdom relative to West 
Germany. I use shift-share analysis and decomposition analysis to determine the 
industry-origins of the reversal of fortunes in the British-German productivity race 
across World War II. The second part of Section 2 deals with the changing 
                                                   
1 The reconstruction thesis is attributed to Jánossy 1969. On its implication for West-German 
economic growth in the 1950s, see Abelshauser 2004, and Eichengreen and Ritschl 2009, among 
others. 
Winning the war, losing the peace? 65 
 
position of industries within Britain. I provide a detailed discussion on the 
productivity performance of the British textiles industry over the course of the 
twentieth century. This industry provides a perfect example of the difference 
between relative decline and failure. Section 3 deals with the German 
Wirtschaftswunder and the role of reconstruction in the difference in productivity 
levels attained by West Germany and Britain. I discuss the post-war reconstruction 
period and the consequences for British relative economic decline. In order to do 
so I combine my benchmarks with time-series data to account for the role of the 
war-induced productivity gap in German super-growth. I show that Britain’s 
relative decline in the 1950s cannot be attributed to British manufacturing failure. 
If at any time during the post-war Golden Age, such failure can be observed in the 
1960s only. In Section 4, I investigate the potential explanations for the alleged 
poor performance of British industry, focussing on the application of 
Americanisation and mass production techniques, and human capital endowments. 
Section 5 concludes.  
3.2 Changing fortunes  
The pre- and post-war labour-productivity estimates for Britain and West 
Germany allow me to investigate, at disaggregate levels the economic 
consequences of the Second World War for manufacturing industries in Britain 
and West Germany. Unfortunately, not many statistics on productivity and 
performance are available for the war period, which hugely complicates 
calculating any measure of labour productivity. Estimating labour productivity for 
individual industries is especially problematic due to the lack of reliable price 
information, and estimates of output of separate industries. Broadberry and 
Howlett (1998) made an attempt to calculate labour-productivity levels for Britain 
during the period 1939-1946. They use GDP per head as an indicator of labour 
productivity, and are able to show that by 1946 the level of GDP per employee is 
only 3.8 per cent higher than it was by 1938, which seems to be a relatively small 
increase, when compared to peacetime standards (Broadberry and Howlett 1998, 
p.44-46).
 2
 Most of the exceptional growth of productivity in Western Europe 
materialised after the war. 
 This section focusses on shifting fortunes at the disaggregate industry level. 
Knowing how the British-German productivity race advanced over the course of 
the Second World War is of substantial importance for the debate on failure and 
                                                   
2 For literature on the performance and problems of economies during the war see e.g. Harrison 
1998; Milward 1977; and Ránki 1993. 
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relative economic decline in British manufacturing. As discussed in Chapter 1, I 
expect that part of Britain’s disappointing growth performance in industry is 
simply the effect of the so-called inevitable causes, such as structural change, and 
less potential for catch-up, convergence and reconstruction growth. Therefore, I 
assess at the disaggregate industry level how British and West-German 
manufacturing industries performed before and after the Second World War. This 
allows us to evaluate whether there was room for catch-up and reconstruction 
growth in West Germany, and whether this implies that Britain was bound to have 
lower growth rates. If so, this would imply that there is not necessarily failure in 
the British economy.  
3.2.1 The structural component of the aggregate productivity gap 
The greatest merit of disaggregated productivity comparisons is that they allow us 
to measure the contribution of individual industries to and the role of structural 
effects in the productivity performance of different economies. I conduct a shift-
share analysis to evaluate which were the most important drivers of the labour-
productivity gap between Britain and West Germany, structural differences within 
industry, or different labour-productivity levels across industrial branches.  
3.2.1.1 Shift-share analysis  
Shift-share analysis has been developed to distinguish between sector- (or region) 
specific and inter-sectoral (or inter-regional) effects in accounting for aggregate 
patterns. Shift-share techniques were pioneered in the 1960s and have since been 
used in different applications, mostly in regional studies of employment 
expansion. The specific formulas that I employ to measure the contribution of 
structural shifts to the aggregate labour-productivity gap are taken from a 
comparative study of Jaap Sleifer (2006, p.60) on East and West-German 
economic development.
3
 Sleifer applies two different specifications, a static model 
and a dynamic model.  
 















𝐷)                                       [3.1] 
 
                                                   
3 Sleifer derived the equations from Timmer 1999, p102-105.  
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 In the static model, the aggregate labour-productivity gap between the two 
countries is explained by (1) an intra-sector effect that accounts for differences in 
labour-productivity levels within each industry assuming equal shares in total 
labour input, and (2) a shift effect that measures the impact of structural 
advantages on aggregate productivity performance assuming equal branch-specific 
labour-productivity levels. In the above equation, the shift effect will be positive if 
high-productivity industries have a larger share in total labour input, measured by 
hours worked, in Britain than in West Germany. 
 The dynamic model is typically used in inter-temporal investigations, but it 




𝐿𝑃𝑈𝐾 − 𝐿𝑃𝐷 = ∑ (𝐿𝑃𝑖
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𝐷)                                                         [3.2] 
 In the dynamic model the aggregate labour-productivity gap between the two 
countries is explained by three factors. The first is an intra-sector effect that 
accounts for differences in labour-productivity levels within each industry 
assuming that both countries have equal labour shares, in this case the West-
German share. The second effect is a static shift effect that measures the impact of 
structural advantages on aggregate productivity performance assuming equal 
branch-specific labour-productivity levels, in this case the West-German 
productivity level. The third effect is a dynamic shift effect that accounts for 
differences in the labour share of those industries where the branch-specific 
productivity levels differ most between the two countries. Thus, the first part 
considers the intra-branch effect and parts 2 and 3 combined measure the 
structural change effect.  
 The dynamic shift effect of the above equation will be positive if Britain has 
larger shares in total labour input than West Germany in those industries where it 
has an advantage in labour productivity, or smaller labour shares in those 
industries where it is lagging behind in terms of productivity.  
 I use value added per hour worked as a measure of labour productivity in this 
analysis. Table 3.1 reports the results that I have obtained by running the two 
specifications on my benchmark data sets.  
  
                                                   
4
 Although it might be somewhat unusual to call an analysis on a cross section dynamic, the name is used her 
since this type of shift-share analysis is commonly known as the dynamic shift share model.  
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Table 3.1: Decomposing the aggregate labour-productivity gap between United Kingdom and 
German industry 1935 and 1951 
 Percentage of labour-productivity gap explained by: 
 Intra-sector 
effect 
Shift effect  Total effect 
1935 76.78 23.22  100 
1951 87.73 12.27  100 
 Percentage of labour-productivity gap explained by: 
 Intra-sector 
effect 
Static shift Dynamic shift Total effect 
1935 79.86 26.29 -6.16 100 
1951 92.41 16.95 -9.37 100 
Note: The effects are expressed as percentages of the aggregate productivity gap. I excluded 
tobacco from the analysis since there is an extreme difference in labour productivity in this 
industry, and this is the result of the different commodities produced.   
Source: Calculations based on labour-productivity estimates as calculated in Chapter 2. See Table 2.1 
and Table 2.4 for the underlying sources.  
In the static model I find for 1935 that the positive intra-sector effect explains 
76.78 per cent of the gap, and the positive shift effect explains 23.22 per cent. The 
positive shift effect indicates that Britain had a higher share of its hours worked 
devoted to industries with high productivity levels. This effect accounts for almost 
a quarter of the productivity difference between the two countries. A positive 
intra-sector effect explains almost 90 per cent of the variation in labour-
productivity in 1951, the impact of the shift effect is just over ten per cent. Hence, 
after the Second World War there were minor differences in the employment 
structure within industry in the two countries. Structural differences were more 
important in the pre-war period.  
 The result of the dynamic analysis indicates for both years a small negative 
dynamic shift effect.
5
 Apparently West Germany had larger shares as compared 
with Britain in those industries were Britain had the advantage, and Britain had 
larger shares in those industries were it did not have an advantage. Britain could 
have had a larger lead over West Germany if it had a different industry structure. 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below presents the allocation of total hours worked in 
manufacturing and the share of value added in both West Germany and Britain for 
                                                   
5 In equation 3.2, I employ the West-German labour share and labour productivity level. Obviously, 
it is possible to rewrite this formula and use the shares of the United Kingdom. For 1951 the results 
change slightly, the intra-sector effect accounts for 83.04 per cent of the total gap, the static-shift 
effect accounts for 7.59 per cent, and the dynamic-shift accounts for 9.37 per cent. For 1935 these 
shares become respectively 73.71, 20.14 and 6.16. Hence, my main conclusion that the intra-sector 
effect is most crucial in explaining the UK/West-German labour-productivity gap remains valid.  
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the 24 industries covered in the labour-productivity estimates for both 1935 and 
1951.  
 For 1951 we see that Britain had a lower share of total employment in some 
industries were it had the productivity advantage, such as non-ferrous metals, 
building materials and woodworking. This contributed to the negative dynamic 
shift. West Germany had a larger share of employment in some industries were it 
had the lead, such as chemicals, glass, timber and paper, which also contributed to 
a negative dynamic shift effect for Britain. For 1935 we find that Britain had a 
larger share in textiles, even though West Germany had a productivity lead in this 
industry. Moreover, West Germany had a much higher share of labour employed 
in the iron and steel industry, where it had a substantial advantage over Britain. As 
a result we observe a negative dynamic shift effect for 1935.  
 When we compare the pre- and post-war analysis we observe not much 
difference in the effects over time. Most important is that we see that the 
employment structure became more equal after the war than before the war. This 
implies that structural changes played a more important role in explaining the 
difference in aggregate productivity before the war. In both years the intra-sector 
effect appeared to be the single most important determinant of the aggregate 
labour-productivity difference. This result, combined with the large variation in 
labour-productivity differences over industries we found in Chapter 2 reveals that 
indeed we should analyse Britain’s performance at the disaggregate industry level. 
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Table 3.2: Distribution of value added and hours worked in manufacturing in West Germany 
and the United Kingdom in 1935 
 
Percentage share in total value 
added 









Coal Mining 7.59 10.49 9.60 12.82 
Textiles 8.35 12.75 12.34 19.02 
Leather 1.26 0.89 1.75 0.94 
Footwear 0.94 1.68 1.92 2.13 
Clothing 1.82 5.09 2.96 7.16 
Iron and Steel 17.02 7.84 14.81 7.67 
Non Ferrous Metals 2.75 2.44 2.05 2.17 
Fabricated Metal Products 2.16 1.70 2.60 2.00 
Vehicles 4.50 5.38 4.20 5.13 
Mechanical Engineering 11.55 8.20 11.43 7.93 
Electrical engineering 7.69 4.80 5.98 4.54 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering 
1.69 0.63 1.90 0.62 
Beverages 3.80 10.25 1.85 1.91 
Food  4.78 6.60 4.89 7.73 
Chemicals 6.25 7.40 3.17 3.54 
Glass 0.68 0.88 0.83 0.85 
Building Materials 5.65 2.86 6.87 2.47 
China and Earthenware 0.87 0.78 1.19 1.26 
Woodworking 3.58 1.96 3.46 2.34 
Timber 2.51 1.15 1.87 1.25 
Paper  2.57 2.29 2.17 2.97 
Rubber and Asbestos 1.34 1.45 1.22 1.21 
Miscellaneous 0.66 2.46 0.93 2.35 
Source: own calculations, see Table 2.4 for the underlying sources. 
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Table 3.3: Distribution of value added and hours worked in manufacturing in West Germany 
and the United Kingdom in 1951 
 
Percentage share in total 
value added 











Coal Mining 6.59 7.89 10.29 11.47 
Textiles 15.40 15.72 11.84 13.38 
Leather 1.42 0.86 1.16 0.67 
Footwear 1.29 1.12 1.76 1.53 
Clothing 2.17 3.33 4.25 5.79 
Iron and Steel 9.55 7.73 7.58 7.90 
Non Ferrous Metals 1.95 2.01 1.84 1.65 
Fabricated Metal Products 1.32 2.91 3.20 3.32 
Vehicles 5.05 5.08 5.10 5.20 
Mechanical Engineering 10.50 10.55 11.87 11.95 
Electrical engineering 4.39 6.94 6.30 8.46 
Optical and Precision Engineering 1.74 0.98 2.03 1.20 
Beverages 3.95 8.84 1.49 1.80 
Food  7.88 6.47 4.91 6.70 
Chemicals 9.81 6.45 6.72 4.83 
Glass 1.28 0.82 1.25 1.01 
Building Materials 3.23 1.96 5.06 2.17 
China and Earthenware 0.81 0.79 1.50 1.21 
Woodworking 2.81 1.66 4.25 2.26 
Timber 2.04 0.96 2.12 1.28 
Paper  4.77 3.52 2.75 2.57 
Rubber and Asbestos 1.14 1.66 1.33 1.63 
Miscellaneous 0.91 1.75 1.33 1.98 
Source: own calculations, see Table 2.1 for the underlying sources. 
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3.2.1.2 Decomposition analysis 
In this section, I employ simple analytical tools to decompose the aggregate 
labour-productivity gap that I have estimated between Britain and West Germany 
in 1951, into industry contributions and the impact of structural differences. These 
structural components, in turn, do not only help to better explain the aggregate 
productivity gap at the start of the post-war Golden Age. They also have important 
implications for the comparative growth performance of the two nations in the 
manufacturing sector during the Golden Age itself. The initial productivity gap 
can indicate the difference in the distance to the world frontier and thus in the 
scope for catch-up growth, whereas differences in the relative weight of high- or 
low-productivity industries in the two economies can also explain trends of 
divergence between their subsequent growth paths.    
 My benchmarks are of higher quality than previously published estimates and 
they are much more disaggregated. This disaggregation allows for a 
decomposition study. Decomposition techniques are frequently used in 
disaggregated growth accounts to exploit the richness of data in order to gain a 
better understanding of the aggregate growth processes. The exact specification is 
derived from the recent work of Timmer and associates (2010, p.153-154).
6
 I 
modified their model slightly, in order to make it applicable to cross-sectional 
examination. Aggregate nominal value added (Y) is defined as the sum of nominal 
value added (Z) over all industries (j). 
𝑃𝑦𝑌 = ∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗                [3.3]  
Labour productivity in a given industry (j) is, in turn, computed as value added in 
the respective industry divided by the number of employees or labour hours (L). 
𝑧𝑗 = 𝑍𝑗 𝐿𝑗⁄                 [3.4] 
Aggregate labour productivity is defined as a weighted average of labour-
productivity levels in all industries, where the weights represent the share of 
industry (j) in value added. 
𝑌
𝐿⁄ = ∑ 𝑣𝑍,𝑗
𝑌
𝑗 𝑧𝑗                    [3.5] 
 
                                                   
6 The authors applied the above model to decompose GDP growth. 




In a comparative framework, the aggregate labour-productivity gap between two 
countries can be decomposed into a set of industry contributions, where the 
industry-specific benchmarks are weighted by the average of their value added 
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The residual, which in disaggregated growth accounts is referred to as the 
reallocation effect, measures the contribution of differences between the two 
countries in the composition of their labour input to the aggregate labour-
productivity gap. It is positive whenever industries with above-average levels of 
labour productivity have a larger weight in the country of the numerator (A). 
Table 3.4: Decomposing aggregate labour productivity in West-German industry (UK =100) 
 1935 1951 
Aggregate labour productivity (24 industries) 111.5 85.1 
Industry contributions 117.4 90.7 
Residual -5.9 -5.6 
Sources: see text.  
 Table 3.4 reports the results obtained by this decomposition for my two 
benchmarks for industrial value added per hour worked. Note that the aggregate 
labour productivity reported here is the total labour productivity level of the 24 
industries, whereas the aggregate labour productivities reported in Chapter 2 were 
for the whole industrial sector. The total manufacturing gap reported in Chapter 2 
includes additional industries, therefore, the two numbers are not exactly the same, 
albeit they are very close. Table 3.4 confirms that neither the gap between the two 
countries in total industrial labour productivity nor the shifting of their relative 
positions between the mid-1930s and the early 1950s can be explained by 
structural differences within the industrial sector. Individual industry contributions 
would have produced very similar results had the two economies exhibited exactly 
the same industry weights in manufacturing employment. British industry had a 
small structural advantage in both periods, meaning that its productivity level 
relative to West Germany would have been slightly smaller in both 1935 and 1951 
based on the individual industry contributions alone. However, this advantage 
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amounted to only a few percentage points. This finding is in line with the results 
from the shift-share analysis, where I found a positive static shift effect, which was 
larger than the negative dynamic shift effect.  
 There is an important contribution that this decomposition analysis can make 
though. The decomposition allows us to reveal the impact of individual industries 
on the aggregate productivity gap. Figure 3.1 depicts the contributions of 
individual industries to the aggregate labour-productivity gap between West 
Germany and the United Kingdom on a horizontal bar chart. The bars represent 
the percentage point deviation of the productivity levels attained in each industry 
in West Germany from the corresponding British levels, weighted by the average 
share of the respective industries in total manufacturing value added between the 
two countries. The diagram confirms that Britain had managed to establish a lead 
in almost all industries by 1951, even in sectors where West Germany was clearly 
superior before World War II. I can observe major shifts in the relative importance 
of the different industries in explaining the change of fortunes in the British-
German productivity race. The main reason for West Germany’s falling behind 
was clearly the sharp deterioration of its productivity position in the principal war 
industries: iron and steel, metal products, machine tools and transport vehicles, 
electrical engineering and chemicals. In iron and steel, chemicals, and textiles, 
West Germany managed to preserve some of its vast superiority, but even here, 
British industry had closed most of the pre-war gap. West Germany’s relative 
position had improved across the war only in the glass industry, paper and board, 
and in food products.  
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Figure 3.1: Industry contributions to the aggregate manufacturing labour-productivity gaps 
 
Source: own calculations based on labour-productivity estimates calculated in Chapter 2. See Table 
2.1 and Table 2.4 for underlying sources.  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the tobacco industry is a special case. The already sizeable 
British productivity lead in the 1930s increased after the war due to the fact that 
technological shift from cigar to cigarette production explained in the previous 
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sections was faster than in West Germany. The mass demand for cigarettes born 
out of wartime experience all over Europe also meant that both the actual volume 
and the price of tobacco products relative to other manufactures had increased 
substantially across the war. The average share of the tobacco industry in total 
manufacturing value added between the two countries jumped from a mere 2.6 per 
cent in 1935 to 8.4 per cent in 1951. Figure 1 shows that over half of the aggregate 
German productivity lag in 1951 was the contribution of the tobacco industry. In 
fact, with the exclusion of tobacco manufactures, labour productivity in West-
German relative to British industry would increase from 85 per cent to 92 per cent. 
This finding provides a perfect example for how helpful decomposition techniques 
are in explaining aggregate growth processes or, in this case, comparative 
industrial performance. In the next section I focus on shifting fortunes and 
changing positions of industries within Britain. 
3.2.2 Shifting fortunes in Britain  
In this section I evaluate how the productivity performance of individual industries 
within Britain evolved over time. Until this point, I have been focusing on 
comparisons with West German, however, shifting fortunes within Britain can also 
be very useful indicators for relative economy decline and failure.   
 Table 3.5 below shows for the 12-industry classification the position each 
industry had in terms of value added generated per hour worked in 1935 and 1951 
in the United Kingdom. In 1935, the most productive industry in terms of value 
added per hour worked was chemicals, followed by the food, drink and tobacco 
industry. Value added in chemicals per hour worked was twice as high as value 
added per hour in total manufacturing. Clothing and footwear, and textiles were 
the least productive industries in terms of value added generated per hour worked.  
 By 1951, the food industry is the most productive industry, followed by 
chemicals. The final column of Table 3.5 shows the ratio of total hours worked for 
1935/1951. This demonstrates how much larger or smaller an industry became 
after the war in terms of working hours. In total manufacturing, there was an 
increase of approximately 20 per cent in the total number of hours worked in 1951 
as compared to 1935. The largest increase in hours worked took place in the 
chemicals industry, where more than 60 per cent extra hours were reported in 
1951. There was a decrease in the total hours worked in leather, clothing and 
footwear, and textiles trade.  
 Overall, we can see that by 1951 many industries remained very close to their 
relative position in 1935. The most spectacular change in relative position is made 
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by the textile industry. It increased its position on the list from the 12
th
 to the 8
th
 
place. Although later in this chapter I will shift the focus towards the underlying 
causes of Britain’s relative economic decline, the next section will already briefly 
investigate the developments in the textiles sector, as it has historically been a 
large and important sector in British industry. The evolution of the textiles sector 
over the course of the twentieth century provides a perfect example of how 
important it is to distinguish between failure and decline.  
Table 3.5: Relative position of industries in the UK in 1935 and 1951 in terms of value added 
















Chemicals and  allied trades 205 1 123 2 1.61 
Food, drink and tobacco  171 2 280 1 1.12 
Paper trades 121 3 103 3 1.02 
Miscellaneous Trades 107 4 85 5 1.19 
Engineering and vehicle trade  102 5 80 7 1.85 
Iron and steel  99 6 103 4 1.36 
Clay and building materials  97 7 75 9 1.13 
Leather trades 93 8 85 6 0.85 
Woodwork  85 9 70 10 1.11 
Mining 80 10 63 11 1.05 
Clothing and footwear  71 11 55 12 0.93 
Textiles trade  66 12 80 8 0.83 





Note: a. total manufacturing is 100, the index is based on current prices. Value added per hour 
worked in 1935 was £0.10 per hour worked in current prices; in 1951 this was £0.40 per hour worked 
in current prices. Using the index of wholesale prices from the Business Statistics Office (1978). I 
find that this translates to £0.12 per hour in 1951 in 1935 prices, which implies an increase of 23 per 
cent in total value added per hour worked generated in 1951 as compared to 1935.  
Sources: Value added and employment are taken from Board of Trade (1954), ‘The Report on the 
Census of Production for 1951’; Board of Trade (1938-44), ‘Final Report on the Fifth Census of 
Production and the Import Duties Act Inquiry 1935, pt. 1–4’. Hours worked for 1951 are obtained 
from O’Mahony (1999), for 1935 hours worked are obtained from Department of Employment and 
productivity (1971), ‘British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstract 1886-1968’.  
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3.2.2.1 Britain’s textile industry during the twentieth century: an illustration of 
failure or decline?  
The textiles industry provides a very important case study for investigating 
Britain’s relative economic decline. The decline of the British cotton industry is 
used in the literature as a clear example of manufacturing failure. Most notably by 
Lazonick (1981, 1986), who argues that Britain was failing in this industry 
because it did not develop modern corporate structures using high throughput 
capital-intensive techniques. Already at the end of the nineteenth century the most 
important region for textiles in the UK, Lancashire, started to decline. Before the 
First World War more and more nations tried to set up their own cotton industry, 
which was usually protected with tariffs. These protection schemes were harmful 
for British exports (Sandberg 1974). Whereas in the beginning of the 1930s Britain 
exported 137 million pound of cotton yarn, and 2490.5 million linear yards of 
piece goods, this had fallen to respectively 65.5 million pound and 857.8 million 
linear yards by 1951 (Robson 1957 p.332-333 as cited in Broadberry 1997a, p. 
249).  
 Table 3.6 presents the annualised growth rate of value added per hour worked 
for sub-branches in the textile industry for three periods from 1935 till 1968.
7
  The 
period 1935-1948 is characterised by negative labour-productivity growth rates in 
almost all textile branches, except in spinning and doubling on the cotton and flax 
system, which presents 17 per cent of value added generated in textiles in 1948. 
Also the miscellaneous textile industry witnessed a small increase in productivity, 
however, this industry is of minor importance. Compared to other industries this 
decline in labour productivity is not very severe, which explains why the textile 
industry could overtake some other industries in terms of labour-productivity.  
 The period 1948 to 1958 is also characterised by decreasing labour 
productivity. The period 1958 to 1968 displays relatively high growth rates in 
labour productivity for certain branches. The period directly after the Second 
World War was relatively favourable for the British cotton industry, as other 
countries struggled to replace war torn capacities (Millward 1994). However, in 
the early 1950s cotton cloth exports were already dramatically lowered, and there 
was severe competition from abroad.  
                                                   
7 I used the wholesale price index from the Business Statistics Office (1978)   For the period 1930-
1949 there are three separate price indexes for textiles, namely one for cotton, one for wool and one 
for other textiles. For the period thereafter only one index is available. Data for the period until 1962 
is lacking in the historical record. Therefore, I relied on the wholesale price index from the ‘Annual 
Abstract of Statistics 1958’.   
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Table 3.6: Labour-productivity growth rates (%) and total hours worked in British textile 
industry (1935 – 1968) 
  
Annualised labour productivity 
growth rates 
Index of total hours worked 








1948 1958 1968 
Production of man-made fibre  -2.04 0.02 8.98 85 94 98 
Spinning and doubling on the 
cotton and flax systems 
2.87 -4.02 6.92 79 65 35 
Weaving of cotton, Linens and 
man-made fibres 
- -4.08 5.61 - 110a 35a 
Woollen and Worsted -0.55 -5.17 4.22 82 81 58 
Jute -1.62 -1.81 4.4 68 66 53 
Rope, Twine, Net -1.4 -2.12 3.65 93 79 48 
Hosiery and Other knitted goods -1.38 -2.67 4.88 79 94 103 
Lace -0.47 -5.25 4.21 74 63 29 
Carpets -1.87 -1.51 3.52 75 102 133 
Narrow Fabrics -1.72 -2.63 3.87 99 104 92 
made-up household textiles - -6.88 4.72 - 282a 276a 
Canvas Goods and Sacks -2.37 -0.98 2.14 125 128 88 
Textile Finishing -2.78 -2.35 4.41 75 72 47 
Asbestos -3.02 -2.97 2.96 202 259 268 
Miscellaneous textiles 0.23 -3.11 6.91 118 112 103 
Notes: a. data for 1935 was not available, thus 1948 is set to 100. 
Sources: Employment, value added and the wholesale price index are taken from Business Statistics 
Office (1978). Hours worked is obtained from O’Mahony (1999) and Department of Employment 
and productivity (1971), ‘British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstract 1886-1968’.  
 Table 3.6 also presents an index of total hours worked in the textile industry 
for 1948, 1958 and 1968. Interestingly, the decline in working hours was 
especially severe in spinning and doubling on the cotton and flax systems. In 
weaving of cotton, linen and man-made fibres there was a large decline in the 
amount of hours worked during the 1960s. In terms of gross output this industry 
decreased by almost 40 per cent between 1948 and 1968.  
 British cotton industry relied on old technologies, such as the mule and 
Lancashire loom, until the 1960s. Whereas in the United States all looms were 
automatic in the mid-1950s, in Britain only just over ten per cent were automatic 
(Lazonick 1981, p.32).  
 In 1959 the Cotton Industry Act offered manufactures of cotton compensation 
if they would scrap their old and redundant machinery and mills (Lee 1996). A 
total of 678000 ring spindles and 11000 automatic looms were purchased with the 
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subsidies; the total investment amounted to 53.5 million pounds, whereas the 
government had hoped to reach an investment of at least 80 million pounds 
(Singleton 1991). Hence, this incentive was not as great of a success as hoped for. 
However, according to Millward (1994) there is rationale behind the decision of 
British entrepreneurs to stick to older production methods, since there still was a 
large skilled labour force, an inheritance from the industrial revolution. Another 
explanation for the lack of the adoption of new techniques that Millward mentions 
is that there were many small or family-owned firms. These small firms could not 
afford the large investments needed for the introduction of mass production 
techniques. Mass and Lazonick (1990) argue that the decline in the British cotton 
industry was the result of outmoded economic individualism, whereas collective 
response was required to be able to compete with other nations 
 According to Lazonick (1981) managers failed to create new profitable 
opportunities. In contrast, Sandberg (1974) argues that the decline of British textile 
industry is not the result of technological backwardness nor of failure to invest in 
new types of machinery.
8
 Sandberg believes that the decline can for the largest 
part be ascribed to a change in comparative advantage, and obviously Britain 
could not compete with low-wage countries. Therefore, the decline of the industry 
can be seen as inevitable. Broadberry (1997a) agrees with the idea that to a large 
extent the decline of the industry was simply a shift in comparative advantage, 
however, he believes that the process was speeded up by the action of managers 
between the world wars. Hence, although Broadberry does not believe that the 
decline of the textile industry is solely the result of failure, he argues that there 
was room for failure.      
 According to Singleton (1991) the cotton industry was overwhelmed with the 
threat of cheap imports, and pessimism about future prospects hampered 
investment. Singleton (1991) argues that in general businessmen in cotton had 
very long planning horizons, and their decisions not to install new machinery was 
sensible since the only textile industries in developed countries that thrived were 
those that were heavily protected, such as in the United States. The textile industry 
provides a perfect example of how comparative advantage influences an economy. 
Even though Britain once had the advantage, with numerous skilled labourers who 
could operate textile machinery, the mass production techniques introduced during 
the nineteenth and twentieth century simply asked for unskilled cheap labourers. 
Therefore, Britain was not able to remain the leader in the textile industry, since 
                                                   
8 There is no evidence that firms that did install automatic looms in the first decade of the twentieth 
century did make faster or larger profits than their more conservative competitors.  
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the introduction of new technologies, which were non-neutral, changed the 
requirements for a successful business and called for substitution. Britain could 
simply not meet these new requirements.  
 The textile industry example demonstrates how important it is to clearly 
distinguish between the terms decline and failure.  Decline is objective; it refers to 
an industry that is decreasing in size, as measured by employment and/or output. 
Concluding that an industry is failing, on the other hand, is a much more 
subjective statement. Failure implies that if other decisions had been made by the 
representatives, decline would not have been the result. It is very important to keep 
this distinction clearly in mind, since it plays a large role in the debate on Britain’s 
relative economic decline which is discussed in the remainder of this chapter.  
3.3 Reconstruction growth in West Germany  
A part of German’s super-growth might be the result of the setback West Germany 
experienced as a result of the Second World War. In this section I will focus on the 
effect of reconstruction growth in Britain’s relative economic decline, and 
specifically on how its position changed in comparison to West Germany. 
Although Britain was not as severely hit as West Germany and not much capital 
was destroyed, there were severe issues after the war. The balance of payment 
deficits were extremely large, and Britain had a massive overhang of unspent 
money balances, which was the result of forced saving and the repressed inflation 
of the wartime economy (Crafts 1993;1994). This situation had a significant 
impact on its possibilities for growth after the war. But in the remainder of this 
section I will focus on the effects of the war on West Germany, and how this 
influenced West-German productivity. I will first briefly elaborate on the 
deconstruction of capital in West Germany, and then I discuss reconstruction 
growth. By understanding West Germany productivity growth, we can also better 
understand the case of Britain’s relative economic decline.   
3.3.1 The bombing of Germany  
Already before the end of the war the United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
(USSBS) reported on the effectiveness of Allied bombing and the remaining 
production capacity of Germany. Although destruction rates in the country’s major 
cities reached 75 per cent or more in city centres, the material damage in West 
Germany was of a small magnitude according to the USSBS (1945, p.37). The 
survey stressed that the Allies never attempted to destroy the German economy, 
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but rather to stop it from operating by damaging key points. Mid 1944 Allied 
Strategic Bombings targeted electric power, synthetic fuels generation, and 
railroad networks, in an attempt to disrupt the supply chain instead of destroying 
productive capacity (Birkenfeld 1964). The air bombardments of transportation 
infrastructure and the Ruhr area had a substantial effect. Although coal production 
itself was not too heavily affected, since most of the operational facilities of coal 
mines are underground, the effects of bombing of transport routes had a large 
impact (USSBS 1945, p.99). Only 17.4 per cent of industrial fixed assets on the 
territory of the later West Germany was destroyed as a consequence of aerial 
bombardment and ground fighting, and a mere 6.5 per cent of all machinery and 
equipment suffered significant damage (Krengel 1958 cited by Abelshauser 2004; 
Vonyó 2012). Coal supply was disrupted because transport from the pitheads to 
power stations and factories became increasingly difficult (USSBS, 1945, p. 99; 
Eichengreen & Ritschl 2009). The effects of the shortage of raw materials and the 
energy crisis persisted well into 1947 (Eichengreen & Ritschl, 2009).
9
 Quick 
recovery was possible because the productive capacity was not severely damaged, 
but only infrastructure and supply chains were.  
 It is difficult to construct reliable estimates of the fixed industrial assets in the 
Federal Republic at the end of the war due to data limitations. It is assumed, 
however, that the amount of assets was higher than in 1939 (Braun 1990). 
Investments during the war were very likely to exceed the damages done by the 
war, which means there was a built up of capital (Braun 1990). Krengel (1958) 
showed that the age structure of fixed assets in industry was more favourable in 
1948 than 1935. Whereas by 1935 only 29 per cent of capital was under 5 years, 
by 1948 this share had grown to 50 per cent. (Krengel 1958, p.52-53). Thus, 
capital in Germany was not in a poor state after the war.  
3.3.2 The Reconstruction Thesis 
Reconstruction growth can be explained within the neoclassical growth 
framework. The war destroyed productive capacities which implied a temporary 
deviation from the steady state. The gap that exists between actual output and a 
country’s technological potential combined with the changed ratio of factors of 
production due to the destruction of capital plays a major role in initiating high 
growth rates. Figure A-2.1 in the Appendix illustrates in a basic graph the idea 
                                                   
9 In 1947 coal production in Germany was only at 52 per cent of its 1938 level, whereas in Britain 
output already reached 87 per cent of the pre-war level (Eichengreen and Ritschl, 2009, p.200, Table 
3). 
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underlying the reconstruction thesis of Jánossy (1969) and demonstrates how the 
West-German and United Kingdom growth performance fits into this framework.  
 In the early reconstruction phase, between 1947 and 1950, GDP per capita 
grew over 15 per cent per annum in West Germany (Maddison 1995).  Part of the 
growth miracle of West Germany was indeed simply a return to the steady state.  
However, in the beginning of the 1950s West Germany was already back at its 
pre-war GDP per capita level. Thus, this type of reconstruction growth is only 
capable of explaining part of the growth miracle. The reconstruction thesis can be 
seen in a framework of an extended neoclassical growth model in which human 
capital is not a separate part of the production function, but enters in a labour-
augmenting form such as in the model of Hall and Jones (1999). In Jánossy’s 
(1969) interpretation of a ‘potential growth path’, growth is not limited to a 
historical trend, but depends on the potential of the economy, which in turn 
depends on the stock of labour, physical capital and human capital. Jánossy 
stressed the importance of the qualification structure of the labour force.
10
 In the 
Jánossy model there is a constant capital over human capital augmented labour 
ratio in the steady state.
11
  
 Several scholars have defined reconstruction as the period directly after the 
war time shock in which countries grow back at their pre-war level of welfare 
(Cairncross 1951). If we would use this definition we would conclude that by 1953 
reconstruction was completed, because by then West Germany’s GDP per capita 
was back at its 1938 level. This period in which a country retains its pre-war level 
of GDP represents the recovery period, wiederaufbau or pure reconstruction 
(Dumke 1990, Smolny 2000). Table 2.5 in Chapter 2 revealed that the 1935 level 
of output per man-hour worked was surpassed by 1951.  
 However, the reconstruction thesis, as developed by Jánossy, actually states 
that a country should be back on its potential growth path. This implies that 
reconstruction growth only ends when the actual level of production equals the 
level of production that West Germany would have attained if the Second World 
War had not taken place. The trendline that Jánossy refers to is a line that dictates 
how large production could have been, in case of no economic disturbances. 
Jánossy (1969, p. 12) states the following ‘the trend line of economic development 
must be defined as a top limit curve of the line representing the actual production 
                                                   
10 However, the important question in the neoclassical growth model is how far a country is from the 
international frontier, whereas in the reconstruction model we are interested in the distance to the 
national frontier, which is some sort of theoretical frontier. 
11 It can also be viewed in the context of an endogenous AKH model such as used by Crafts (1995a) 
in his paper on the Golden Age as a potential model. 
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level. Thus, the trend line must not be determined as an average production-level 
line, i.e. not as a line running between the maxima and minima of production, but 
as a curve that connects the maxima of the production level line, thus bridging the 
gaps in production caused by disturbances. (Original emphasis)’. Therefore, for 
many countries this is a sort of ‘hypothetical’ line, which the country might  never 
or only occasionally reach. Although Jánossy referred to the potential growth path 
of a country, other scholars have interpreted this as the ‘historical normal long run 
growth path’.12 There are some problems in defining a country’s ‘historical normal 
long run growth path’ and this concept has received much critique. Bombach 
(1985), for example, has argued that the geographical area of Germany changed 
markedly over the World Wars and large labour migration changed the 
composition of the population, making it hard to argue that there is such a growth 
path for West Germany. However, the main problem in defining a trend line as 
Jánossy envisaged, is that the first half of the twentieth century witnessed two 
major shocks that prohibited the German economy from operating at full potential: 
the First World War, and the worldwide economic crisis. Therefore, it is expected 
that before the outbreak of the Second World War West Germany was not on its 
trend line of undisturbed economic growth.  Simply extrapolating West Germany’s 
growth before the world war will thus not result in the trend line. This also implies 
that reconstruction growth for West Germany was not only the result of  
recovering from the Second World War, but it could also reflect recovering from 
the relative poor performance during the interwar period. Moreover, the Second 
Industrial Revolution allowed for higher growth rates, hence the long-run trend 
line of growth does not need to exhibit a constant growth rate.  
 Quantitative research found some support for the reconstruction thesis. Crafts 
and Mills (1996) concluded that for ten European countries the reconstruction 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, but they find little support for the longer-run 
dynamics properties of the reconstruction thesis. Crafts and Mills find that 
Jánossy’s emphasis on the importance of reconstruction in the early post-war 
                                                   
12 See Dumke 1990, among others.  
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growth is important, but the suggestion of a constant ‘historical normal’ rate of 
growth on a traditional neoclassical natural rate model is generally not valid.
13
  
 To conclude, I believe that reconstruction indeed played a significant role in 
West Germany’s fast growth rates after the Second World War. However, West 
Germany continued to exhibit spectacular growth rates after the 1950s, when it 
should be expected that it was back on its long run growth trajectory.
14
 Table 3.7 
depicts labour-productivity growth rates for West Germany and the United 
Kingdom for the period 1951 to 1968. Close inspection of Table 3.7 reveals that 
West-German growth rates after 1960 where higher than before 1960 in some 
important industries. In chemicals, for example, growth rates are even in double 
digits in the second half of the 1960s, which was the result of the introduction of 
new technologies. In Britain one can also see a spurt in growth rates in the 
chemical industry during the second half of the 1960s. In the mid-1950 there was a 
change in the production of organic chemicals as compared with the pre-1950 
period. Whereas in 1950 less than one-sixth of organic chemicals was produced 
with the use of petroleum or gas, by  the mid-1950s this was over 50 per cent, and 
by 1964 more than two-third of the output was produced by using petrochemicals 
(Stokes, 1991, p. 12, figures were drawn from Shworm, 1967, pp. 54, 56-57). 
 During the 1960s, the growth rate of most West-German industries was still 
substantially higher than the growth rate of British industries, although the 
differences in growth rates become gradually smaller. In the last period of the 
1960s, Britain reports higher labour-productivity growth rates in a few industries: 
mechanical engineering; vehicles; textiles; clothing and footwear; and building 
materials. These industries together accounted for roughly one-third of gross 
output produced in manufacturing in 1968.
15
 This indicates that a substantial part 
of the West-German overtaking took place after the 1960s. By that time we should 
expect that reconstruction growth is completed. Hence, although I believe that 
                                                   
13 Vonyó (2008) found that for core western industrialised nations, the rapidity and variety of 
economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s can mostly be explained by post-war reconstruction. 
Dumke (1990) finds for 16 OECD countries that reconstruction growth is economically and 
statistically significant.13 He concludes that this type of growth was especially important for 
Germany. Smolny (2000) estimated that approximately one third of labour-productivity growth in 
Germany during the 1950s was caused by reconstruction growth and about half can be explained by 
catching up to the United States. The productivity gap hypothesis and reconstruction together 
explained about 90 per cent of the variance of productivity growth rates during the fifties according 
to Smolny’s calculations. 
14 If we believe that West Germany was already pushed off its long-run growth trajectory by the First 
World War, and by the severe crisis of the 1930s, we might conclude that reconstruction growth 
takes a much more prominent role during the 1950s and 1960s. 
15 Calculated on the basis of Business Statistics Office (1978), table 1. 
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reconstruction is indeed an important factor in explaining the UK/German 
productivity race, it is only part of the explanation. 
Table 3.7: Labour-productivity growth rates in West Germany and the United Kingdom, 1951 
-1968 
 


















Mining  3.95 6.27 7.35 10.56 -0.05 0.09 5.12 6.05 
Food and Tobacco  5.30 6.48 6.79 5.53 0.70 5.40 2.82 3.81 
Chemicals 6.84 8.40 9.51 13.48 3.74 6.56 6.63 9.53 
Iron and Steel 5.09 4.91 3.55 8.48 3.61 1.43 2.79 1.32 
Non-Ferrous Metals 7.46 6.76 4.79 7.89 0.31 1.83 2.61 3.91 
Mechanical Engineering 3.59 4.05 4.00 1.35 0.89 2.19 3.77 4.79 
Electrical Engineering 7.53 6.50 6.81 7.61 1.87 3.52 3.62 6.68 
Transport Vehicles  10.93 8.45 6.12 4.67 6.71 6.17 4.97 5.42 
Fabricated Metal Products 4.50 6.30 5.49 3.40 1.94 1.20 2.23 1.55 
Textiles  5.86 8.99 7.77 7.19 1.36 3.00 4.58 9.30 
Leather Industry 4.93 6.05 5.32 3.92 0.03 0.13 2.47 1.98 
Clothing and Footwear 5.71 5.04 5.74 3.81 3.18 4.77 5.48 3.98 
Building Materials 5.86 7.64 7.40 7.45 2.69 3.12 7.04 8.12 
China and Earthenware 3.16 6.10 6.55 6.59 -0.43 2.59 4.07 6.54 
Glass Industry 1.51 8.09 8.70 6.04 2.28 2.56 4.38 5.69 
Lumber and Woodworking 5.17 8.21 7.63 6.40 2.89 2.13 2.12 -0.93 
Paper, Printing, Publishing 3.99 5.85 5.68 6.36 2.69 3.85 3.37 2.62 
Miscellaneous Industries  5.77 8.19 7.53 7.41 3.46 2.42 2.99 5.90 
Source: own calculations based on data from the Statistisches Bundesamt (1973), ‘Lange Reihen zur 
Wirtschaftentwicklung’, pp. 74-75; Statistisches Bundesamt (1975), ‘Industrie und Handwerk’, 
Fachserie D, Reihe 2, p. 7; various volumes of the Central Statistical Office’s ‘Annual Abstract of 
Statistics’; Department of Employment and Productivity (1971), ‘British Labour Statistics, 
Historical Abstract 1868-1968’.  
3.3.3 Post-war reconstruction and Britain’s relative economic decline  
Having established the relative productivity levels for British and West-German 
industry both before and shortly after World War II enables me to account for 
convergence and reconstruction growth in the comparative development of 
industrial labour productivity during the Golden Age. As I have argued, Britain’s 
relative decline was to some extent unavoidable since it was due to West 
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Germany’s larger potential for catch up growth. I use existing time-series evidence 
to extrapolate my new 1951 benchmark forward to 1958. I only extrapolate a few 
years since it is well known that extrapolating too far into time can lead to severe 
biases. However, by extrapolating in this way, it is possible to observe 
approximately when West Germany managed to surpass the British productivity 
level in a given industry and when West Germany recovered, if at all, to the 
relative position established in the mid-1930s. This exercise requires annual 
growth rates of gross-value added per man-hour worked at the industry level. For 
West Germany this data can be directly acquired from a collection published by 
the Federal Statistical Office on long-run time series.
16
 The index numbers have 
been constructed on 1962 as the base year, and thus it required an additional 
source to establish industry shares in 1962 gross value added for the purpose of the 
reclassification.
17
 For the United Kingdom, index numbers on valued-added in 
constant prices for total industry are reported annually from 1948 onward online 
by the Office for National Statistics.
18
 However, this source was not sufficiently 
disaggregated for my purposes. For Britain, an industrial index of production is 
reported in the Annual Abstract of Statistics.
19
 I built a consistent 1951-68 index-
number series by using 1958 weights. Employment figures and index numbers on 
hours worked are drawn from the British Labour Statistics, Historical Abstract 
1868-1968.
20
 Using these data, I could construct an index on value added per hour 
worked for every year from 1951 to 1959. 
 I have managed to disaggregate my series into 18 industry groups that are 
closely matching the industry classification of my benchmark. I only needed to 
average up a few industries, especially under food and tobacco and the 
miscellaneous group, to make the 1951 benchmark perfectly compatible with the 
time series. The results of the computations are reported in Table 3.8. At the 
aggregate level and in almost all industries, German manufacturers caught up with 
their British rivals in labour productivity by the late 1950s. The shaded figures 
represent the point in time when West Germany had overtaken the United 
Kingdom in a given industry. The bordered rubrics indicate industries where the 
German lead was already established in 1951. Table 3.8 demonstrates that by 1960 
the West-German productivity lead over Britain was indeed overwhelming in the 
                                                   
16 Statistisches Bundesamt, Lange Reihen, pp. 74-75 
17 Fachserie D, Reihe 2 (1975), p. 7 
18 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase 
19 Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics (1958, 1960, 1966, and 1976) 
20 Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistics, Tables 25-26, and Table 
138 
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branches of large-scale industry, such as coal mining, iron and steel, non-ferrous 
metals, chemicals and textiles. By contrast, British manufacturers were performing 
relatively well in industries that traditionally included a vast army of highly 
specialised small and medium-sized firms, mechanical engineering and metal 
products, china and earthenware, or clothing and footwear. In electrical 
engineering and transport vehicles, labour-productivity levels in Britain fell behind 
more substantially, but were still not worse compared with the respective West-
German levels than they had been in the mid-1930s. These findings are also 
largely in line with the finding of Smith et al. for 1968. As indicated in Table 2.7, 
West Germany was performing especially well in the chemical industry and the 
metal industry.  
  

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Although the cross section is far too small to apply sophisticated econometric 
techniques, even a quick glance over the table reveals a clear pattern of 
convergence in the early 1950s, and a clear overtaking of Britain by West 
Germany in the second half of the 1950s. In coal mining, the engineering 
industries, and leather goods, where the initial productivity gap was smaller than 
for industry as a whole, West Germany had overtaken Britain in the first half of 
the 1950s. By contrast, in food and tobacco, china and earthenware, and in the 
miscellaneous industries (which include rubber and asbestos, jewellery, musical 
and sports equipment among others), German manufactures only managed to erase 
the relatively large initial gaps towards the end of the decade. In two industries 
where the West-German relative productivity level was the lowest in 1951, 
building materials and fabricated metal products, the British productivity lead 
survived for an extended period. In 1960 the United Kingdom still had the lead in 
a few industries, namely food and tobacco, fabricated metal products, clothing and 
footwear, miscellaneous and building materials. Although, except for fabricated 
metal products, this lead was small. Near the end of the Golden Age in 1968 West 
Germany was still behind Britain in some of the industrial branches within the 
fabricated metal products industry.
21
  
 From the perspective of my motivation, the most important finding is that 
while West Germany had overtaken the United Kingdom in industrial labour 
productivity in the late 1950s, it was not before the beginning of the 1960s that 
West-German manufacturers managed to re-establish the relative productivity 
position they had attained by the mid-1930s.
22
 At the aggregate level, Britain’s 
relative decline in industrial productivity in the course of the German 
Wirtschaftswunder can be attributed to the post-war reconstruction dynamic and 
not to failure per se. The disaggregated figures enable me to test this postulation in 
a cross section of industries. The scatter diagram in Figure 3.2 plots the projected 
levels of labour productivity in West Germany in 1960 relative to Britain against 
the benchmark estimates for 1935. This analysis is similar to the analysis in 
Section 2.6. There I was able to show a large continuity in relative labour-
                                                   
21 According to labour-productivity estimates of Smith, Hitchens and Davies (1982, pp. 122-124) 
West Germany is more than 20 per cent behind Britain in cutlery and tableware.21 It must be noted 
however, that the method Smith et al. used to construct their labour productivity estimates deviate 
from the method I apply, and therefore I cannot directly compare results. For more information see 
Section 2.6 in Chapter 2. 
22 I found that the gap for the mid-1930s was 115 (GE/UK). If I extrapolate my labour-productivity 
estimate for 1951 further, I find that at the aggregate manufacturing level in 1962 Germany is at 117 
per cent of the British level.  
Winning the war, losing the peace? 91 
 
productivity levels between West Germany and the United Kingdom over the 
period 1935-1968. The estimate for 1968 from Smith et al. was not directly 
comparable to my own data set, hence I could not use the full sample size. In this 
analysis I am interested in the continuity over labour-productivity gaps over a 
shorter period, to evaluate to what extent German reconstruction played a role in 
the German Wirtschaftswunder. 
Figure 3.2: Relative levels of labour-productivity in West-German industry (UK = 1) 
Sources: my own labour-productivity estimates for 1935 (see Table 2.4) and the extrapolation from 
Table 3.8.  
We can observe a very strong positive relationship for most industries, with only a 
few outliers. West Germany reported very low relative productivity levels in 
fabricated metal products, where it actually commanded a respectable lead in the 
1930s. The main reason for this shift is most likely the changing composition of 
the product mix. In the interwar statistics, small firearms, hand grenades, and 
simple tools used for military consumption were all included under this industry. 
The production of armaments was shut down by the Allies after 1945 and was 
only re-allowed following the German accession to NATO in 1955 – most notably 
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operated without the relatively large-scale and highly capital-intensive plants that 
used to supply these products in 1935. 
 In contrast, in the leather and glass industries, West Germany recorded much 
higher levels of labour productivity relative to Britain in the post-war period than 
in 1935. Depressed consumer demand during the 1930s together with the 
prioritisation of first public works and later war reparations implied that light 
manufacturing received very little investment. This changed markedly thanks to 
the consumer boom of the early post-war decades. These industries became 
increasingly capital intensive particularly from the late 1950s onward. West 
Germany was entering an extended period of critical labour shortage, with the 
unemployment rate averaging one per cent between 1959 and 1972. Under these 
conditions, the industries that typically paid the lowest wages tried to increase 
output with fewer employees. This called for the substitution of capital for skilled 
labour, which was in particularly short supply as the number of industrial 
apprentices began to plummet already in 1956 (Hoffmann 1962). In the early 
1960s, the number of manual workers also began to decline sharply in textiles, the 
timber industry and woodworking, yielding higher levels of capital intensity and, 
thus of labour productivity.  
 For all 18 industry groups, I obtain a coefficient of correlation of 0.33 between 
the 1935 benchmark and the projected levels for 1960, which is not significant at 
the ten per cent level. If I eliminate fabricated metal products, which is a clear 
outlier, the coefficient jumps to 0.41 and turns significant at the ten per cent 
level.
23
 Given the small number of observations, this is a statistically very robust 
finding, which backs the argument that West-German super-growth until the early 
1960s was partly driven by post-war reconstruction.  
3.3.4 The implications of the new findings for the debate on Britain’s 
failure 
 The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the long debate on Britain’s 
relative economic decline during the Golden Age of economic growth. The new 
data set I constructed, and the analysis performed with this new data allow me to 
discuss this important debate on British economic history, which is still very much 
alive. My new findings shed more light on the big questions concerning the 
economic performance of Britain, and I am able to demonstrate that some 
                                                   
23 When the glass industry and the leather industry are also excluded from the sample the coefficients 
of correlation increases even further to 0.62, which is statistically significant at the 1.6 per cent 
significance level. 
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arguments used in the literature should be rethought. My conclusion on the timing 
of the West-German overtaking of the British productivity level are different from 
what previously has been argued in the literature. This is best explained by 
reviewing an important discussion on the ‘Manufacturing Failure Hypothesis’ 
which has been held in 2003 in the ‘Economic History Review’ between Booth 
(2003a) and Broadberry and Crafts (2003). Booth claims that Britain was actually 
performing much better during the long-boom than supposed in the literature. He 
claims that two-third of the total relative improvement of German manufacturing 
productivity during the period 1950 to 1973 had been secured by 1952. He uses 
data from Broadberry’s (1997) ‘Productivity Race’ to reach this conclusion. In 
Broadberry’s data (1997, pp. 49-50) Germany is at 96 per cent of the British 
productivity level by 1950, at 111.2 per cent of the British level by 1952 and at 
118.6 per cent by 1973. This indeed implies that 67 per cent of Germany’s 
improvement in relative productivity was secured by 1952. In their reply, 
Broadberry and Crafts (2003) argue that it is of crucial importance to take business 
cycle peaks as end point in calculating trends in growth rates. This dispute of dates 
is of crucial importance, since it heavily influences the conclusion that will be 
drawn on the basis of the data. Also important in this respect is that from 1952 till 
1959 the German productivity level as compared with the British never exceeds 
111.5. During some years the productivity level of West Germany as compared to 
Britain also decreased and fell below this 111.5 level. Thus, if we focus on the 
1960s only, the average annual growth rate will be much larger than the growth 
rate that Booth calculated for the whole period.  
 Broadberry’s estimate for 1950 is not based on a benchmark constructed for 
that year, but it is based on an extrapolation. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
there can be large distortions in extrapolations. Broadberry’s work does not take 
hours worked into account. According to Broadberry (1997) taking hours into 
account would make no substantial change, since working hours have moved in a 
broadly similar way. Although this is to some extent true for 1935, I managed to 
demonstrate that there is a large difference in the actual hours worked for Britain 
and West Germany in the post-war period, and this highly influences the results.  
 I have reworked the existing labour-productivity estimates of Fremdling et al. 
to include only West Germany, and I find that West Germany was 11 per cent 
ahead in manufacturing labour-productivity as compared with Britain in 1935. 
When I use my new data, I come to a different conclusion with respect to the part 
of relative labour productivity gain that West Germany secured in the early 1950s. 
94 British failure? 
 
 
Table 3.9 presents the comparative labour-productivity estimate in manufacturing 
for the period 1951 to 1968.  
 My estimate for 1968 is the same as the 1968 based labour-productivity 
estimate of Smith et al. (1982, p.124). They also arrive at a labour-productivity 
level of 123 for West Germany, albeit they use a different method. When I 
measure labour-productivity as value added per hour worked, I find that West 
Germany is at 79 per cent of the British level in 1950. When I extrapolate this 
finding, I conclude that West Germany was at 123 per cent of the British 
productivity level by 1968. By 1952 less than one-quarter of this productivity 
advance was secured. This means that the period after 1952 is of crucial 
importance for the other three-quarters of productivity improvement that West 
Germany secured by the end of the 1960s. This conclusion deviates substantially 
from the conclusion Booth draws. More importantly, the claim that Booth makes 
focusses only at aggregate manufacturing while I strongly believe that any 
discussion on failure of British manufacturing should focus at the disaggregate 
industry level. My estimates make clear that there is a substantial increase in the 
relative productivity position of West Germany in the 1960s. 
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Table 3.9: Comparative labour productivity in industry West Germany/United Kingdom, 
1951-1968 (UK = 100) 




















Sources: see Table 3.8.   
 The data presented in Table 3.6 reveal large differences in the growth rates 
and in the difference between growth rates in West Germany and the United 
Kingdom across industries. I see that the average annual growth rates in labour-
productivity of West Germany were indeed high in the first half of the 1950s, 
while in Britain growth rates were very low, or even negative. In the second half 
of the 1950s Britain also experiences higher growth, but West Germany was able 
to more than match these growth rates. Importantly, after West Germany caught 
up to the British levels of labour-productivity in the late 1950s, it still witnessed 
much higher growth rates than Britain. Most important in this respect are the large 
differences across industries. Especially in chemicals, non-ferrous metals, lumber 
and woodworking and paper and printing the West-German growth rate is 
substantially higher in the second half of the 1960s.  
 If in any period during the Golden Age, British industry was failing in 
comparison with West Germany it must have been during the 1960s, and not so 
much in the 1950s. After 1961 the growth of value added per hour worked in total 
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manufacturing was still more than 1 percentage point faster in West Germany than 
in the United Kingdom. Thus, during the 1960s the West-German productivity 
level increased substantially as compared with the UK. Therefore, I believe that 
the Broadberry-Crafts view on failure in the manufacturing sector should focus 
more specific on the second part of the Golden Age, since in the first decade we 
can hardly speak of failure, given the underlying economic conditions and 
Germany’s scope for catch-up and reconstruction. In the next section I will discuss 
the underlying causes of British failure.  
3.4 Underlying causes for British failure   
The previous comparisons have all focused solely on Britain and West Germany.  
In this section, I will introduce the United States, which was the world’s most 
productive nation in virtually all manufacturing industries, and undoubtedly the 
productivity leader during the Golden Age.
24
 Therefore, the United States 
represents the actual technology frontier and West Germany and Britain, like other 
industrial nations, were converging to. I use an existing US/UK labour-
productivity benchmark of Paige and Bombach (1959, p.33) for 1951 and data 
from the GGDC 10-sector database for value added and total hours worked to 
construct a productivity index for United States manufacturing in the period 1951-
68 (Van Ark 1996). Figure 3.3 shows how German and British industry converged 
towards the technological frontier during the post-war Golden Age. Whereas the 
American productivity lead over Britain remained relatively constant, it became 
significantly more moderate in relation with West Germany, even though it did 
remain substantial. The US/UK labour-productivity benchmark dropped from 3.87 
in 1951 to 3.44 in 1968. The indirectly constructed US/West Germany benchmark 
moved from 4.55 to 2.7 between the two years. West Germany seemed to be much 







                                                   
24 See Nelson and Wright 1992 among others. 
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Figure 3.3: Labour productivity in US, UK and German industry (natural logs) 
 
Sources: own calculations, see text for the underlying sources.  
 The diagram demonstrates two important findings. First, West Germany was 
gradually catching up with the United Kingdom until the 1958 recession, after 
which the two countries moved together in terms of productivity growth until 
1961. In the mid-1960s, however, West-German industry managed to pull away 
from its British counterpart. Secondly, this forging ahead followed a significant 
acceleration in American productivity growth. One of the reasons to introduce 
America in the picture is the important claim in the literature that Britain failed in 
so-called Americanisation of manufacturing production. The next section will 
investigate this issue in detail.      
3.4.1  British failure in Americanisation and mass production techniques  
In this section, I focus on the adoption or the lack of adoption of American models 
of production and mass production techniques. In the literature on Britain’s 
relative economic decline the lack of adopting mass production techniques is often 
seen as one of the main reasons of relatively poor performance in an international 
comparison. I will focus on both technological reasons and institutional reasons 
which may have affected the decision to adopt mass production techniques.  
 The American model usually refers to a system of mass production, in which 
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machinery, with mainly unskilled labour, and systematic management techniques 
and hierarchical structures (Zeitlin 2004). The extent to which countries can adopt 
this system of production is dependent upon factor and resource endowments, and 
the demand pattern. In the nineteenth century the United States was equipped with 
cheap resources, and skilled labour was scarce, combined with a homogeneous 
demand pattern. This allowed for a wider adoption of mass production techniques 
than in Europe (Ames and Rosenberg 1968; Broadberry 2004).
25
 Even though 
Britain was not adopting mass production techniques at the same speed as the 
United States and relied on craft based production, it is well agreed upon in the 
literature that in terms of technology Britain was the leading manufacturing nation 
in the first part of the nineteenth century (Broadberry 1994). However, this 
position was gradually overtaken by the United States in the second half of the 
century.   
 The view that Britain failed in mass production is not limited to the post-war 
period. According to Harley (1974 p. 414) in the Edwardian period there ‘is no 
question that British industry was slow in adopting new techniques that were 
adopted elsewhere and that were probably also technically, if not economically, 
more efficient’. According to Chandler (1992) the problem in British 
manufacturing already started at the end of the nineteenth century. As an example 
he mentions the synthetic dye industry, a sub-industry in the chemical sector, were 
the British entrepreneurs were pioneers. The first person to invent synthetic dyes 
was British. Until after the Second World War the largest market for these dyes 
was the British textile industry. Since dyes are made from coal, and Britain had the 
largest supply of high quality coal in the world, it should be expected that Britain 
would dominate the world dye market. However, according to Chandler British 
entrepreneurs failed to make the necessary investments in production, distribution 
and management whereas German competitors did. Chandler argues that failure in 
the development of organisational capacities is the underlying problem in many 
manufacturing industries. For the early 1970s Prais (1981) argues that Britain 
failed in especially those industries that require a very large-scale of production. 
Davies and Caves (1987) conclude for the end of the 1960s and 1970s also that 
Britain’s plants failed especially in industries with large scale economies. 
 In the Broadberry-Crafts view (2003), Britain’s inability to adopt American 
mass production techniques is seen as an important reason for its slow 
performance in labour-productivity growth. Booth (2003a) criticises the 
                                                   
25 Although Allen (2013) comes to another conclusion, and argues that the differences between the 
United Kingdom and the United States are small when viewed in a global context.  
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Manufacturing Failure Hypothesis for having fundamental flaws, where his 
critique is focused on the premise that Britain was failing in large plants, and on 
the distinction between Fordism in the US, and specialised batch-production in the 
UK. The British production system is usually viewed as operating on a smaller 
scale than the United States system. Many firms were family owned. The United 
Kingdom is supposed to be specialised in batch-production, and usually a family-
member takes the role as manager. However, Booth warns that this distinction 
might be too crude. Although America was using mass-production techniques, not 
all manufacturing output was produced in large plants. Therefore, classifying the 
United States as ‘Fordist’ is not a very sensible classification according to Booth.  
 There is also good economic reason not to adopt mass production. As 
compared with the United States Britain experienced greater inequality in the 
distribution of income and wealth, combined with a class distinction, which means 
that standardisation was not accepted (Frankel 1957). As Crafts (1994) writes 
‘investigation of decisions made by entrepreneurs and by investors in capital 
markets has refuted some of the wilder charges or irrationality and incompetence 
which used to be commonplace explanations of an over commitment by late 
Victorian/Edwardian Britain to old methods and an outdated industrial structure’, 
(p 39). Zeitlin (2004) notes that British manufacturers of components saw more 
possibilities for a reduction in production variety, than manufacturers of consumer 
goods and capital equipment. The most aspiring projects to experiment with mass 
production and standardisation were actually undertaken by nationalised 
enterprises, for example the railways and the electricity supply (Zeitlin 2004).  
 After the Second World War, there seemed to be interest from the United 
Kingdom in American production techniques. An important question is whether 
there were any effects from the United States on British corporations to enhance 
productivity. The most frequently mentioned example of such initiative is the 
Anglo-American Council of Productivity (AACP), which was formed during the 
autumn of 1948.
26
 This council consisted of representatives of management and 
labour both in Britain and in the United States.
27
 The aim of the AACP was ‘to 
promote economic well-being by a free exchange of knowledge in the realm of 
industrial organization, method and technique, and thereby to assist British 
                                                   
26 See ‘The final report of the Anglo-American council on productivity’. The AACP was part of the 
Marshall plan. The congress of the United States declared it to be American policy to promote 
industrial and agricultural production and increase productivity in European countries  (AACP final 
report, p. 5).  
27 The constituent bodies in the United Kingdom were: the Federation of British Industries, the 
British Employers’ Confederation and the Trades Union Congress.  
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industry to raise the level of its productivity’.28 The method to achieve this goal 
was to send American industrial teams to Britain. These teams consisted of a 
mixture of members from supervisory levels, technical personnel, and workshop 
personal. The Council was operating until June 1952, which was the end of the 
Marshall aid period. The Council continued as the British Productivity Council 
after this period.
29
        
 In the literature scholars have been pessimistic about the achievements of the 
AACP.
30
 Tomlinson (1991) discussed the reasons for failure of the productivity 
enhancing initiative. He mentions as one of the most important reasons that the 
period in which the AACP operated had a particular economic climate, with a 
sellers-market. This implies that there was little incentive for employers to 
revolutionise their practices, since profits were high anyway. Carew (1987; 1991), 
in his critique on the AACP, focuses mainly on the tendency of the reports to 
emphasise the intangible causes of the productivity difference between the United 
States and the UK. Some of the reports of the AACP would literally state that 
Americans were found to be ‘production-minded’ and that attitude derived from a 
‘climate of productivity’ (Carew 1991). These types of findings do not yield any 
suggestion for changes that could be implemented in the British manufacturing 
industry.  
 Due to the historical commitment to craft production in Britain, attempts to 
switch to American mass-production methods were resisted by skilled shop floor 
workers whose job became threatened (Broadberry & Wagner 1996). In many 
sectors, this became a more serious problem as markets and possibilities for 
technology transfer changed in the early post-war period. Another effect of the 
success of the unions was that in many industries they could defend custom and 
practise in working habits, even when new technologies were introduced 
(Williams, Williams and Thomas 1983). According to Williams et al. (1983) this 
resulted in machines, installations and assembly lines that became over-manned, 
were run slowly and poorly used. 
  British managers were also not very eager to adopt the American mass-
production technologies since they were not used to exercising the degree of shop 
floor control needed to make it profitable (Lewchuk 1987). Part of the reason 
might be that in Britain managers were rarely recruited on the basis of educational 
attainment, selection in management positions was the result of on-job experience 
                                                   
28 See ‘The final report of the Anglo-American council on productivity’, p. i.  
29 The BPC started in 1953, the aim of this permanent organisation was to promote awareness of 
productivity and to follow up on the recommendations done in the reports of the AACP.    
30 See e.g. Tomlinson and Tiratsoo 2002.  
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(Tuckman 1996,). In crafts industries such as for example the printing industry, 
labour unions were resisting the introduction of new equipment and 
reorganisations (Eichengreen 2006, p. 124). But also in the motor vehicle industry, 
workers managed to impose restrictions on the introduction of mass production 
techniques (Eichengreen 2006).  
 Interestingly, US management consultancies had a relative limited impact in 
Britain and West Germany in the early post-war period (Zeitlin 2004). There came 
a role for US management consultancy firms, notably McKinsey&Co in 
transferring the multidivisional form of corporate organisation to large British 
firms in the 1960s. However, the introduction was not without problems, quite 
often the multidivisional structure was implemented in an incomplete or modified 
form. In West Germany the important industries such as the steel industry, 
engineering industry, automobile industry never adopted the M-form at all, and 
they kept the traditional holding company structure till the 1970s (Zeitlin 2004). 
Important in this aspect is also investment in capital. If we assume that Britain is 
transferring to mass production techniques, we should witness an increase in 
capital investment, as mass production techniques are more capital intensive than 
the traditional crafts based techniques. In the period 1924 to 1937, the capital stock 
in Britain grew very slowly, at only 1 per cent per annum (Crafts 1994, p. 39). 
Hence, there was not much capital deepening going on before the Second World 
War. Especially in engineering managers opted for methods less capital intensive 
than in the US, which meant more job control by the strong craft unions (Crafts 
1994). In the next section I will discuss the large plant problem in more detail.  
3.4.2 The large plant problem in Britain  
This section attempts to provide more quantitative evidence on the productivity 
levels of firms with a different scale. To assess to what extent there was a problem 
in large-scale manufacturing in Britain Booth constructed so-called ‘footprints’ of 
British and American manufacturing productivity for 1954. These footprints show 
net output per employee for establishments of different sizes (Booth 2003a).
31
 
Table 3.10 below reports his results.  
                                                   
31 In the British data the establishment size reported in the census varies over time. Booth therefore 
made guesstimates to obtain information on the same establishment size groups as provided in the 
US census of manufactures.  
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Table 3.10: Manufacturing footprints, US and UK, 1954 and 1967-1968 












85 89 96 105 111 110 100 
% total net output 9 9 32 14 17 19  
US relative 
productivity 
82 87 96 105 113 112 101 
% total net output 11 9 29 14 17 21  










86 85 92 103 115 118 100 
% total net output 12 8 29 13 15 23  










88 83 91 105 112 116 100 
% total net output 11 7 28 15 15 24 15 
Source: Booth (2003a), Table 5, p. 16.  
In 1954 for example, British establishments with 10-49 employees were at 85 per 
cent of the productivity level in total British manufacturing. US establishments in 
this size class were at 82 per cent of the US productivity level in total 
manufacturing. Thus, for both countries, these small establishments were less 
productive than average.  
  Booth concludes that the distribution of total value added and the productivity 
measure are very similar in the United Kingdom and the United States for the year 
1954 and 1968. He indeed finds that the United States has larger establishments in 
the largest size class, however, only a small percentage of the total labour force is 
employed in this category.  Probably the most interesting result of his comparison 
is that the productivity gap in establishments with less than 100 employees is of 
the same dimension as the gap in establishments employing more than 2500 
employees. Especially for the small establishments it is expected that scale, 
multidivisional organisation, and deep managerial hierarchies are not very relevant  
(Booth 2003a, p.17). Table 3.10 also reveals that in the United States only a bit 
more than 20 per cent of net output was produced in establishments with more 
than 2500 employees. Roughly half of the production was produced in 
establishments with less than 500 employees. This pattern is very similar for 
Britain. Hence, Booth’s conclusion is that there was no large plant effect at work.  
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 Although Booth makes a good attempt by comparing productivity in 
manufacturing plants of different sizes in Britain and the US, there is not too much 
sense in doing this only at the aggregate level. As I have argued before, failure will 
be industry specific, and hence, any endeavour to reveal failure should take place 
at the disaggregated industry level. One major problem with aggregating is that in 
terms of employment, what is large for one industrial branch can be small for 
another. Different industries work with different production functions. For 
example, in 1951 in Britain the largest plants in engineering, shipbuilding and 
electrical goods employed more than 10.000 persons, whereas the largest firms in 
the leather industry employed less than 1000 persons. Obviously, in some 
industries there are larger economies of scale than in others. Therefore, simply 
grouping all industries together will not capture all the industry dynamics. 
However, the information at the aggregate level does reveal whether there is an 
increase in scale over time. Table 3.11 reports for total manufacturing the 
percentage of net output produced, and percentage of the total labour force 
employed, and the relative productivity level in different establishments size 
groups, for the period 1930 till 1970. By 1970 more than 43 per cent of net output 
is produced in establishments with more than thousand employees, and more than 
40 per cent of all employees in manufacturing is employed in such establishments. 
When we compare 1951 with 1970, we see that there has been a steady increase in 
the amount of net output produced in the largest establishments, whereas there is a 
decrease in the smaller establishments. There has been a decrease in the 
percentage of employees employed in establishments with less than 500 workers. 
The average size of the largest establishments increased from 2225 in 1951 to 
2647 by 1970. There is a clear increase in the scale of production in the period 
1930-1970. This is partly the result of an increase in the number of establishments 
in this size group, and partly the result of an increase in the size of establishments 
in this size group. Interestingly enough, however, the productivity level of the 
largest size group does not change much from 1951 to 1970. If mass production 
techniques led to higher productivity, we would expect to see an increase in 
productivity over time.  
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Table 3.11: Net output and employment distribution over different establishment sizes for total 
manufacturing in the United Kingdom  
Source: own calculations based on Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical Record of the 
Census of Production 1907-1970’, Table 7 pp. 244-245.  
 
 In an attempt to partially solve the problem with aggregate footprints I 
constructed disaggregate ‘footprints’ for 1935, 1951 and 1971 for the UK. The 
production censuses of the United Kingdom provide information on the number of 
 
 
Percentage of net output produced by different establishment sizes 
 1-24 25-99 100-500 500-999 1000+ 
1930 12.26 15.45 30.65 41.65 
 
1935 12.09 16.69 32.92 38.30 
 
1948 9.41 16.92 32.63 13.63 27.39 
1951 7.38 15.32 32.58 13.79 30.92 
1954 7.57 13.71 30.89 13.66 34.18 
1963 7.13 10.51 28.56 14.84 38.96 
1968 7.80 10.29 28.45 15.13 38.33 
1970 a 16.36 25.74 14.37 43.53 
 
Percentage of total employment employed by different establishment sizes 
 1-24 25-99 100-500 500-999 1000+  
1930 12.80 16.10 32.68 38.44 b 
1935 12.53 17.63 35.36 34.49 b 
1948 9.89 16.95 32.22 13.49 27.46 
1951 8.41 16.80 32.64 13.21 28.94 
1954 8.36 15.71 32.39 13.14 30.42 
1963 8.01 12.19 30.67 14.24 34.90 
1968 8.45 11.82 30.65 14.55 34.53 
1970 7.34 11.10 27.03 13.89 40.63 
Productivity level (net output per employee) based on size of establishments (average productivity = 
100) 
 1-24 25-99 100-500 500-999 1000+ 
1930 96 96 94 108 n.a. 
1935 96 95 93 111 n.a. 
1948 95 100 101 101 100 
1951 88 91 100 104 107 
1954 91 87 95 104 112 
1963 89 86 93 104 112 
1968 92 87 93 104 111 
1970 n.a. 147 95 103 107 
Note a: for this size group the information is presented in the next higher size range.  b: for this size 
group the information is presented in the next lower size range. 
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employees per establishment, and the output generated there. Per size-group I 
calculated labour productivity per employee based on value added per employee; 
the percentage of total employment employed in these firms; and the percentage of 
total output and value added of the industry produced by this type of firms. 
Unfortunately the sizes of establishments distinguished by the censuses are not the 
same for all industries and not the same for all years. To keep as much information 
as possible I stick to the classification as given in the respective years, Table A-
2.1, A-2.2 and A2.3 in the Appendix present the results, where I have set the 
average labour productivity of each industry in each year on 100. The relative 
productivity of establishments of a certain size type differs remarkably over 
industries.  
 To assess whether there is a problem with Britain’s performance in large-scale 
manufacturing I need to define clearly what I mean by failure in large-scale 
operations. A clear example of failure in large-scale operations would be if large 
firms which produce a similar product as small firms were less productive. But 
even if the large plant was as productive as a small plant, we could consider this as 
failure, since we would assume that a large plant can benefit from economies of 
scale, and hence productivity should be higher. Failure in large-scale operations 
does not only mean failure in the sense of relative low-productivity in existing 
large plants, but also failure to set up these high productive large plants. Even if 
we find that large-scale production is more productive than small-scale production, 
we do not know how much larger production in these large-scale establishments 
could have been, under more efficient production, which can still hint at failure. 
Thus, we should be careful in interpreting the result.  
 A major difficulty in this analysis is to judge whether the production mix of 
different plants will be the same. Part of the reason for differences in productivity 
might simply be that the output produced is different and more, or less labour 
intensive. In some industries, such as in the engineering, shipbuilding and 
electrical goods industry for example, we can assume that the products produced 
in the establishments with 11-24 employees is of a different nature than the 
products produced in those firms with more than 10,000 employees. When we 
examine the ratio of net output to gross output for 1951 in Table A-2.1 in the 
Appendix, we observe that there is a difference between the size groups. Since net 
output is obtained after deducting from gross output the costs of materials and fuel 
used, and the amount paid to for work given out and other payments recorded in 
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the census, this can be the result of a different input-output structure.
32
 For 
example, if a large establishment can buy its inputs more cheaply, this will lead to 
a higher net to gross output ratio. Similarly, it can be the result of simply 
producing a different type of product, which requires more or less inputs, or inputs 
of a different quality. When we assess wages we see that these are in general 
higher in the larger establishments. This makes sense if we believe that more value 
is added in these firms, and labour is paid its marginal product.
33
  
 Productivity is for some industries higher than average in the large 













(average = 100) 
Textiles 
1935 33 83.6 7.92 121 
1951 38 90.1 9.74 138 
1970 44 134.8 22.01 127 
Chemicals 
1935 12 38 19.67 100 
1951 29 93.7 24.96 89 
1970 56 175.8 42.66 109 
Sources: own calculations based on Board of Trade (1938-1944), ‘Final Report of the Fifth Census 
of Production and the Import Duties Act Inquiry 1935’; Board of Trade (1954) ‘The report on the 
census of Production for 1951’; Business Statistics Office (1976), ‘Report on the census of 
production – summary tables’.  
In textiles for example the establishments with more than 1500 employees were 
1.38 times as productive as the average in the industry in 1951. In 1935 the largest 
establishments in the textile industry were also more productive than average, but 
the differences in productivity between the size classes were much smaller than in 
1951. By 1971 establishments with more than 1500 employees were responsible 
for 22 per cent of total employment, whereas this share was less than ten per cent 
in 1951, and less than 8 per cent in 1935. Thus, there has been a clear shift towards 
                                                   
32 Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical Record of the Census of Production 1907 to 1970’, p. 
xiv. 
33 The coefficient of correlation between the wage and relative productivity is 0.40 for 1951 and it is 
statistically significant even at the 1 per cent level. 
34 This is a subset of the information provided in Tables A-2.1, A-2.2 and A-2.3 in the Appendix.  
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larger scale operations, which hints at a transfer to mass production and 
Americanisation. 
 In the chemicals industry the largest establishments, with more than 1500 
employees, are as productive as the average in that industry in 1935. By 1951 the 
largest establishments are less productive, but by 1971 the establishments with 
more than 1500 employees are nine per cent above the average labour-productivity 
level of the industry. Whereas there were only 12 establishments with more than 
1500 employees in 1935, employing around 20 per cent of all employees in this 
sector, this number increased to 29 by 1951, when 25 per cent of all employees in 
the sector are employed in this type of establishment. By 1971 there are 56 of 
these large establishments, employing more than 40 per cent of all employment in 
this industry.  
 American investment in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) could 
have been an important source of Americanisation. However, until the early 1950s 
American FDI was of minor importance in Europe, except for the oil and car 
industry, where in particular GM was a big party (Schröter 2005, p.63). Dunning 
(1958) hypothesised that if the superiority in US productivity was solely the result 
of better management, US manufacturing affiliated in Britain should perform as 
well as their parent companies, and much better than firms from British origin. His 
results indicated that indeed the American affiliates were more productive than 
British companies, but not as productive as American companies in the US.  
 Overall, I conclude that there is an increase in scale in British manufacturing 
over the course of the period under investigation. However, given Britain’s 
specific situation, manufacturing was much less suited for mass production 
techniques and Americanisation than the United States was. Hence, it is not very 
surprising that these techniques were not implemented in the same form as the US. 
And one should wonder whether we should talk about failure, where there are 
clear economic reasons not to adopt a different production mode.  
 Although my calculations of labour-productivity levels in Chapter 2 did not 
focus on establishments with ten or fewer employees, i.e. the very small plants, it 
is interesting to evaluate the trend of these establishments as well. In 1930 Britain 
had over 93,000 establishments with less than ten employees and by 1960 only 
35,000 such establishments existed and by 1970 it was it a bit more (see Table A-
2.3 in the Appendix). By 1970 the share of employment in small firms (less than 
200 employees) was less than 30 per cent (see Table A-2.3 in the Appendix) and 
approximately similar to the share in West Germany (Bannock 1981). Other 
advanced nations all employed larger shares of employment in small firms. Hence, 
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I must conclude that Britain was, compared with nations other than West 
Germany, further ahead in the process of large-scale operations. 
 Although we usually assume that it is up to entrepreneurs to set up and run a 
business, there are some cases were the government is involved in deciding on the 
size of a business. A good example of how this government interference resulted 
in plants of a smaller size than necessary is the fourth steel mill in Britain. When 
the government planned to invest in steelmaking, they could choose for a modern 
and large plant at Newport, however, they decided to split the investment and 
construct two smaller and less efficient plants (Lee 1996, p. 38). The reason was 
the interest of employees and the regions where the facilities were located.  
 The data I have used here have revealed that in many cases the large plants 
were more productive than average. In that sense I can agree with the conclusion 
from Booth (2003a), who argued that there is not really any failure in large-scale 
operations. 
3.4.3 The role of human capital  
According to Oulton (1995) education is an important institution that was 
responsible for holding back British productivity growth in the post-war period. 
His argument is that too much effort of the British schooling system was focused 
on selecting and training the elite, instead of training the whole population. The 
critique that the British education system focuses too much on academic 
education, rather than practical education, and thus did not prepare pupils for the 
type of job they will carry out during their adult live, is not limited to the post-war 
period. For example, the growing technical superiority of Germany during the 
nineteenth century in chemicals, iron and steel and dyes has been attributed to the 
fact that Germany developed an extensive system of both university and 
polytechnic education with close ties to industry, whereas Britain focused much 
more on empirical methods and incremental tinkering to strive for improvements 
and adaptation (Vejarano and Ramírez 2002).
35
  
 Even as late as 1975 still 70 per cent of the population (aged 16-69) had no 
educational or vocational qualifications other than having attended school for the 
prescribed period (Oulton 1995, p. 61).
36
 Since the end of the Second World War, 
Britain had suffered a chronic shortage of skilled craftsmen. Part of the reason that 
Britain’s ability to compete with other industrialised countries declined derived 
                                                   
35 Adam Smith complained that education did not match with the requirements for jobs in the end of 
the eighteenth century (Prais 1993). 
36 The school leaving age in Britain was 15, and changed to 16 in 1972.  
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from Britain’s failure to build and maintain a more skilled workforce (Dintenfass 
1992, p. 38).   
 The Americanisation of industry required not only physical capital. Skill 
endowments in the industrial workforce had to be restructured as well. Craft-based 
production techniques prevalent in most branches of European manufacturing until 
the early post-war years relied heavily on the use of skilled manual labour. By 
contrast, large-scale serial production not only substituted capital for skilled 
labour, but also employed a large number of highly skilled technical personnel, 
production engineers and technicians. Prais (1993) criticises the British education 
system for not preparing students for jobs in manufacturing. Employees who are 
working with machinery on the shop floor usually do not have knowledge to 
maintain the machines. In West Germany, on the other hand, employees working 
with machines could also maintain machinery, which led to less stoppages and a 
more efficient production process (Prais 1993). 
 When we want to compare the West-German skill level with the British level 
an obvious proxy would be years of formal education experience of the population 
aged 15-64. However, this is an imperfect proxy, since the schooling systems of 
West Germany and the United Kingdom differed substantially. Moreover, during 
the 1950s and 1960s apprenticeship training remained the main formal method of 
skill formation for manual labourers (Gospel 1995, pp. 34-35; Prais 1988; 
Tuckman 1996, p. 135,). 
 I do not have data to compare the composition of industrial employment 
according to qualification levels in the two countries over the whole period. 
However, I have enough evidence to show that the West-German training system 
proved to be flexible enough to facilitate this technological transition. The number 
of apprentices in industry and handcrafts declined by twenty per cent between 1956 
and 1960, despite the significant expansion of manufacturing employment 
(Hoffmann 1962, p. 112). By contrast, total enrolment in engineering schools 
increased by 62 per cent between 1958 and 1968, even though employment growth 
was much more modest than during the 1950s (Kultusministerkonferenz 1969).  
 In Britain the decline in apprenticeships was even larger than in West 
Germany (Broadberry and Wagner 1996). According to Broadberry and Wagner 
(1996) we can interpret this decline in apprenticeships as a signal that both 
countries tried to introduce Americanisation. The fact that the decline was much 
larger in Britain as compared to West Germany is an indication of the greater 
enthusiasm in Britain for Americanisation. An important element of 
Americanisation is larger control by managers. Broadberry and Wagner (1996) 
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were able to show that the educational attainments of British and West-German 
managers were roughly on par. Hence, as Broadberry and Crafts (1996) argue, the 
relatively poor performance of Britain in American production techniques cannot 
be explained by the educational attainments of the management level. The view in 
the literature on amateurism in British managements seems highly overdrawn.  
  Figure 3.4 shows how the skilled labour endowments of West Germany 
industry had evolved over the 1950s and 1960s. From 1962 onward, the national 
employment and social statistics report detailed data on the composition of 
industrial employment, based on which I compute the share of both skilled manual 
workers, and engineers and technicians in total employment. For the 1950s, such 
figures are not available. However, the Federal Statistical Office conducted two 
large representative surveys on the structure of industrial wages and salaries in 
November 1951 and in October 1957.
37
 From these sources, I can determine the 
ratio of skilled workers to the manual workforce and the ratio of technical 
personnel to all salaried employees represented in the survey. The industry 
statistics report employment broken down to salaried staff and wage labour.
38
 
Therefore, I can use these data to compute the share of both skilled manual 
workers and engineers and technicians in total employment. Figure 3.2 depicts a 
marked shift towards a more intensive use of highly skilled technical personnel 
and a parallel decline in the application of skilled manual labour between the late 
1950s and the early 1960s.  
 To the extent that this trend was not matched by, or was less dynamic in, 
British industry, it provides an additional explanation for the superior German 
productivity performance in large-scale manufacturing. In Britain, a craft 
production strategy was still pursued. Shopfloor workers retained high degrees of 
control over the production process, and as a result there was less need for 
investment in management (Broadberry & Wagner 1996).  
 
                                                   
37 Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. 90-91 (1954), vol. 246.1-2 (1960) 
38 Die Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe 4: Sonderveröffentlichungen, No. 11 (1956); 
Statistisches Jahrbuch 1958 
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Figure 3.4: The share of skilled manual workers and salaried technical personnel in total 
industrial employment in West Germany (%) 
 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (1954a), ‘Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, vol. 90-91 
(1954), and Statistisches Bundesamt (1960) vol. 246.1-2 (1960). Statistisches Bundesamt (1956d), 
‘Die Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, Reihe 4: Sonderveröffentlichungen, No. 11; 
Statistisches Bundesamt (1959), ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch 1958’. 
 In comparison to the United States British firms were relatively small and 
even very large firms were usually loose holding companies (Elbaum 1989, 1991). 
Due to weak managerial hierarchies, craft labour remained important to organise 
production. According to Elbaum (1991), the adequate supply of both skilled and 
unskilled labour, combined with the slow development of internal labour markets, 
meant that British firms had to rely on craft labour or occupational labour markets, 
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In this chapter I have analysed and discussed the sources of Britain’s poor  
economic performance when placed in a comparison with West Germany. With 
the use of decomposition techniques I was able to show the individual contribution 
of each industry to the gap in labour-productivity in total manufacturing between 
West Germany and the United Kingdom. In 1951 a large part of the aggregate gap 
is the result of Britain’s sizable lead in the tobacco industry. I have shown that 
West Germany’s falling behind by 1951 was the result of the sharp deterioration in 
the principal war industries. West Germany did however, manage to preserve a 
lead in iron and steel, chemicals and textiles.  
 The British literature on Britain’s relative economic decline during the Golden 
Age builds partly on the work of Broadberry and Crafts on manufacturing failure. 
Their premise is that evidently Britain failed during the 1950s and 1960s in 
manufacturing productivity, and this was one of the causes of its gloomy economic 
performance. In this chapter I have shown, with use of the pre and post-war 
labour-productivity estimates that Britain was indeed falling behind West 
Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. Presumably West Germany already overtook 
Britain in terms of labour-productivity at the end of the 1950s, as the extrapolation 
indicates. West Germany clearly forged ahead in the 1960s. However, when I 
consider the war induced gap in productivity in West Germany, a large part of 
West Germany’s growth acceleration in the 50s can be explained by reconstruction 
growth. West Germany was bound to get back to its own historical growth path. 
This growth could not have been mirrored by the UK, since it simply was not as 
severely damaged by the war, and thus did not experience a war-related output gap 
of the same magnitude. This reconstruction growth is not capable of explaining the 
entire gap between German and British productivity. Labour productivity growth 
rates in West Germany were still significantly higher than British growth rates 
during the 1960s. By that time we would expect that reconstruction growth would 
have ended. This means that during the 1960s there is room for British failure. In 
that sense, the title of this chapter ‘Winning the War, Losing the peace’ seems to 
capture the British experience during the Golden Age of economic growth.  
 My new data contributes to the debate on Britain’s relative economic decline 
because it revealed that West Germany did not secure the largest part of its 
overtaking in the first years of 1952, as Booth (2003a) has argued. Instead, only a 
small amount of the total productivity advantage was secured during the first years 
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of the 1950s. This implies that the period of the 1960s is also of crucial importance 
in the explanation of the British-German productivity race.  
 Many hypotheses have been put forward to help explain British relative 
economic decline. This chapter has attempted to add to the debate in some areas. I 
have used disaggregate industry data to investigate the effect of establishment size. 
Although I cannot firmly conclude that Britain was failing in Americanisation, I 
do find evidence that large establishments in Britain were not substantially more 
productive than smaller sized establishments. An important aspect is also when we 
should term the British performance as failure. In many industries the American 
techniques could not be adopted due to specific supply and demand side factors, 
and hence, it seems questionable to state that entrepreneurs making decisions in 






  Chapter 4
The role of international trade in 
Britain’s relative economic decline. 
The link between productivity and 
trade examined 
4.1 Introduction 
  In the debate on Britain’s relative economic decline in the post-war era, trade 
and openness have been mentioned as causes of its relatively weak performance 
(Broadberry  & Leunig 2013,  Milward and Brennan, 1996). The Golden Age of 
economic growth was in essence a period of protectionism in Britain, tariffs 
remained at their 1930s level through the mid-1960s and the median tariff was 
twice as high as the West-German level in the late 1950s (Crafts 2012). This 
chapter investigates whether the degree of Britain’s openness had an effect on 
manufacturing productivity performance.  
 Britain’s failure to become a member of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in the early post-war period is mentioned in the literature as a cause of 
declining competitiveness. When Sir Winston Churchill came back into office in 
1951 his government showed very little interest in participation in a European 
organisation (Clark 1962). At the same time however, industrialists believed that 
the United Kingdom should become a member of the Common Market, since not 
being a member meant being excluded from one of the most rapidly expanding 
markets for specialised products, and high quality consumer goods (Clark 1962, 
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pp. 64-65). However, it was not before 1973 that Britain finally joined as a 
member of the EEC, and by that time, industries were already too uncompetitive to 
be able to compete effectively with foreign manufacturing industries (Broadberry 
and Leunig 2013). Problems with limited competition have been frequently 
mentioned as an important source of Britain’s relative economic decline in the 
influential work of Broadberry and Crafts.
1
 
 The relationship between trade and growth has been a subject of great 
controversy in the economic literature of the past decades. There are multiple 
channels through which trade and openness can have an effect on growth or 
productivity.
2
 The most important are the market size effect, the possibilities of 
more scope for learning by doing, knowledge spill-overs, technology transfers, and 
enhanced competition (Grossman & Helpman 1991; Keller 2002; Melitz 2003; 
Romer 1987). However, there is considerable disagreement about the nature of the 
relationship and the possible direction of causality (Hutchison & Singh 1992; 
Hsiao 1987). Although there is no consensus on the issue, a large literature 
suggests that differences in growth performance and productivity may be related to 
variation in international openness.
3
 In this chapter I am interested in the 
relationship between international trade, openness and labour productivity at the 
industry level in Britain during the post-war era. To fully evaluate to what extent 
Britain’s relative economic decline can be (partly) the result of its trade policies, 
openness and trade patterns, we first need to investigate whether there are any 
effects on productivity.        
 The main contribution of this chapter is to set an important first step in the 
quantification of the relationship between openness and productivity during the 
post-war era in the United Kingdom. Although the literature has mentioned 
Britain’s trade patterns and its export performance as a cause of its relative 
economic decline, there is not much quantitative evidence available to support this 
claim. This chapter attempts to make a beginning in filling this lacuna. I use 
labour-productivity growth rates at the disaggregate industry level in 
manufacturing to examine the relationship between trade and growth. This 
approach allows me to use quantitative econometric analysis to answer the 
research question. I present a novel data set of labour-productivity growth rates for 
23 industries within manufacturing for the period 1951-1970. Although there are 
estimates of labour productivity available for this period from O’Mahony (1991), I 
constructed my own data set because O’Mahony’s classification does not match 
                                                   
1 See e.g. Broadberry and Crafts (2001); and Crafts (2012). 
2 See Redding (1998) for a detailed overview of theoretical linkages. 
3 See e.g. Edwards (1992); Sachs &Warner (1995). 
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the classification in the trade statistics.  By constructing my own data set I am able 
to include as many industries as possible in the analysis.  
 I use behavioural measures of openness to examine the relationship between 
openness and labour-productivity growth.  As discussed in the previous chapter 
catch-up and convergence potential are of substantial importance for the growth in 
productivity during the period of this study.  I therefore control for catch-up and 
convergence by including a measure of distance from the productivity frontier, 
which is widely acknowledged to be the United States during this period.   
 I do not only use labour-productivity growth rates as a dependent variable, I 
also use data on Multi Factor Productivity as provided by Oulton and O’Mahony 
(1994). I reclassified their data set to exactly match the industry classification 
system of the data in the trade statistics. This approach allows me to investigate 
not only the effect of trade on labour productivity, but also the effect on 
productivity increases which do not result from a change in the input of capital or 
the input of labour.  
 My approach combines imports and exports from the whole world. This 
ignores the area pattern of trade. In the final section I therefore examine the area 
pattern of trade in more detail and I investigate whether the origin and destination 
of trade at the disaggregate manufacturing level have an impact on labour-
productivity.   
 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents a literature 
review. Section 4.3 provides a detailed description of the construction of the 
measures of openness and the novel labour-productivity data set. Section 4.4 
develops the theoretical framework and econometric specification. Section 4.5 
presents the results of estimation. In this section I will also discuss the robustness 
checks to verify that the results are not driven by a few outlier industries. In 
Section 4.6 the focus shifts from labour-productivity growth rates to Multi Factor 
Productivity growth rates. Section 4.7 discusses the effect of the geographical 
composition of trade on labour-productivity growth rates. Finally, Section 4.8 
summarises and concludes the chapter.  
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4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 The Commonwealth problem and British ‘failure’ in international 
trade 
The United Kingdom was once the first major, dominant trading country of the 
world. At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain was the number one exporting 
country in the world, responsible for 32.5 per cent of world trade in manufactures 
(Tyszynski 1951, p. 286, as quoted in Wells 1964, p. 15).
4
 Until the First World 
War, there were no restrictions on international capital mobility, and tariffs were 
so low that there was virtually a situation of free trade (Crafts 2012).
5
 As Moore 
(1988) points out, the British economy appeared to be a paradigm of an industrial 
country, exporting manufactures and importing primary goods. Even in 1950 the 
biggest share of its imports consisted of agricultural goods, whereas eighty per 
cent of its exports were manufactures. Interestingly enough, between the two 
world wars most economies turned inwards, and trade in 1950 was at a lower level 
than trade in 1913 (Krugman, Cooper & Srinivasan 1995). In 1913 Britain’s trade 
share in GDP was 27.7 per cent, whereas by 1950 this was only 13.1 per cent, and 
even in 1970 it was not back at the pre-World War One level (Krugman et al, 
1995). A large part of the growth in trade from 1950 onwards represents recovery 
to former levels.  
 Table 4.1 below presents the share of the United Kingdom and other principal 
manufacturing countries in world trade in manufacturing for the period 1938 to 
1959. In 1938, just before the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain was still 
a bigger exporter than the United States. After the Second World War, the United 
States became the biggest exporter of manufactured goods in the world, and by 
1958 West Germany overtook Britain’s position as the world’s second largest 
exporter of manufacturing goods (Wells 1964, p. 3). Clearly, the share of the 
United Kingdom in total manufacturing trade has fallen substantially during this 
period. Only the United States experienced a larger decline in this share. West 
Germany increased its share in world trade the most. We must not forget the 
obvious fact that the total volume of Britain’s production represented a smaller 
                                                   
4 Trade in manufactures includes Class III of the British Export List 1950, and alcoholic drinks and 
manufactured tobacco, but excludes coke and refined petroleum.  
5 Whereas at the beginning of the nineteenth century the average custom rates of Great Britain were 
still up to or  over 50 per cent, by 1913 they were lowered till just over 5 per cent (Imlah 1958, Table 
11, p. 121 and Table 19, p. 160). 
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share of world output in the post-war period than during the nineteenth century 
and the pre-war period.  
Table 4.1: Share of world market in trade of manufactures, 1938, 1953-1959 
 Percentage shares of principal manufacturing countries 
 




United Kingdom  22.1 21.3 20.4 19.7 19.1 18.1 17.9 17.3 -4 
United States  20 25.9 25.1 24.5 25.2 25.4 23.3 21.3 -4.6 
West Germany  22.7 13.3 14.8 15.5 16.4 17.5 18.5 19.1 5.8 
Belgium-Luxembourg 5.9 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.7 6 5.9 6 -0.5 
France 6.5 9 9 9.3 7.8 8 8.6 9.2 0.2 
Italy and Trieste 2.9 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.5 1.2 
Netherlands 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.2 0.5 
Sweden  2.3 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 0.5 
Switzerland 2.7 4 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 -0.6 
Canada 5.1 6.8 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.2 -1.6 
Japan 6.6 3.8 4.7 5.1 5.7 6 6 6.7 2.9 
Note: 1938 is the whole German Reich, 1953-1959 German Federal Republic only. After the war, 
exports of the Federal Republic region were approximately two-thirds of those of pre-war 
Germany.  
Source: Wells (1964), Table 1.1, p. 15. 
 Although in contemporary literature on British relative economic decline, 
openness and international trade have been mentioned as causes of this process, 
economists had been relatively silent on issues such as trade policies and the effect 
of openness on economic performance during the first part of the Golden Age 
(Wells 1966). In the previous chapters I have compared Britain to West Germany, 
which is common practice in the discussion on British relative economic decline. 
When we compare Britain to West Germany in the context of trade and openness, 
it seems as if the British market was stuck in Commonwealth and colonial trade, 
whereas West Germany benefited from being integrated into a fast-growing 
continental bloc in Western Europe. During and after the Second World War, 
Britain entered in long term contracts to buy primary products from the dominions 
and the colonies at negotiated prices. At the same time, the West-German 
economy was booming, and this economic miracle has been seen by many as the 
consequence of an even more remarkable export miracle (Boltho 1982; Wallich 
1955). Between 1950 and 1958 industrial exports of West Germany grew by 
almost 20 per cent annually (Delhaes-Guenther (2003), p. 17). In the 1960s the 
growth rate was slower, but still a remarkable 10.6 per cent. Britain was unable to 
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acquire closer integration with the Atlantic countries due to its close involvement 
with the Commonwealth countries, to such extent that it has been referred to as 
‘the Commonwealth problem’ (Wells, 1966).     
 Britain had high import tariffs as compared to for example West Germany. For 
the early post-war period attempts have been made to investigate to what extent 
imports were hindered by these restrictions. Estimates for 1952 and 1954 range 
between a reduction in imports, as a percentage of actual imports, of 5 to 9 per 
cent (Milward and Brennan, 1996, p. 139). In 1953 the Committee on the Future 
of Dollar Saving Industries estimated that output with a value of 314 million 
pound was protected by quantitative import restrictions, and 270 million pound of 
this came from production which was very likely to disappear if quota protection 
against North America ended (Milward and Brennan 1996, pp. 198-199).
6
 Hence, 
the import tariffs had a pronounced effect on the actual imports.  
 Harold Macmillan announced on 31 July 1961 that Britain planned to start 
negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC) with the aim of 
acquiring full membership (Ludlow 1997). Since Britain was not willing to give 
up its preferential trade agreements with the Commonwealth countries, the 
application was vetoed by France in 1963. Another issue in the admission to the 
European Union was the British Pound Sterling. Although the negotiations 
focused mainly on trade problems, the issue of sterling as an international currency 
was an important symbol of the distinct character of Britain’s relations with the 
rest of the world (Schenk 2010). If Britain became part of the EEC, fixing the 
sterling exchange rate to the system of stable exchange rates in the area would 
have implied less policy sovereignty for Britain (Schenk 2010). From the 
perspective of the EEC sterling posed a problem since in the Treaty of Rome 
members were committed to offer support when a member experienced balance-
of-payment problems (Schenk 2002). Moreover as Schenk (2002) mentions, the 
weakness of the pound signalled general weakness of the British economy, which 
implied it was an unattractive partner. Furthermore, Schenk argues that Britain’s 
attachment to sterling might imply that its interest in policies might deviate from 
the interest of the EEC, which obviously posed a problem. Thus, Britain’s position 
to sterling was fundamental for entering the EEC.   
 In 1960 Britain established a European industrial group, the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), with some smaller non-EEC countries.
7
 The other 
                                                   
6 In 1954 gross output of the manufacturing sector was 18.000 million pound, and value added was 
about one-third of this.  
7 The founder members of the EFTA were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  
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nations in the EFTA had relatively small manufacturing sectors and hence, British 
manufacturing was still relatively isolated from competitive pressure.
8
 Broadberry 
and Leunig (2013) claim that one of the main reasons for the relatively low 
productivity growth rates of Britain in the 1960s, as compared to for example 
West Germany or France was this isolation of British firms from foreign 
competition. According to Broadberry and Leunig, by the time Britain became a 
member of the EEC, firms were already too uncompetitive. Britain’s failure to be a 
founder member of the European Union might have had significant implications 
for the development of British manufacturing. Whereas European nations had a 
relatively similar economic structure, which implies that firms in each country 
competed with each other in a potentially vigorous manner, Britain and the 
Commonwealth had a different economic structure, being complementary to each 
other. Trade between Britain and the Commonwealth was more likely to reduce 
intra-industry competitive pressure. Therefore, trade with the Commonwealth was 
not a potential substitute for trade with the EEC. The recent publication of 
Broadberry and Leunig once more indicates that the debate on British relative 
economic decline and the possible causes of this decline is still relevant and not 
settled.         
 Britain applied again for membership of the EEC in 1967, and was finally 
admitted in 1973. As Supple (1994, p. 447) describes ‘when Britain joined the 
European Economic Community…that step acknowledged, as few others could 
have done, the relative weakness rather than the international strength of the 
polity and the economy’.      
 In the literature on British trade policies and openness there has been 
substantial critique on the export performance during the Golden Age of economic 
growth. Panić and Seward (1966) mention three points of critique: firstly, the 
United Kingdom was pricing herself out of the market due to faster rising prices 
and incomes than in the other major industrialised countries. Wells (1964) stated 
that higher rates of productivity did not keep pace with the advance in money 
wages in the United Kingdom, whereas in other advanced countries this was the 
case. Moore (1964) found that price is indeed important for the export of 
chemicals and machinery and transport equipment. For chemicals she found a 
direct price elasticity of more than one, and she found a cross elasticity with 
respect to the price of other European countries of two for machinery and transport 
equipment.    
                                                   
8 Only Denmark and Sweden had a slightly higher GDP per capita than the United Kingdom. 
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 Secondly, an unfavourable export commodity structure might hinder growth of 
export. This argument basically entails that Britain was not exporting those goods 
for which demand is rapidly increasing. Although this is a recurrent argument in 
the literature, Panić and Seward (1966) concluded that the structure of British 
exports seemed to be no less favourable than that of some of its most important 
competitors in the period 1959-1964. The National Institute of Economic Review 
performed a study in 1963 to evaluate whether Britain’s commodity pattern of 
trade was disadvantageous in the period 1954 to 1961. They researched the three 
most important categories in manufacturing trade: machinery, transport 
equipment, and chemicals. Products in these groups were split up in fast growing 
and slow growing products. The share of Britain in fast and slow growing products 
was compared to the share of a group of advanced countries.
9
 The result indicated 
that Britain did not start the period with significantly different export patterns than 
the other advanced countries. Britain’s fraction of exports in fast growing products 
was lower than in the total of the advanced countries group, but this difference was 
not significant.  
 And thirdly, the United Kingdom exported mainly to areas of low growth 
whereas it would be more advantageous to sell to dynamic fast growing countries. 
Wells wrote in 1964 ‘Indeed, a high and growing level of export has now come to 
be regarded as a sine qua non of Britain’s very existence as an influential trading 
nation’ (p. xix, original emphasis). One of the reasons for the disappointing export 
shares was that the Sterling Area became more self-sufficient during the war, and 
therefore less reliant on British manufactured goods. Moreover, these markets 
were not growing as fast as the markets to which for example West Germany was 
exporting. Baldwin (1958 p. 57) found that in the first half of the twentieth century 
the major cause of the declining export share of Britain, in trade with ten advanced 
countries, was not the effect of structural change, but rather the effect of 
competitive weakness.
10
 In conclusion, it seems that the spatial pattern of trade, 
and the price of British exports might have been important in its relative weak 
export position. The product composition does not seem to have been a driving 
force.  
 Between 1955 and 1972 the United Kingdom underwent three successive 
rounds of most favoured nations tariff reductions. In 1956 the number of duties 
                                                   
9 Countries included in this sample are: the United States; the Netherlands; Western Germany; Italy; 
Belgium-Luxembourg; France; and Japan.  
10 There was a negative structural effect between 1928 and 1952; however, this is solely the result of 
the declining export of textiles, when textiles are excluded from the analysis only a competitive 
effect is found.  
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reduced was small, less than 120 or 3.5 per cent of all tariff headings were 
affected, and only a few categories were affected (Morgan and Martin 1975, p. 
39). The average reduction for all manufacturing was only 0.7 per cent. In 1960-
1961 the Dillon Round negotiations, which were implemented on 31 October 
1962, affected all major categories of imports of manufactures. Duties were cut by 
20 per cent of the existing tariff. Nevertheless, the average reduction of all 
manufacturing was only 6 per cent. Finally, the most significant change in tariffs 
was negotiated during the Kennedy Round in 1967. Duties were reduced by fifty 
per cent for more than half of the manufacturing industries. These cuts were 
implemented during the period 1967-1972, thus the effects will be of lesser 
importance for the time frame used in this research. There are no big structural 
changes in the manufacturing sector during the era 1950-1970, and hence I will 
treat the entire Golden Age as one period in my research.  
4.2.2 The effect of trade on productivity and growth 
Many empirical studies on the effect of trade and productivity take a cross country 
approach, focus at the aggregate economy level, and take for example GDP 
growth as their measure of growth (see e.g. Barro 1991). In this study I will focus 
on productivity at the disaggregate industry level because the most important 
channels through which openness and trade can influence productivity are the 




 There are multiple channels through which trade and openness can have an 
effect on growth or productivity.
12
 The first channel is the market-size effect. The 
increased size of the market, due to export opportunities, can lead to an increase in 
the size of production, which means there might be more scope for learning-by-
doing externalities (Grossman & Helpman 1991a; Romer 1987).
13
 Another 
important effect of the increase in market size is that it offers potentially larger 
rents to successful innovators (Grossman & Helpman 1991a).    
 The second channel through which international trade can enhance 
productivity are the possible knowledge spill-overs. Trade induces knowledge 
spill-overs from more advanced countries and sectors, to less advanced countries 
and sectors (Grossman & Helpman 1991a; Helpman 1993; Keller 2002). It is well-
                                                   
11 Moreover, by evaluating the relationship at the industry level within one country, we avoid the 
possibility that other factors, such as culture or geography, drive the results.  
12 See Redding 1998 for a detailed review of theoretical links between openness and growth. 
13 See Lucas 1988 for a model where learning-by-doing externalities at the sector level create a link 
between trade policy and the sectoral trade patterns.  
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known that cumulative domestic R&D is an important determinant of productivity 
(Griliches 1988). A country or industry can also benefit from R&D of trade 
partners by learning about the production process, new technologies, new 
materials, or organisational methods (Coe & Helpman 1995). This learning can  be 
direct, or indirect via importing goods which embody new technology. Coe and 
Helpman (1995) found for a sample of 21 OECD countries, and Israel, in the 
period 1971-1990, that more open economies extract larger benefits from foreign 
R&D. In neoclassical Solow-type growth models technological change is 
exogenous, and therefore unaffected by international trade and openness. New 
growth theory however, endogenizes technological change, and suggests that 
international trade and openness can have an effect on growth and productivity 
through its impact on technological change (Cameron, Proudman and Redding 
2005; Romer 1990).  A third channel through which openness affects productivity 
is enhanced competition. Competition with foreign counterparts can induce 
domestic firms to innovate, in order to be able to compete with the new firms. 
Competition with foreign firms can also enhance productivity growth because 
competition might force the least productive firms out of the domestic market. 
However, not all scholars agree that the effect of competition on innovation is 
positive; very well-known in this respect is the so-called Schumpeterian effect of 
competition, based on Schumpeter’s (1943) early models, which predicted that 
competition might well discourage innovation, since the expected profits are 
lowered. Aghion and Howitt (2009) also observe that there is a possibility that 
firms in a country that is behind the world’s technology frontier may be 
discouraged from innovation after the threat of entry by foreign firms. Even if 
innovation were successful, the company would lose out from the foreign entrant. 
Leading endogenous growth models also come to the conclusion that increased 
competition, or an increase in the rate of imitation, will have a negative effect on 
productivity growth, since monopoly rents, the reward of innovation, are lowered 
(see e.g. Aghion & Howitt 1992; Grossman & Helpman 1991b; Romer 1990). 
According to Marin (1992) whether or not trade expansion will enhance or reduce 
productivity growth will depend on the competitive conditions on the domestic 
market. 
 Although many trade theories emphasize positive learning effects, and spill-
overs effects from trade, there can also be an increase in an industry’s productivity 
after exposure to trade without any of these effects taking place. Most famous in 
this respect is the 2003 article of Melitz, in which he develops a dynamic industry 
model with heterogeneous firms to analyse the intra-industry effects of trade. The 
model shows that as a result of exposure to international markets the least 
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productive firms in an industry are forced to exit the market, while the most 
productive ones stay in the market and export. As a result of this intra-industry 
effect, the overall productivity of the industry increases (Melitz 2003). Thus, there 
is no need for a change in the production process. As long as the firms that remain 
in the industry have a higher level of productivity than those who leave the 
industry, the overall productivity level will increase.   
  Another possible negative effect of growth is related to the efficient allocation 
of resources over sectors as a result of specialisation and comparative advantage. 
If a country specialises in sectors were it has a comparative advantage, but there is 
little potential for growth, the aggregate growth rate of the economy may actually 
fall as a result of international trade (Cameron, Proudman & Redding 1999). 
 Proudman and Redding (1998) have investigated to what extent international 
specialisation persists or changed over time for Britain and Germany for the period 
1970-1992. They found no increase in the degree of specialisation during this 
period. Moreover, they were able to demonstrate a considerable change in the 
international specialisation in British manufacturing. However, further analysis by 
Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1998) suggested that the explanatory power of 
these resource allocations was relatively low in explaining aggregate 
manufacturing productivity.  
 Cameron et al. (1999) investigated the relation between openness and TFP 
growth across 19 sectors in manufacturing in the United Kingdom between 1970 
and 1992. Using discriminant analysis the manufacturing sectors were sorted into 
groups on the basis of their measured value of openness. The main finding is that 
there is a clear cross-sectional association between international openness and TFP 
growth in manufacturing in the United Kingdom during this period. The group 
with the most open industries enjoyed significantly higher growth rates than the 
group containing the least open industries. 
 In conclusion, there is no consensus on the precise effects of trade on growth 
or productivity. However, empirical research provides an overwhelming amount of 
evidence, that trade can have a pronounced effect on productivity. Although the 
relationship between openness and productivity is complex, there is reason to 
investigate this relationship for post-war Britain, since the literature perceives 
openness, trade policy, and trade performance in Britain as a potential important 
reason for its relatively poor economic performance. Hence, this chapter will 
contribute to the ongoing debate on the causes of British relative economic decline 
in the post-war era.   
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4.3 Data description: data sources and adjustments  
The data used in this research is drawn from a number of different sources. The 
main data sources on which I rely are the ‘Historical Record of the Census of 
Production 1907-1970’ published by the Business Statistics Office (1978) and 
different volumes of the ‘Report on overseas trade’. The Reports on overseas trade 
are published by the Board of Trade and the information in these reports is partly 
based on material presented in the ‘Accounts relating to trade and navigation of 
the United Kingdom’ and partly on other information which is provided by the 
Statistical Office, H.M. Customs & Excise. The main object of these publications 
was to summarise statistical material showing the broad pattern of United 
Kingdom overseas trade (Board of Trade 1950, p. i). Important to note is that the 
reported imports in these publications are general imports, which means they 
include also re-exports. Exports, however, are United Kingdom exports, i.e. 
without re-export. Imports are valued with cost insurance and freight and exports 
are valued as free on board. These monthly reports are available for the whole 
period studied in this Section. The report is published at a monthly interval. Below 
I will specify how I constructed the novel labour-productivity data set, how the 
distance to the productivity frontier is calculated, and how the trade measures are 
created.    
4.3.1 Openness measures   
One issue in studies on openness and productivity is the definition of openness. 
Although, as Cameron et al. (1999) argue, the definition may conceptually be quite 
clear, moving to an empirical definition is more problematical. According to 
Cameron et al. (1999, p. 7) ‘an industry or economy is said to be more open the 
smaller the extent of barriers to the free movement of goods and services, factors 
of production and ideas’. This is in line with recent research, were the meaning of 
openness has become similar to the notion of free trade, a system of trade where 
barriers are removed (Yanikkaya 2003). However, not all scholars agree with the 
idea that the definition is clear, and empirical research has used many different 
definitions (Yanikkaya 2003). Most studies that examined the relationship 
between openness and economic growth have relied on trade volumes as a 
measure of openness. The simplest measures of trade are behavioural measures 
based on actual trade flows, such as for example imports as a share of home 
consumption, or exports as a share of production. These behavioural measures are 
endogenous outcomes of trade policy and other economic factors, and the growth 
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rate might be part of these factors. Using behavioural measures is therefore only 
valid if they are correlated with an underlying measure of trade policy, or 
international openness (Cameron et al. 1999). Direct measures of trade barriers, 
such as tariff rates, coverage of tariffs and nontariff barriers are usually more 
difficult to use in quantitative research. A first problem that arises when applying 
these data is how to construct an overall industry index. In many cases there are 
specific tariffs for goods which fall under the same heading.
14
 Deciding how to 
weight all these specific tariffs can be a daunting process. Using the actual import 
shares as a weight can be deceptive, since high tariffs might discourage imports, 
and thereby this method gives too little weight to these high tariffs. Although 
empirical research uses behavioural measures of trade and openness, the 
theoretical growth literature has focused mainly on the relationship between trade 
policies and growth, instead of trade volumes and growth (Yanikkaya 2003).  
 There has been a discussion in the literature on whether exports or imports are 
more important for growth. Early literature tends to focus on exports, as discussed 
by Edwards (1993). However, given the possible linkages between trade and 
growth outlined above, it makes sense to also focus on imports, since imports are 
responsible for the competitive effect and the spill-over effects. Rodrik (1999) also 
claims that the benefits of openness stem from the import side, and according to 
him focus should lie on imports. According to the theory of comparative 
advantage, international trade leads to a more efficient use of resources, through 
the option of importing goods which a country does not possess, or which are 
simply too costly to produce (Yanikkaya 2003). In this research, I will focus on 
both imports and exports. Imports are essential since the competition effect is an 
important explanation in the discussion of British failure (Crafts 2012). Exports 
are important for the debate since Britain has been criticised for its relatively bad 
export performance, see for example Panić and Seward 1966.   
 I have constructed two measures of openness, in which I follow the approach 
taken by Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1999). The first measure is the share 
of exports to the whole world in domestic production (XGO). Which is calculated 
as exports (X) from manufacturing industry i at time t, as a share of domestic 




               (4.1) 
                                                   
14 For example, within the product group ‘Paper for diaries and periodicals’, which seems to be a 
relatively homogeneous group of products, the tariff ranges from 0 to 16, 2/3 per cent depending on 
the specifics of the paper. i.e. (see PEP 1962, p. 172, and p. 311). 
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 The second measure I use is based on imports. I take imports from the whole 
world as a share of home sales. Home sales are proxied by adding imports to 
domestic production (measured by gross output) and deducting exports from 
domestic production. The resulting ratio is calculated by dividing the imports from 




              (4.2) 
I use data on exports and imports from various volumes of the ‘Report on overseas 
trade’ to construct these behavioural measures of openness. One caveat is that the 
classification of industries in these reports changed during the period. Moreover, 
the reports do not provide information on all industries separately. Therefore, it is 
not possible to have a complete series for all manufacturing industries and all 
years. It was possible to obtain data on 23 industries, for almost the complete 
period under investigation. These 23 industries together accounted for more than 
76 per cent of value added in 1951, and for more than 85 per cent of value added 
in 1970. Hence, the majority of manufacturing is covered by this sample. In some 
cases data is missing for a few years, or there is only data for import, and not for 
export, or vice versa. Where possible these gaps are interpolated or guesstimated. 
Appendix A3 provides detailed information on the procedures undertaken.  
 The data from the reports on overseas trade do not specify to which industry 
the imports are designated. For example, there is one entry of textiles import, but it 
is not specified whether these imports go to the UK’s textiles industry to undergo 
further processing, or whether this is an input into the clothing sector. This 
implies, that when we use imports in a measure of openness, we are not able to 
take into account all possible channels through which imports can affect 
productivity. Basically, the import measure of openness is a measure of import 
competition. This measure is less capable of capturing technology spill-over 
effects at the disaggregate industry level. Exports obviously originate from the 
same industry as classified in the trade statistics, and by constructing an openness 
measure with export the market size effects are taken into account.  
 Tables 4.2 and 4.3 display information on the ratios of imports to home sales 
(MS), and exports to domestic output (XGO) over the period 1950-1970. The 
variation across industries is substantial, in the leather (manufactured) industry the 
share of export in gross output was almost 66 per cent in 1970, whereas for wood 
(basic materials) industry the share was never as much as 1 per cent during this 
period. If we look at the export share in domestic output for the total of the 23 
industries in the sample, we see that openness in 1970 is only marginally larger 
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than in 1950. However, when we look at individual industries there are substantial 
changes in openness during the period under consideration. For example the non-
ferrous metals industry, the rubber industry and the leather (manufactured) 
industry exported a much larger share of gross output in 1970 than in 1950, 
whereas in the textiles industry, the transport equipment industry, and the oils and 
greases industry, the amount of export as a percentage of gross output decreased 
substantially.   
 When we examine the import share in home sales more closely we see a 
similar pattern, in the sense that the MS ratio hardly changed for the total of the 23 
industries. However, there are sizable changes within individual industries. For 
example the dependency of the meat industry and the dairy industry on imports 
was declining during this period, whereas for the mechanical engineering industry 
it was rising. The ranking in terms of most open industry, measured by either MS 
or YGO is not constant over time.   
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Table 4.2: Imports as a percentage of home sales in the United Kingdom (1950-1970) 












Meat Industry 64.87 36.25 36.25 64.87 51.72 
Dairy Industry  34.80 16.44 16.44 51.55 37.20 
Fruits and Vegetables 
Industry 
62.56 48.38 48.38 62.93 55.74 
Tobacco  8.23 6.33 5.89 9.91 7.70 
Beverages 3.01 3.91 3.01 4.71 3.93 
Leather (manufactured)  46.14 55.40 37.87 61.58 48.40 
Paper  21.74 24.76 21.74 32.67 23.92 
Wood (basic materials)  35.78 25.56 25.56 56.09 39.07 
Wood (manufactured)  31.85 35.50 28.42 42.72 36.54 
Leather (basic materials)  29.57 34.54 28.36 37.61 32.32 
Non-Ferrous Metals   34.46 48.70 34.46 50.71 40.37 
Oils and Greases  54.95 57.08 39.58 58.73 49.79 
Textiles (basic materials)  20.79 10.47 10.47 23.47 17.15 
Rubber (manufactured)  0.14 2.27 0.14 2.34 1.51 
Clothing 2.01 13.64 1.06 14.14 6.46 
Footwear 1.65 13.40 1.41 13.40 6.56 
Iron and Steel   3.12 7.86 2.42 10.46 5.13 
Electrical Engineering  1.50 10.18 1.50 10.18 4.58 
Mechanical Engineering 7.52 20.33 6.44 20.33 12.39 
Chemicals  9.39 14.84 7.94 14.84 10.73 
Textiles (manufactured)  20.12 22.29 10.61 28.77 21.65 
Transport Equipment  2.36 6.67 1.54 8.72 3.34 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering 
13.10 24.28 13.10 24.28 17.51 
Total 23 industries  16.29 16.40 13.85 19.19 15.61 
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Table 4.3: Exports as a percentage of gross output in the United Kingdom (1950-1970) 
 












Meat Industry  1.08 1.80 1.08 2.58 1.78 
Dairy Industry  0.81 1.51 0.81 4.62 2.67 
Fruits and Vegetables 
Industry  
4.84 5.19 3.41 7.79 4.83 
Tobacco  2.62 2.40 1.30 3.35 2.18 
Beverages  6.11 10.37 6.11 11.36 7.85 
Leather (manufactured)  49.60 65.95 35.94 68.63 48.26 
Paper  9.05 6.64 5.35 9.13 6.71 
Wood (basic materials)  0.10 0.40 0.10 0.42 0.33 
Wood (manufactured)  3.18 4.00 2.65 4.09 3.71 
Leather (basic materials)  1.55 6.75 1.55 6.97 3.71 
Non-Ferrous Metals   21.54 35.35 14.84 36.59 23.39 
Oils and Greases  18.00 10.93 7.39 21.02 12.61 
Textiles (basic materials)  2.17 5.77 2.16 7.12 5.35 
Rubber (manufactured)  5.14 14.06 3.87 15.33 11.48 
Clothing 7.78 13.06 5.05 13.06 7.20 
Footwear 6.54 11.93 5.38 12.33 7.36 
Iron and Steel   16.81 11.76 9.80 16.81 11.82 
Electrical Engineering  24.33 16.09 13.12 24.33 17.43 
Mechanical Engineering 36.77 32.88 27.47 36.77 31.65 
Chemicals  20.33 20.15 16.49 23.37 18.33 
Textiles (manufactured)  51.17 30.75 27.16 59.12 40.15 
Transport Equipment  31.60 20.54 17.72 32.77 21.49 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering 
27.00 32.09 22.89 32.09 26.91 
Total 23 industries  16.29 16.40 14.87 17.38 15.84 
Source: own calculations, see text for the underlying sources. 
4.3.2  A novel labour-productivity data set   
I constructed a novel data set on labour-productivity, since existing data sets were 
not suited for the analysis I wish to make. The most important reason for this is 
that I have to rely on the classification of industries as in the trade statistics. 
Existing labour-productivity estimates do not cover the same industries as I have 
in the sample I took based on the reports on overseas trade.  
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 I calculated annual labour-productivity levels for 23 industries on the basis of 
value added and employment information by industry from the ‘Historical Record 
of the Census of Production 1907-1970’ which is published by the Business 
Statistics Office (1978). I have reclassified the industries presented in the census in 
order to make them comparable to the classification from the Reports on overseas 
trade. Table A-3.6 in the Appendix provides the details on this reclassification. 
Value added data was reported in current prices; therefore a wholesale price index 
was used to convert to constant prices. The wholesale price index from the census 
had some gaps, which I interpolated or guesstimated using data on retail prices or 
data from other sources. Table A-3.7 in the Appendix provides detailed 
information on the procedure undertaken. Unfortunately the data on value added 
and employment in the census is not available at yearly intervals but it was 
possible to interpolate the data using index numbers for employment and industrial 
output.
15
 The yearly index of production is available from the ‘Annual Abstract of 
Statistics’ and employment information is taken from the ‘British Labour 
Statistics: Historical Abstract 1886-1968’. Appendix Table A-3.7 explains in 
detail the procedure undertaken to interpolate the data. 
 I adjusted the employment data for hours worked, since on average the 
number of hours worked in manufacturing declined with 7 per cent in the period 
1950-1970.
16
 Without correcting for this change we would overestimate 
productivity in those years where there were still long working weeks. Data on 
hours worked is obtained from O’Mahony (1999). As a result of the Korean War 
in 1950, North America and Western Europe, except the Federal Republic, 
rearmed. The war led to a rapid increase in the demand for primary products, and 
this resulted in skyrocketing prices (Moore 1985, p.35).
17
 Due to the large increase 
in prices labour-productivity growth rates, calculated as constant price value added 
per hour, are negative for many industries, however, this is mainly a statistical 
effect and not so much an actual productivity effect. This problem manifests itself 
only in the early 1950s. In the estimation I will control for this.  
4.3.3  Distance to the productivity frontier  
I will include a measure of the distance to the frontier in my analysis since this can 
be an important explanation in labour-productivity growth. Catch-up and 
                                                   
15 Detailed industry information is available for 1948, 1950, 1951, 1954, 1958, 1963, 1968 and 1970. 
For some industries data is also available for 1949, 1950, 1952, 1953, 1955, 1956, and 1957.  
16 Own calculation based on O’Mahony (1999), Table C, page 96. 
17 The price effect is also found in studies on other countries, for example De Jong (2003) found this 
effect for the Netherlands. 
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convergence theories predict faster growth for those industries further from the 
technology frontier. Leading scholars such as Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol 
(1986), and many others, interpret convergence as the process of follower 
countries that catch-up to leader countries by adopting the technologies from these 
countries. In later literature, most notably by Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1991), the driving force behind convergence is diminishing returns to 
factors of production. After the Second World War, the United States was the 
world’s most productive economy and the productivity leader in virtually every 
industry (Nelson and Wright, 1999). To control for the distance to the frontier and 
the possible catch-up opportunities I include a measure of distance to the frontier 
(DTF). Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1997) found in their investigation of the 
impact of openness on rates of productivity growth in the United Kingdom for the 
period 1970-1990, that there is clear evidence that the levels of relative 
productivity in the United Kingdom and the United States are an important 
determinant of the productivity growth rate in the United Kingdom. 
 The DTF measure is defined as productivity, in terms of value added (Y) per hour 
worked in manufacturing industry i, at time t, in the leader country (the United 
States) over the productivity per hour worked in the follower country (the United 
Kingdom). Hence, I use the following measure:  
𝐷𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐿 𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐹⁄               (4.3) 
Where 𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐿  is the labour productivity level in the leader country (the United 
States) in industry i in year t, and 𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐹 is the labour productivity in the United 
Kingdom in industry i in year t. Although the United States is generally regarded 
as the technological most advanced nation of the world in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Britain might have benefitted from technology transfer from another country that 
has a higher technological level than Britain but a lower level than the US. Thus, 
the assumption I rely on is that the distance from the technology frontier is 
correlated with the potential for technology catch-up.
18
   
 I base my estimate of labour productivity on a comparison between the United 
States and the United Kingdom for 1950 offered by Paige and Bombach (1959). 
The advantage of the data set they provide is that they have used industry specific 
PPPs to convert output in the two nations. This method is clearly preferred over 
other alternatives, such as using an exchange rate or the Purchasing Power Parities 
(PPPs) as for example calculated by the International Comparison Program (2005). 
                                                   
18 I follow Griffith, Redding and van Reenen (2004) in making this assumption.  
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Moreover, their method closely matches the method I have used in the previous 
chapters to calculate labour-productivity benchmarks for West Germany and the 
United Kingdom in the pre and post-war period. 
 I reclassified the estimates of Paige and Bombach to match the industry 
classification used in this chapter. Table A-3.8 in the Appendix provides more 
detail on the reclassification. Moreover, I adjusted the gaps by taking into account 
hours worked, for which I relied on data from O’Mahony 1999. As discussed in 
the previous chapters this is a very important and valuable adjustment, since hours 
worked can have a substantial impact on the resulting labour-productivity levels 
calculated when there is a significant difference in the reported hours in the two 
countries under consideration. I extrapolated the industry data to 1970 using for 
the United States data on output and employment from the ‘Historical statistics of 
the United States, volume 4, Economic sectors’ and wholesale prices are taken 
from ‘Historical Statistics of the United States, volume 3, Economic structures and 
performance’. For the United Kingdom I relied on the data from the ‘Historical 
Record of the Census of Production 1907-1970’ which I interpolated to obtain 
annual estimates. As discussed in Chapter 2, we should be careful in extrapolating 
labour-productivity estimates too far from the actual benchmark, because there is a 
danger of obtaining results which deviate substantially from the actual 
productivity levels achieved. Thus, we should be careful in interpreting the results. 
However, since the industry-specific gap used in this analysis is simply a proxy for 
the actual distance to the technology frontier, it is not to be expected that this will 
pose large problems in the analyses.
19
 It is to be expected that there is a high 
correlation between the DTF and the actual distance to the frontier. 
 Table 4.4 below presents the substantial variation in levels of relative labour 
productivity across the sample of industries for 1950 and 1970. The gap between 
the United Kingdom and the United States clearly became smaller during this 
period. However, the process and speed of catching up is not the same for all 
industries.  
 
                                                   
19 Smith, Hitchens and Davies (1982) report a US/UK labour-productivity benchmark for the year 
1967/1968. However, as discussed in section 2.6 in Chapter 2, their method deviates substantially 
from the method that I have used in Chapter 2. It also deviates from the method Paige and Bombach 
have used. In my point of view the method of Paige and Bombach is clearly superior to the method 
chosen by Smith et al. It is not possible to connect the estimates of Smith et al. to the estimates of 
Paige and Bombach due to the difference in the underlying methodology applied.  
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Table 4.4: Levels of relative labour productivity US/UK in 1950 and 1970 (UK =100) 
 
1950 1970 
Meat Industry  159 198 
Dairy Industry  245 182 
Fruits and Vegetables Industry  226 285 
Tobacco  251 425 
Beverages  283 182 
Leather (manufactured)  204 197 
Paper  484 450 
Wood (basic materials)  354 275 
wood (manufactured)  277 224 
Leather (basic materials)  235 237 
Non-Ferrous Metals   296 317 
Oils and Greases  221 287 
Textiles (basic materials)  264 194 
Rubber (manufactured)  199 195 
Clothing 212 168 
Footwear 192 150 
Iron and Steel   314 294 
Electrical Engineering 344 229 
Mechanical Engineering 352 363 
Chemicals  359 320 
Textiles (manufactured)  240 159 
Transport Equipment  364 408 
Optical and Precision Engineering 332 380 
Source: own calculations, see text for the underlying sources.  
In 1950 Britain is performing relatively the worst in the paper industry, where the 
United States is more than four times as productive. Britain is performing 
relatively well in meat industry, footwear industry, and rubber industry, in which 
the United States is less than two times more productive. By 1970 we see that for 
over half of the industries the difference in labour-productivity levels became 
smaller. Table 4.5 presents the percentage distribution of value added in the 
United Kingdom for 1950, 1960 and 1970. The industries in which its 
performance worsened as compared to 1950 constituted 35 per cent of the total 
value added of the 23 industries in 1970. Transport equipment and mechanical 
engineering accounted for more than one-quarter of value added produced. In 
mechanical engineering the British position worsened, although it was only by a 
few percentage points. Although we should be careful to give too much confidence 
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to the estimates of the 1970 labour-productivity gap, it can be concluded that the 
period is characterised by an overall convergence of UK labour-productivity levels 
towards US levels.   
Table 4.5: Percentage distribution of value added in the United Kingdom in 1950, 1960, 1970, 
current prices (total of 23 industries =100) 
 
1950 (%) 1960 (%) 1970 (%) 
Meat Industry  0.67 1.02 1.52 
Dairy Industry  1.45 0.65 1.45 
Fruits and Vegetables Industry  0.98 1.03 1.10 
Tobacco  2.03 1.47 1.46 
Beverages  3.69 4.37 4.56 
Leather (manufactured)  0.47 0.33 0.27 
Paper  4.55 4.65 4.13 
Wood (basic materials)  2.12 1.69 1.85 
Wood (manufactured)  0.80 0.78 2.37 
Leather (basic materials)  1.16 0.43 0.34 
Non-Ferrous Metals  2.25 1.75 1.48 
Oils and Greases  0.45 0.40 0.23 
Textiles (basic materials)  11.31 7.16 5.57 
Rubber (manufactured)  1.97 2.10 2.51 
Clothing 6.09 5.15 4.33 
Footwear 1.94 1.73 1.46 
Iron and Steel  10.77 8.33 6.80 
Electrical Engineering  8.14 10.05 10.97 
Mechanical Engineering  6.93 12.55 12.62 
Chemicals  9.57 13.27 16.22 
Textiles (manufactured)  4.88 4.91 4.83 
Transport Equipment  16.34 14.70 11.90 
Optical and Precision Engineering  1.44 1.49 2.03 
Source: own calculations based on Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical record of the Census 
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4.4 Theoretical framework and econometric specification  
This section outlines the theoretical framework underlying my modelling strategy. 
I denote manufacturing industries by i = 1, …,N and years by t =1..,T.  Value 
added (Y) in each manufacturing industry i at time t is produced according to a 
standard production technology using capital (K) and labour (L) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡(𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖𝑡)                                      (4.4) 
Labour productivity (LP) in a given industry (i) is defined as value added (Y) in 




                                    (4.5) 
Where 𝐻𝑖𝑡  is the total hours worked in industry i in year t.   
 Although it is possible to estimate the effect of openness for each industry 
separately, there are disadvantages to this approach. The number of degrees of 
freedom will be very small given the relatively short time period in the data. 
Moreover, omitted variable biases can be severe. Therefore, I construct a panel 
data set with 23 manufacturing industries for the period 1951-1970. From the 
literature we know that some factors which affect productivity growth might well 
differ over industries. These differences, such as for example institutional factors, 
are hard to measure at the industry level. It is possible that these unobserved 
industry-characteristics are correlated with the explanatory variables. To control 
for this unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the explanatory variable I 
use industry dummies, which function as industry fixed effects. This approach 
reduced the potential of omitted variable bias substantially, and increases the 
degrees of freedom. 
 I also include a full set of time dummies, since there might also be some 
shocks to the economy that hit all industries. I will regress the measures of 
openness and the measure of the distance to the frontier on labour-productivity 
growth.  The following equation is estimated:  




𝑡=1 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (4.6) 
Where ∆𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of labour productivity, as measured by value added 
per hour worked, in industry i in year t. 𝐷𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡  measures the gap in labour 
productivity between industry i in year t in the United Kingdom and industry i in 
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year t in the technology frontier of the world, the United States. By including the 
distance to the frontier, I take catch-up effects into account.  𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑡 is imports over 
domestic sales for industry i in year t, and 𝑋𝑌𝑖𝑡 is export over domestic production 
for industry i in year t. The import measure of openness is theoretically related to 
the competition effect, whereas the export measure of openness should capture the 
possible positive externalities of the market size effect, such as possibilities for 
reaping scale economies. ∑ 𝛾𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  are the year dummies and ∑ 𝜗𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  are the 
industry dummies which function as fixed effects.  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a serially uncorrelated 
error.          
 We need to consider a potential problem that might result from using this 
estimation strategy. It might well be that the openness measures are not strictly 
exogenous. External shocks to the economy, captured in 𝜀𝑖𝑡, can have an effect on 
imports and exports, and hence on the openness measures. Obviously, behavioural 
measures of openness are prone to endogeneity problems. This will be the case for 
direct measures of trade policies as well, although the problem may be less 
pronounced. I use an instrumental variables approach to avoid the problem of 
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4.5 Results  
I use a two-stage least square instrumental variable approach to estimate equation 
4.6. I apply a two-year lag of the openness measures and the distance to the 
frontier measure as instruments for the explanatory variables in the regression. I 
have chosen a two-year lag length since this is theoretically large enough to avoid 
endogeneity issues, and it assures that the time dimension of the data set does not 
become too short. Taking a lag of more years becomes problematic since in that 
case many observations in the beginning of the 1950s are lost, which leads to 
lower degrees of freedom in the estimation strategy. I lose the observation for 
1950, which given the disturbing effects of the Korean War is not a problem.  
 Although theoretically it seems reasonable to assume that MS, XGO and DTF 
are endogenous, I have tested this assumption after performing the two-stage-least 
square instrumental variable estimation. I have used the Wooldridge’s (1995) 
robust score test and a robust regression based test of exogeneity, since these tests 
are robust to heteroskedasticity.
20
 Table 4.6 shows the outcome of both tests. Both 
tests reject the null hypothesis that all variables are exogenous, hence I should 
treat all three explanatory variables as endogenous 
Table 4.6: Exogeneity tests for explanatory variables 
H0: all variables are 
exogenous 
Test static p-value 
Robust score chi-square 37.453 <0.001 
Robust regression F (3,390) 12.904 <0.001 
 
 The instruments used in an instrumental variable regression need to be strong 
and valid. To test whether my proposed instruments are strong and significant I 
use the relation between the T-static and the F-statistic.
21
 If the T-statistic is larger 
than 3.16 this implies the F-statistic is larger than 10, and hence it is possible to 
conclude that the instrument is strong. Table A-3.9 in the Appendix shows the first 
stage result of the estimation of equation 4.6. The result indicates that, as expected, 
the two-year lag of MS is a strong instrument for MS, the two-year lag of XGO is a 
strong instrument for XGO and the two-year lag of DTF is a strong instrument for 
DTF.  
                                                   
20 Both tests can tolerate autocorrelated errors.  
21
 The square of the T-statistic is the F-statistic. To reject that an instrument z1 is weak, the usual rule 
of thumb is that the F-statistic for the null hypothesis H0: θ = 0 should be larger than 10 (where θ is 
the coefficient of z1 in a regression where the endogenous variable is the dependent variable, and all 
other exogenous variables are included as well) (Hill, Griffith and Lim 2012). 
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 One potential problem with the openness measures is that the import and 
export data are relatively volatile, which implies there can be relatively large 
variations from year to year. To reduce the effect of this annual variation I used 
the three-year moving average of the MS and XGO measure as instruments as well. 
It means that for the observation of each year I take the average of the preceding 
year, the current year, and the next year.
22
 Hence, for example for the year 1952 I 
use the average observations of MS and XGO for industry i for 1951, 1952, and 
1953. To avoid endogeneity issues I take the two-year lag of these newly created 
variables. Table A-3.10 in the Appendix shows the first stage result of the 
estimation of equation 4.6 when the two-year lags of the three-year moving 
average MS and XGO are used. The results indicate that, as expected, the two-year 
lag of the three-year moving average of MS is a strong instrument for MS, the two-
year lag of the three-year moving average of XGO is a strong instrument for XGO 
and the two-year lag of DTF is a strong instrument for DTF.   
  Table 4.7 below presents the second stage estimation results. In column 
one, I have used the two-year lag of the endogenous variables as instruments, and 
in column two I have used the two-year lag of the three-year moving average of 
the openness measures, and the two-year lag of the DTF measure as instruments. 
In columns 1 and 2 the estimated coefficient for the export measure of openness is 
positive, and statistically significant. The measure of openness based on imports is 
not statistically significant at the conventional levels. However, given the p-value 
of 0.12 it is significant at a slightly higher level, and given the small size of the 
data set this might still be seen as indicating statistical significance. 
 Whether a two-year lag of the endogenous variables or a moving average is 
used does not substantially affect the estimation. Hence, these results indicate that 
there is indeed an effect of openness on the labour-productivity growth rate. But 
only the export measure of openness seems to be capable of capturing this effect. 
This might imply that the competition effect, which the import measure of 
openness should capture, does not have a pronounced effect of labour-productivity 
growth. Alternatively, it might also be the case that high levels of import in 
industries imply that these industries are not competitive enough to supply the 
home market. Hence, we should also expect lower labour-productivity growth in 
these industries. The estimated coefficient for the distance to the frontier measure 
is positive in all estimations. So, the further an industry is from the technology 
                                                   
22 The three-year moving average of MS is calculated as the average of the observations of three time 
periods: MovingaverageMS = (MSi,t−1 + MSi,t + MSi,t+1)/3.  
Similarly, MovingaverageXGO = (XGOi,t−1 + XGOi,t + XGOi,t+1)/3   
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frontier, the higher the growth rate of labour productivity. This result confirms the 
hypothesis that the distance to the frontier has an impact on labour-productivity 
growth.  
 Obviously not all industries have an equal size. Columns 3 and 4 show the 
result when industries are weighted by their average share, over the period 1950-
1970, in gross output. This approach ensures that we can test whether the result is 
driven by some form of heterogeneity across industries. Column 3 shows the result 
when the two-year lags of the explanatory variables are used as an instrument, and 
column 4 shows the result when the lags of the three-year moving averages of the 
explanatory variables are used. The estimated coefficients are not substantially  
different from the estimation in columns 1 and 2. The reason that the coefficient 
for the export measure of openness is slightly lower in columns 3 and 4 is 
probably that the effect of openness is somewhat smaller for the industries which 
have a larger weight in gross output. However, the difference in coefficients is 
small, and the newly estimated coefficients are well within the 95 per cent interval 
of the coefficients estimated without any weighting scheme.  
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The coefficient for the export measure of openness ranges from 0.342 to 0.312 in 
the four estimations presented in Table 4.7. If we focus on the un-weighted 
estimation in column 1 and 2, we can see that, keeping everything else constant, if 
XGO increases by 1 unit, the growth rate of labour productivity increases by 0.34 
units. An example will make clear how large the effect is. The average labour-
productivity growth rate per annum in the paper industry during the period 1951-
1970 was 3.74 per cent. The average XGO measure for the period was 6.7, thus 
just under 7 per cent of the produced gross output was exported. If this industry 
had instead exported ten percent of its gross output, that would imply a 3.3 point 
increase in XGO, which leads to an increase of 0.34 * 3.3 = 1.122 in the labour 
productivity growth rate. Hence, the resulting labour-productivity growth rate 
would, keeping everything else constant, be equal to 4.86 per cent per annum. 
Over a period of twenty years, this results in an increase in labour-productivity 
levels of well over 20 per cent. The effect suggested by the estimation is quite 
substantial, which means that for the period under consideration openness has 
clearly a pronounced effect on the labour-productivity growth rate. 
 However, we should be careful in interpreting these results, since they do not 
necessarily represent structural coefficients. There is no theoretical model 
underlying the estimation strategy. But the results indicate nevertheless that a 
small increase in the share of export in gross output leads to a relatively large 
increase of the labour-productivity growth rate, keeping everything else 
unchanged. Obviously, it will not be possible for an industry to simply increase 
exports by a large share without implications. In the example of the paper industry 
above, I suggested an increase in the XGO ratio from 6.7 to 10, which is an 
increase of almost 50 per cent in exports. An important question then becomes 
how large an increase in the export share of gross output would have been 
realistic, if British trade policies were different. Answering this question is outside 
the scope of this dissertation, and should be the topic of further research. This 
analysis succeeded in providing empirical evidence that international openness did 
have a significant effect on labour-productivity growth rates in British 
manufacturing industries during the Golden Age of economic growth. Thus, lack 
of openness and trade should be seen as a cause of Britain’s relative economic 
decline. However, the analysis is not able to pinpoint the exact channels through 
which openness had an effect on growth. As the literature review made clear, there 
are some obvious candidates, such as the competition and the market size effect.  
 The fact that in this analysis the import measure of openness is not significant, 
whereas the export measure of openness is, suggests that apparently the market 
144 British failure? 
 
 
size effect has a bigger impact on labour-productivity growth than the competition 
effect. However, the fact that exports are important for labour-productivity growth 
can also mean that Melitz type of composition effects are at work. Trade, and 
especially export, can lead to a shift in the firms active in an industry, with higher 
overall labour-productivity level as a result. This, however, does not necessarily 
imply a change in the production function within these firms. It would be 
interesting to redo the analysis with detailed information on the imports of 
intermediary and final goods at the industry level. Intermediary goods are 
supposed to facilitate technology transfer, since it offers the buying industry a 
chance to learn about the technology and to reproduce it. Unfortunately, this data 
is not readily available. Detailed data on the type of products imported and 
exported is available in the various volumes of ‘Accounts relating to trade and 
navigation in the United Kingdom during each month during the year’. However, 
these data impose some problems when one wants to focus solely on intermediary 
goods, since quite often a product group described in these data consists of both 
final goods, and intermediary goods. Hence, constructing a database with final and 
intermediary goods is a formidable task, a great challenge for further research.  
4.5.1 Robustness checks  
Having established through estimation of equation 4.6 that there is a strong 
relation between openness and labour-productivity growth levels in the United 
Kingdom, I now consider the robustness of this relationship to the exclusion of 
outlier industries. I re-estimate equation 4.6 with an instrumental variable 
approach where I use the two-year lag of the moving average of XGO and MS and 
the two-year lag of DTF as instruments. I exclude the three outlier industries, with 
the highest and lowest levels of respectively the import measure of openness the 
export measure of openness, the distance to the frontier, and the labour-
productivity growth rate. This approach allows us to verify that my parameter 
estimates are not driven by outlier industries. Table 4.8 presents the results.  
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When we observe the results we see that in most of the columns the results are 
very close to the results in table 4.7. The estimated coefficients fall within the 95 
per cent interval of the estimated coefficients in table 4.7 for most of the columns. 
Only the estimated coefficient for the export measure of openness in columns 3, 5 
and 9 is somewhat different from the estimated coefficient when the whole sample 
is used. In all three estimations I have excluded textiles (manufactured), since 
textiles is an outlier in three dimensions. The estimated coefficient in column 5 
and 9 are still within the 95 percent confidence interval of the estimated coefficient 
in Table 4.7, the estimation in column 3 however, is not. In column 3 I have 
excluded the three industries with the highest level of openness as measured by 
export over gross output. These industries are leather (manufactured), textiles 
(manufactured), and mechanical engineering. Hence, apparently in these industries 
the effect of openness on productivity growth is less pronounced than in other 
industries. The textile industry is a rather extraordinary industry, since it is the 
most open in terms of export over gross output in the beginning of the period 
under consideration, it is one of the industries with the highest labour-productivity 
growth rate in the period, and it has a relatively small distance to the frontier.   
4.5.1.1 The textiles industry and trade   
 In Chapter 3 I have already discussed the importance of textiles as a case study 
for Britain’s relative economic decline. There I have shown that the textile 
industry was declining during the twentieth century, in the sense that the industry 
becomes smaller in terms of employment and output. However, although the 
literature has used the textile industry as a clear example of manufacturing failure, 
I have argued that there was not necessarily failure, since Britain could simply not 
compete with low wage countries. In that sense, the decline of this industry was 
inevitable.          
 In 1950 more than 85 per cent of gross output in the textiles (manufactured) 
sector was exported, but this share fell to only 30 per cent by 1970. Britain lost its 
exporting position in textiles due to fierce competition from low wage countries. 
At the same time however, the labour-productivity growth rate in textiles was 
relatively high, with an average of 5.39 per cent during the period 1951-1970. 
However, the size of the industry as measured by employment was falling. One of 
the most important changes in the textiles industry was the increasing importance 
of man-made fibres. Whereas by 1950 the share of man-made fibres was less than 
23 per cent, by 1980 it increased to almost 70 per cent (Broadberry 1997, p.345). 
This process came along with significant shifts in technology. Therefore, it is 
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possible for the textile industry to exhibit high growth rates in labour productivity, 
and at the same time a declining share in exports and even a decline in the size of 
the overall industry. Oulton and O’Mahony (1994) provide information on the 
increase in capital input and labour input in the textiles industry. Table 4.9 
displays the annual growth rate of capital and labour input in three separate 
periods, and the percentage share of all sub-industries in textiles in 1951 and 1970 
in terms of value added and gross output. For most industries the annual growth 
rate of capital input is positive, whereas the growth rate of labour input is negative. 
Only the carpet industry and the very small category ‘other textiles industries’ 
report positive growth rates for labour input for all three periods. The final 
columns of Table 4.9 display the annual change in the capital labour ratio. For all 
industries we observe a positive change throughout the period. Thus the capital-
labour ratio increased substantially over the period, which indicates major 
technological change in this industry. This technological change allowed the 
textile industry to exhibit high growth rates. The effect of trade is less pronounced 
in the estimation for the obvious reason that trade was declining in the textile 
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Overall we can conclude that openness appears to have had an effect on the rate of 
labour-productivity growth in UK industries. This result is robust to the exclusion 
of outlier industries.         
 Another potential concern in using labour-productivity growth rates is that 
possible outliers in these labour-productivity growth rates can have a large impact 
on the estimation. Due to capital utilisation, business cycle fluctuations etcetera, 
labour productivity may vary from year to year, and this obviously has an effect on 
the growth rates I calculated. To smoothen the effect of the year to year changes, I 
have used a three- and four-year moving average of the labour-productivity growth 
rate as the dependent variable in the estimations.
23
 The caveat of this approach is 
that a few observations are lost, since it is not possible to calculate moving 
averages for the first and last years of the data set.  This approach decreases the 
degrees of freedom in the estimation strategy. Table A-3.11 in the Appendix 
presents the results of the estimation. Although the coefficient for YGO is 
somewhat smaller than in Table 4.7, the estimated coefficients are still within the 
95 per cent confidence interval of the estimates in Table 4.7. Clearly, the results 
are not driven by outliers in the labour-productivity growth rate. Therefore, this 
provides further evidence that the results are robust.   
4.6 The effect of openness on Multi Factor Productivity   
In this section I use Multi Factor Productivity (MFP) growth rates, also known as 
total factor productivity, instead of labour-productivity growth rates as the 
dependent variable. As discussed in Chapter 2, labour-productivity growth rates 
are of substantial importance when we want to make claims about the economy, 
since a higher labour-productivity will lead to more welfare and presumably 
higher livings standards. MFP growth is the ‘residual term’ in growth accounting. 
It measures the increase in productivity after accounting for the increase in the 
inputs in the production process. According to Helpman (2004, p.20) ‘changes in 
MFP, which are separate from changes in inputs, represent the joint effects of all 
input-augmenting technological improvements and the effects of Hicks-neutral 
technological change’. At the level of the individual plant we would assume that 
MFP is close to zero, since any increase in productivity, which is not the result 
from an increase in labour input or capital input, would in most cases be a one-off 
increase. For example, as Arrow (1962) pointed out, learning by doing 
                                                   
23 The three-year moving average is calculated as the average of the observations of three time 
periods: (𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1)/3. The four-year moving average is calculated as: (𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝐿𝑃𝑖,𝑡+2)/4. 
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opportunities will be exhausted at some point. However, at a broader level, for 
example at the sectoral or industry level, MFP growth rates are usually far from 
zero and they explain a significant amount of productivity increases (Oulton & 
O’Mahony 1994). Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1997) researched 
productivity convergence and international openness in the United Kingdom for 
the period 1970-1992. Using as a measure of openness the ratio of imports over 
output, they estimated that the doubling of the log imports to output ratio over the 
period 1970-1992 was responsible for roughly 50 per cent of the increase in the 
estimated mean steady-state level of log-relative TFP. Cameron et al. (1997) find 
that international openness has a pronounced effect on productivity convergence.  
Hence, openness played a substantial role during the post 1970 period. However, 
no research is available which investigated the link between openness and total 
factor productivity growth at a disaggregate manufacturing level in the United 
Kingdom for the preceding decades. Especially the Golden Age of economic 
growth is a period of crucial importance. Therefore, it makes sense to perform a 
similar analysis for the period 1950-1970.       
 I use MFP data constructed by Oulton and O’Mahony (1994). Whereas many 
studies only provide MFP for the whole economy, or for broad sectors, Oulton and 
O’Mahony provide MFP growth rates at the level of the individual industry. Their 
estimates cover more than 130 industries, nearly all in manufacturing. The 
classification of industries in the MFP data set closely matches that of the official 
UK production censuses. I believe these estimates provide the most detailed data 
available. Oulton and O’Mahony followed the method of Jorgenson, Gollop and 
Fraumeni (1987). This approach ultimately rests on Solow (1957), who showed 
that under certain conditions, the growth rate of MFP can be estimated as the 
growth rate of output minus the growth rate of total inputs, where the latter is 
equal to the sum of the value -share-weighted growth rates of individual inputs. 
The approach relies on the assumption that producers are price takers in the output 
and input market, and therefore, output prices are equal to the marginal costs of 
production. Technology is characterised by constant returns to scale. In light of 
new growth theories, this method might seem old fashioned, since externalities 
and learning effects are not emphasised. Considering that this is the only MFP 
database at a disaggregate level, with a similar classification as the censuses of 
production, I will rely on this data to perform the analysis.   
 I use data on the growth rate per annum for the following periods: 1954-1958; 
1958-1963; and 1963-1968. I reclassified the MFP data to match the industry 
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classification on the import and export data.
24
 The industries are weighted 
according to the average of the value added shares in the first and last year of the 
three periods.
25
 Ideally one would use sectoral output shares, i.e. netting out intra-
industry deliveries to weight these industries. Unfortunately this data is not readily 
available. Value added comes quite close to this concept and can therefore be used 
in the aggregation procedure. Table  4.10 presents the percentage growth in MFP 
per annum for the three time periods under consideration.  
Table 4.10: MFP growth rates in British industry (1954-1968, % p.a.) 
 
1954-1958 1958-1963 1963-1968 
Meat Industry 0.64 0.30 0.39 
Dairy Industry -0.19 -1.23 1.00 
Fruits and Vegetables 1.90 0.68 0.27 
Tobacco -7.59 -0.67 -3.21 
Beverages -1.69 -0.60 -2.60 
Leather (manufactured) 0.60 0.25 0.19 
Paper -1.12 1.43 0.07 
Wood (basic materials) 2.20 0.17 -0.31 
Wood (manufactured) 2.07 1.89 0.58 
Leather (basic materials) 3.76 -0.42 -1.28 
Non-Ferrous Metals -2.14 2.15 1.17 
Textiles (basic materials) 2.56 1.54 1.93 
Rubber -2.69 2.42 1.97 
Clothing 0.27 2.00 1.51 
Footwear 1.23 1.73 1.81 
Iron and Steel -2.06 0.87 1.77 
Electrical Equipment -0.92 1.99 1.93 
Mechanical Engineering -1.27 1.64 1.21 
Chemicals 1.58 2.71 1.89 
Textiles (manufactured) 1.03 0.91 1.67 
Transport Equipment -1.30 2.30 2.24 
Optical and Precision Engineering -1.67 2.74 2.00 
Sources: own reclassification based on MFP growth rates from Oulton and O’Mahony (1994), Table 
H.11, pp. 282-284; Value added is taken from Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical Record 
of the Census of Production 1907-1970’.  
                                                   
24 The reclassification is similar to the reclassification of gross output, value added and employment, 
see Table A-3.6 in the Appendix for the details. 
25 i.e. for the period 1954-1958 the average gross output weight of 1954 and 1958 is taken to weight 
all industries. The benefit of this approach is that I rely on values given in the census, and I do not 
need to rely on interpolated values of gross output.  
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The period 1954-1958 is characterised by negative MFP growth rates, especially 
in important and relatively large industries such as engineering. Between 1958-
1963 all industries in the sample, except some food branches and the leather (basic 
materials) industry, report positive MFP growth rates. This trend of positive MFP 
growth continues in the last period under consideration. 
 I begin my analysis by ranking the 23 manufacturing industries by the period 
average level of openness. I have used the sum of exports and imports over gross 
output to rank industries from most open to least open.  Tables 4.11 shows the 
ranking and the corresponding MS, XGO and MFP values. I have split the sample 
in two subsamples, were the first consists of industries which exhibit a relatively 
high level of openness, and the second consists of groups that display a relatively 
low level of openness. The unweighted average total openness measure for the 
‘high openness’ group is 0.71, and the average annual MFP growth rate for this 
group is 0.70. When we consider the ‘low openness’ group, we see that the total 
openness measure is 0.19 and the average annual MFP growth rate is 0.51. This 
result indicates that apparently industries which are more open exhibit higher MFP 
growth rates.  We see that the MS and XGO measure are also higher for the most 
open group. Obviously, this merely ‘eyeballing’ of the table does not provide 
enough evidence to conclude that more open industries have higher MFP growth 
rates. Therefore, I will also conduct an econometric analysis.  
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Table 4.11: Average levels of openness and MFP growth in British manufacturing (1954-1968) 
 Openness  MS  XGO  MFP  
Openness: high 
Fruits and vegetables industry 1.25 0.55 0.04 0.88 
Meat industry 1.07 0.51 0.02 0.43 
Leather and fur (manufactured) 0.96 0.48 0.47 0.33 
Non-ferrous metals 
(manufactured goods) 
0.73 0.39 0.23 0.57 
Dairy Industry 0.70 0.40 0.03 -0.14 
Wood (basic materials) 0.63 0.38 0.00 0.58 
wood (manufactured) 0.60 0.37 0.04 1.47 
Textiles (manufactured) 0.57 0.22 0.40 1.22 
Leather (basic materials) 0.49 0.32 0.04 0.47 
Optical and precision engineering 0.42 0.18 0.26 1.22 
Machinery 0.41 0.12 0.31 0.65 
Average 0.71 0.36 0.17 0.70 
Openness: low 
Paper (manufactured)  0.35 0.23 0.06 0.22 
Chemicals  0.27 0.10 0.17 2.09 
Textile fibres (basic materials)  0.25 0.17 0.06 1.97 
Transport equipment  0.22 0.03 0.19 1.25 
Electrical machinery  0.21 0.05 0.16 1.14 
Iron and steel (manufactured)  0.15 0.05 0.11 0.35 
rubber (manufactured)  0.15 0.02 0.13 0.80 
Footwear 0.14 0.07 0.07 1.62 
Clothing 0.13 0.07 0.06 1.33 
Beverages  0.12 0.04 0.08 -1.62 
Tobacco  0.10 0.08 0.02 -3.55 
Average  0.19 0.08 0.10 0.51 
Source: own calculations based on MFP growth rates from Oulton and O’Mahony (1994), Table 
H.11, pp. 282-284; Import and export values are taken from various volumes of the ‘Report on 
overseas trade’ published by the Board of Trade. Data on gross output is taken from Business 
Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical Record of the Census of Production 1907-1970’.  
I estimate a fixed-effects regression, were the MFP growth rate is the dependent 
variable, and MS, XGO and DTF are explanatory variables.
26
 I use the beginning 
values of XGO, MS and DTF for each of the three periods in the data set as 
explanatory variables to avoid endogeneity problems. It is important to include a 
measure of the distance to the frontier, since the previous analysis revealed that 
                                                   
26 The Hausman test indicated that fixed effects instead of random effects should be used.  
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this distance has a large impact on productivity growth rates. One problem is that 
there is no MFP data for the United States available at a similar disaggregate level 
as for the United Kingdom. Due to difference in industrial classification I do not 
attempt to evaluate the gap between MFP levels in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. I instead use the gap in the labour-productivity levels in the 
United Kingdom and the United States as a control for the distance to the frontier. 
 I include time effects, since it might well be that in certain periods economic 
shocks affected all industries. Table 4.12 presents the results. The regression in 
column one shows the baseline estimation. In columns 2 till 7 I excluded each time 
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The estimated coefficient for MS in the baseline estimation is 0.145, which implies 
that a one unit change in MS will lead to a 0.145 unit change in the average annual 
MFP growth, keeping all else the same. The estimated coefficient for DTF is also 
positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of XGO is not 
statistically significant.  
The estimated coefficients for MS and DTF in columns 2 till 7 are all within the 95 
per cent confidence interval of the estimated coefficient in column 1. Hence, the 
result is not driven by a few outlier industries. In specification 5 the coefficient of 
the MS measure is no longer significant at the ten per cent level, but it is at 10.3 
per cent, which I think we can still accept as statistically significant given the 
small size of the sample.   
 Interestingly, the import measure of openness is significant in almost all of 
these estimations, whereas the export measure of openness does not appear to be 
significant at conventional significance levels. This is different from the result 
found in the previous section when the labour-productivity growth rate was used 
as the dependent variable. This might indicate that for MFP growth the 
competition effect is very important. To enable comparisons between the results 
when labour-productivity growth rates and MFP growth rates are used, I also 
performed the estimation on the period average growth rate of labour-productivity 
for the period 1954-1968. Table 4.13 below shows the results. In column 1 the 
baseline equation is estimated, and in the other columns outlier industries are 
excluded. In these estimations both the measure of openness using imports and 
exports are significant and have the expected positive sign. The magnitude of the 
effects also appears to be higher when labour-productivity growth rates are used 
instead of MFP growth rates. The estimated coefficient of the export measure of 
openness closely resembles the coefficient is of the same magnitude as the 
baseline estimation in table 4.7. The estimated coefficient for the measure of the 
distance to the frontier is not significant at conventional significance levels in the 
baseline estimation. However, the estimated coefficient is significant at the 14 per 
cent significance level, which given the small time dimension of the data set could 
still be seen as indicating significance. Similar to the finding in table 4.7, we also 
find in this estimation that when the textiles (manufactured) industry is excluded 
from the estimation, the estimated coefficient of YGO increases considerably. 
 In conclusion, I find that openness also has a significant effect on MFP levels 
during the period 1954-1968. However, the effect of openness on MFP is of a 
different magnitude than the effect on labour-productivity. This result further 
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strengthens the conclusion that Britain’s relatively weak openness and trade have 
contributed to its relative economic decline.  
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4.7 European integration and the dismantling of the British 
empire 
The previous sections have demonstrated that international trade is an important 
determinant of the growth rate of labour-productivity in Britain during the 1950s 
and 1960s. With use of econometric techniques I have shown that labour-
productivity growth rates could have been substantially higher if there had been 
more trade. Moreover, I found that openness also had a pronounced effect on rates 
of MFP growth. In the previous investigation I used aggregated imports and 
exports. In this section I will zoom in on the origin and destination of trade. The 
literature review already touched upon some of the main critiques on British trade 
policies in the literature. One of the most important points of critique is that 
Britain was not trading with the right countries. Moreover, the literature 
emphasises that Britain was too late in acquiring membership of the European 
Economic Community, and this might have severely hampered British 
productivity growth in manufacturing industries (see e.g. Broadberry and Leunig 
2013; Supple 1994). The aim of this section is to delve deeper into the question of 
whether Britain made a mistake by not joining the European Economic 
Community at the start, and by sticking to trading with the Sterling Area and the 
Commonwealth. 
 The first part of this section will be of a descriptive nature, I will investigate in 
detail how the trade pattern of Britain was shaped during the Golden Age. I will 
investigate with which countries Britain was trading. In the second part of this 
section, I will employ econometric techniques to examine what the effect of trade 
with various parts of the world was on labour-productivity growth in British 
manufacturing industry.   
4.7.1 Does the geographical dimension of trade matter?  
It is well established in the literature that firms that are more active in importing 
and exporting are more productive. A large literature has researched the effect of 
imports of goods with different characteristics. As described earlier, importing 
goods with embodied technology can be beneficial for learning by doing. Another 
question is to what extent the geographical dimension of trade matters. The 
geographical dimension of trade may distinguish for example between advanced 
and developing countries, or between proximate and remote countries. Research 
by Castellani, Serti and Tomasi et al. (2010) on Italian firms for the period 1993-
1997 suggests that imports from advanced countries are associated with higher 
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productivity premiums than imports from developing economies. This explanation 
suggests that imports from high-income countries are of higher quality and are 
more technology intensive than imports from developing economies. If firms want 
to use these imports they need a certain amount of absorptive capacity, which is 
associated with the existence of a productivity premium. Although this study 
focuses on the firm level, whereas I focus on the industry level, it provides 
evidence that the geographical dimension of imports can affect productivity.   
 The positive effects of exports on productivity can also be expected to differ 
between destination countries. De Loecker (2007) mentions that productivity 
improvements resulting from learning will be higher if the destination country is 
highly developed. When firms are exporting to developed countries, they have to 
compete with or supply to firms that operate close to the technology frontier and 
use the latest vintage of capital goods and best practise management to produce.  
 The Board of Trade published the results of an Inter-Departmental Working 
Party Survey on the export trend of the United Kingdom in 1957 (Wells 1964). 
The conclusion of this survey was that approximately one quarter of the decline 
the UK share of world manufacturing trade between 1951-1955 was the result of 
an unfavourable commodity/area pattern of trade. The changes in area pattern 
were found to be more significant than changes in the commodity structure of 
trade. Thus, according to these results, Britain lost by exporting to the wrong 
countries. This brings me to the question relevant for my research: does 
geographical origin of trade matter for the effect on labour-productivity growth 
rates at the disaggregate manufacturing sector?   
 One important point of critique in the literature is that Britain’s ties with the 
Commonwealth were too strong, and that this resulted in less trade with more 
developed countries. The Commonwealth is a group of countries that fell under the 
Sterling Area. The Sterling Area was unofficially formed after the economic crisis 
of 1929-1933 when many countries abandoned the gold standard. A large group of 
these countries decided to stabilise their currency with respect to the value of the 
British Pound Sterling. Most of the countries in this group already had strong 
historical linkages with Britain, and most countries traded intensively with Britain 
(Schenk 2010). Initially the Sterling Area was not a formal group, in 1947 
membership was officially defined in the Exchange Control Act. The Sterling 
Area consisted of all members of the Commonwealth, except Canada and 
Newfoundland, all British territories, Burma, Iceland, Irish Republic, Jordan, 
Kuwait and the other Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms, and Libya. Most of the currency 
reserves of these countries was carried in Sterling. There were, with some 
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exceptions, no exchange restrictions between the members of the Sterling Area. 
According to Gaitskell (1952) the most significant feature of the Sterling Area was 
the so-called Sterling-Dollar pool. All countries in the area, except South Africa, 
pooled their dollar earnings and drew on this pool for their dollar requirements. 
Even more remarkable was that this whole process functioned without any definite 
central control, but only on the basis of contracts between central banks. The two 
world wars and the severe crisis of the 1930s had a particularly debilitating effect 
on the UK’s balance of payments (Mansell 1980). Imports sharply increased and 
exports restrained and a large proportion of production was devoted to the war 
effort. However, also in the post-war period Britain was plagued by problems with 
the balance of payments. After many years of austerity private consumption 
increased and so did investment. During the recovery period imports grew faster 
than exports (Mansell 1980). During the Bretton Woods period there were two 
major devaluations of sterling. The first was in 1949, the second in 1967. The 
devaluation on September 18 1949 was a substantial devaluation from a US 
Dollar/Pound Sterling rate of 4.00 to 2.80. Many of the Sterling Area members 
followed this decision promptly, which led to 28 devaluations in total. The French 
Finance Minister Maurice Petsche was afraid that this 30.5 per cent devaluation 
was too extreme and this would lead to a trade war for competition in international 
markets (Banking, 1968). However, the effect of this devaluation was short lived 
since the Korean War in the beginning of the 1950s led to skyrocketing prices. 
Due to the increase in the price of imported goods Britain witnessed again a 
massive increase in the visible trade deficit (Mansell 1980). The resulting increase 
in imports and the rise in prices reached a peak in 1951 (Briscoe 1975). In 1967 
Sterling was devalued again, from US Dollar/Pound Sterling rate of 2.80 to 2.40. 
The Sterling Area went into decline already before the 1967 devaluation. Whereas 
in 1964 still 83 per cent of the official reserves of overseas Sterling area countries 
was Sterling, by 1967 this was only 65 per cent (Schenk 2010). Moreover, some 
countries left the Sterling parity during the 1960s. 
 I use data on trade from five areas in this analysis. The first is the Sterling 
Area. The second area I focus on is the United States, being the technology 
frontier of the world. The third area I use consists of Eastern European countries. I 
use trade with Eastern Europe since this is a relatively underdeveloped region. The 
fourth region is Canada. Trade with Canada is included since Canada and the 
United Kingdom are historically related with extremely close ties. The fifth and 
final region is West Germany. Trade with West Germany is included since this 
was the fast growing country at Europe’s mainland in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Finally, the last group consists of ‘the rest of the world’. I have constructed a data 
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set on country/area-shares in Britain’s total exports and imports for the period 
1950-1970. I used value data in current prices as published in the report of 
overseas trade. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show the geographical composition of Britain’s 
imports and exports respectively. The graphs show the share of imports and 
exports from and to the United States, Canada, the Sterling Area, Eastern Europe, 
Western Germany, and the rest of the world as a share of total imports and exports. 
On the import side, we can observe that West Germany and the United States 
became more important as suppliers of the United Kingdom over the course of the 
Golden Age. Whereas in 1950 less than two per cent of imports of manufactured 
goods came from West Germany, by 1970 this increased to over six per cent. The 
importance of the Sterling area decreases gradually. In 1950, almost 40 per cent of 
all imports in the manufacturing industry came from the Sterling Area, and by 
1970 this was only 27 per cent. 
 On the export side, we observe that the US share in British exports more than 
doubled over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. The share of exports going to 
West Germany also increased. The Sterling Area became much less important as a 
market for British exports over the course of the Golden Age. Whereas almost half 
of all exports in 1950 were designated to the Sterling Area, by 1970 this share has 
fallen to just over a quarter. Thus, there is a clear shift in Britain’s trade pattern 
over the course of the Golden Age. Britain started to trade less with the Sterling 
Area, and more with the highly developed countries such as the United States and 
West Germany. 
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4.7.1.1 A closer investigation into Britain’s area composition in trade 
I use the labour-productivity growth rates as calculated in Section 4.3.2 to measure 
to what extent trade with different geographical areas affects productivity. This 
data is available for 23 manufacturing industries. I use shares of total imports and 
exports from various countries/regions as explanatory variables drawing from the 
sources mentioned in Section 4.3. Unfortunately, the disaggregated regional data 
which provide information on the industry level are less complete than the 
aggregated data. Therefore, I can only use 12 industries with information on 
imports, and 13 industries with information on exports. There is overlap in 
industries for these two groups. Tables A-3.12 and A-3.13 in the Appendix display 
the share of exports coming from the Sterling Area, the United States, Canada, 
Eastern Europe and the rest of the world, as a share of total exports for the years 
1950, 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1970. West Germany is not included in this regional 
division, since there was no disaggregated information available for the whole 
period under consideration. Although merely ‘eyeballing’ the evolution of trade 
shares to the different regions over the period is obviously not a sufficient means 
for drawing any conclusions on the effect of trade with different geographical 
regions, tables A-3.12 and A-3.13 do suggest that Britain’s trade pattern evolved 
over the course of the Golden Age, and its traditionally important trade partners 
became less important. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 revealed that the Sterling Area became 
less important as a trading area over the course of the Golden Age. However, this 
process is not the same for all industries. For the chemical industry for example, 
the Sterling Area was almost equally important as a market for exports in 1970 as 
in 1950. Also in the electrical engineering industry the importance of the Sterling 
Area did not decrease much. However, in the majority of industries the position of 
the Sterling Area as most important export region was lost by 1970. This process 
was gradual for most industries. When we shift the focus to imports we observe 
that the Sterling Area was a crucial partner for the leather and textiles industry. 
Although the share of imports from the Sterling Area in these industries declined 
over time, by 1970 still a respectable share originates from there. The Sterling 
Area also remained an important supplier of goods in the food industries. 
 The United States became a more important market for exports over the course 
of the 1950s and 1960s. Especially the share of exports in engineering industries 
destined for the United States increased rapidly. Whereas in 1950 only 1.21 and 
0.58 per cent of all exports in respectively the mechanical engineering industry 
and the electrical engineering industry went to the United States, by 1960 the 
shares increased to 6.90 and 5.41 per cent, and finally by 1970 it reached 9.73 and 
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6.91 per cent. The United States became also an important partner for imports, 
especially in the tobacco, iron and steel, chemical and mechanical engineering 
industries. The share of imports from the United States in these industry has 
increased somewhat in 1970 as compared to 1950.     
 Canada was traditionally an important export market for the United Kingdom 
in the non-ferrous metals industry, but this position was lost by 1970. In 1950 the 
most important imported goods from Canada were in the wood (basic materials) 
industry, by 1970 the dependency on Canadian wood and paper increased quite 
substantially. The importance of the Eastern European countries as a market for 
British exports also increased. Whereas in the beginning of the 1950s this area was 
relatively unimportant for most industries, by 1970 its importance increased, 
especially in the textiles and clothing industries, and in the chemicals and leather 
industry.         
 In order to investigate whether the geographical origin of imports has an effect 
on labour-productivity, I performed a two-stage least square instrumental variable 
regression. This approach is similar to the approach in Section 4.4. I use the same 
underlying procedure for the measures of openness. However, whereas in the 
previous analysis the measures of openness were based on imports and exports 
from and to the whole world, I now calculated the import share of home sales, and 
the export share of gross output from and to specific regions. Table A-3.14 in the 
Appendix presents the pairwise correlations of the export measure of openness for 
the four regions in this study. The correlation between the share of gross output 
which is exported to the United States and the share of gross output which is 
exported to Canada is 0.848, which implies that we cannot use these two variables 
at the same time in a regression since this will lead to problems of multi-
collinearity. The correlation between the share of gross output being exported to 
Canada, and the share being exported to the Sterling area is also highly correlated. 
Hence, I will estimate four separate equations, where I include only one region per 
estimation. The pairwise correlations for the import measure of openness are less 
high than for the export measures. Only the correlation of the import measure from 
Canada and Eastern Europe is higher than 50 per cent.  
 The distance to the frontier is included as a control variable in all these 
estimations. For ease of presentation, Table 4.14 only shows the estimated 
coefficients for the export measure of openness for the four regions.
27
 I have 
excluded the optical and precision engineering industry, since there were missing 
                                                   
27 In all these estimations the estimated coefficient of the distance to the frontier entered as expected 
positive and statistically significant. 
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values for the first years. I have also excluded the transport industry, since this 
appeared to be a clear outlier in the estimation. The labour-productivity growth 
rate of the transport sector is very volatile, which is problematic in this small 
sample.    
Table 4.14: Instrumental variable estimation for separate geographical regions 




XGO - Sterling 
0.084 
(0.168) 
XGO - Canada 
0.315 
(1.26) 
XGO – Eastern Europe 
1.281 
(3.286) 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Results of time fixed effects and industry dummies are 
suppressed.  
Estimates marked ***/**/* are significant at the 1/5/10 per cent level. 
I find that the estimated coefficient for the share of gross output exported to the 
United States is positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient 
indicates that if the export share in gross output would increase by one unit, the 
change in the labour-productivity would be 1.67 units, keeping everything else 
constant. This effect is larger than the effect I found in Table 4.6, where export to 
the whole world was considered.  
 The estimated coefficients for the share of gross output designated to the other 
three regions in not significant at conventional significant levels. Hence, exports to 
the United States seems to make a bigger impact on labour-productivity growth 
rates than exports to the other three regions. This is in line with the expectation. 
Firms, and industries, which export to the United States face competition from 
local firms that operate in a well-developed technological regime. Hence, in order 
to be able to compete with these firms, a certain productivity level is required. 
This finding strengthens the idea that Britain’s relative economic decline is partly 
the result of its trading policies. By sticking to traditional trading patterns, the 
developed markets remained a relatively small customer for the United Kingdom. 
Opening up to exports to developed countries could have led to an innovation push 
for British companies. Therefore, I believe that it might have been more beneficial 
to become a member of the European Community in a much earlier stage, rather 
than sticking to Commonwealth trade. This finding also implies that scholars, such 
as Panić and Seward (1966) and Wells (1966) who already in the 1960s argued 
that Britain could have benefitted from trading more with well-developed 
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countries made a valid point. My analysis provides quantitative evidence in 
support of their claims.        
 A similar analysis with the import measures of openness did not produce any 
statistically significant coefficients. However, this might well be the result of the 
limited size of the data set. Theoretically, we would assume that imports from 
more advanced countries would exhibit more options for learning. Moreover, to be 
able to use advanced inputs a certain technology level is required.   
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4.8 Conclusion 
Britain was once the workshop of the world, and the leading trading country. 
However, after the Second World War Britain no longer held this position. Many 
hypotheses have been put forward in the literature on Britain’s relative economic 
decline to explain the relatively poor economic performance of Britain in 
comparison to other developed countries, such as West Germany. Britain’s trade 
performance might be one of the reasons for its disappointing slow growth. One of 
the main issues related to trade and openness mentioned in the literature is 
Britain’s failure to become a member of the EEC at start-up. Britain relied on 
trading with the Commonwealth and set up the EFTA, but both trade groups did 
not contain advanced nations which would normally provide direct competition for 
British manufacturing industries. The result was that Britain remained relatively 
shielded from competition in the period after the Second World War. This 
isolation from competition might have resulted in a lower innovation push in 
British manufacturing, and hence lower labour-productivity growth rates and 
lower MFP growth rates. Moreover, relatively low levels of export could also lead 
to fewer opportunities to reap economies of scale and profit from the market size 
effect. The 1950s and beginning of 1960s were still characterised by high levels of 
protection, which frustrated imports. The first large decrease in tariffs was 
negotiated in the Kennedy Round in 1967, but these changes only went into effect 
in the following five years, and thus had no impact on trade in the first decades 
after the war.        
 In this chapter I investigated whether trade and openness had an effect on 
labour productivity, as measured by value added per hour worked, in a sample of 
23 manufacturing industries in Britain in the post-war period. I have used different 
measures of openness. The first is imports as a share of domestic sales (MS), the 
second measure is the ratio of exports to gross output (XGO).  The labour-
productivity gap between the United States and the United Kingdom, as measured 
by value added per hour worked, is included to control for catch-up and 
convergence effects. To control for possible endogeneity problems (i.e. industries 
export more because they are more productive) I employed a two-stage least 
square instrumental variable approach where lagged measures of the openness 
variables were used as instruments. I find a positive, statistically significant 
coefficient for the export measure of openness. Thus, the larger the share of export 
in gross output, the higher the growth rate in labour productivity. This finding can 
be explained by the larger opportunities to reap scale economies. However, it 
might also be that Melitz-type of effects are at work, and openness to trade implies 
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that the least productive firms in an industry leave the market, which results in a 
higher overall productivity level of the industry. The estimated coefficient of the 
distance to the frontier measure is in most specifications positive and statistically 
significant. This means that industries that are further from the technology frontier 
experience larger labour-productivity growth rates. This finding is as expected, 
and in line with the prediction of the catch-up and convergence literature.   
 I have also investigated the effect of openness on MFP growth rate for the 
period 1954-1968. The advantage of this method is that I did not need to rely on 
interpolated values of gross output and value added. I find that openness, and 
particularly imports also had a pronounced effect on MFP growth rates. This might 
be the result of the competition effect of imports.      
 In the final part of this chapter, I investigated the importance of the 
geographical dimension of trade. Theoretically we would assume that trade with 
more advanced countries is more advantageous. The analysis showed that Britain 
was highly dependent on the Sterling Area for both the imports and exports 
throughout the Golden Age, although near the end of the period the importance 
started to decline. The econometric analysis indicates that exports to the United 
States had a positive and statistically significant effect on labour productivity 
growth rates. This analysis suggested that Britain could have gained from being 
integrated in the EEC. Britain could have experienced higher labour-productivity 
growth rates if it had traded more with advanced countries.      
 This chapter provides new evidence indicating that labour-productivity growth 
is correlated with measures of international openness over the period 1951-1970 
over a cross section of 23 industries in British manufacturing. The effect of 
openness on the labour-productivity growth rates is substantial. Therefore, the 
critique on Britain’s trade policy and export performance seems to be relevant. 
Trade and openness should be considered as important explanations in the debate 




Chapter 5  
Conclusion: A reassessment of the 
manufacturing failure hypothesis 
The concept of economic decline has since long been a research topic in the 
British literature. In particular the literature on the post-war era views the process 
of economic decline as the result of pathological failure of Britain, and not as the 
inevitable result of global capitalism and economic growth in other nations 
(Tomlinson 2009). Economic growth in the United Kingdom was unusually low 
during the Golden Age in comparison with other advanced nations. As the 
previous Chapters pointed out, this is indicating that Britain was confronted with 
relative economic decline. There is a large literature with non-mutually exclusive 
ideas about the causes of the divergent growth experiences during the Golden Age, 
ranging from institutional explanations, to macro-economic policies, and catch-up 
and convergence theories. The mainstream interpretation of Britain’s relative 
decline has crystallized around the Broadberry-Crafts view and, at its core, the so-
called manufacturing failure hypothesis.       
  Chapter 1 spelled out some important questions that need to be answered 
in order to clarify the ongoing debate on the causes and nature of British relative 
economic decline. The first question is whether there was failure in manufacturing. 
To answer this question I set out to find which industries contributed most to 
Britain’s relative economic decline.      
 The dissertation starts with a detailed account of how relative labour-
productivity in the United Kingdom and West Germany developed over the period 
1935-1968. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation I have constructed a disaggregate 
labour-productivity benchmark for West Germany and the United Kingdom for the 
year 1951. I also substantially revised the existing 1935 benchmark from 
Fremdling et al. (2007a) in order to make it directly comparable with the post-war 
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estimates. Finally, I relied on an existing 1968 labour-productivity estimate from 
Smith et al. (1982) to evaluate the relative position of the United Kingdom and 
West Germany near the end of the Golden Age of economic growth. These three 
estimates together allowed me to obtain a complete picture of Britain’s relative 
labour-productivity performance from the interwar period to the end of the 1960s. 
The data reveal that West Germany had a substantial lead over the United 
Kingdom during the interwar period. In the years after the Second World War this 
pattern had completely reversed. The United Kingdom was more productive in 
nearly all industries. However, West Germany remained the productivity leader in 
the iron and steel industry. At the end of the 1950s however, West Germany 
managed to overtake Britain again. According to the estimate of Smith et al. West 
Germany was 23 per cent more productive than Britain in 1968. The period 
1935/1968 is clearly a period of shifting fortunes.     
 In Chapter 3, I have applied shift-share analysis to examine whether the 
aggregate manufacturing gap in labour-productivity between the United Kingdom 
and West Germany was the result of intra-sector effects, or differences in 
industrial structure. I found that for both 1935 and 1951 the intra-industry effects 
were the most important driver of the aggregate gap. The structure between the 
two economies was not very different, and hence, not very important in explaining 
the aggregate gap. Thus the difference in productivity in similar industries in West 
Germany and the United Kingdom was driving the aggregate gap.  
 The great advantage of my novel and highly disaggregated labour-productivity 
dataset is that it also allowed me to investigate in detail what the contribution of all 
individual industries was to the aggregate labour-productivity gap in 
manufacturing. Understanding the importance of individual industries is crucial if 
we want to discuss whether British manufacturing failed or not. The sharp 
deterioration of the principal war industries in West Germany, such as iron and 
steel, metal products, machine tools, transport vehicles, electrical engineering and 
chemicals, was the reason why West Germany fell behind after the Second World 
War. The atypical tobacco industry was responsible for almost half of the 
aggregate manufacturing gap in labour productivity in 1951. Whereas Britain 
produced mainly capital intensive cigarettes, West Germany was still producing 
labour intensive cigars. As a result, British labour-productivity was much higher 
than in West Germany.  
 The second part of Chapter 3 is concerned with the causes of Britain’s relative 
economic performance. The United Kingdom was bound to achieve more modest 
rates of labour-productivity growth in manufacturing because (1) the United 
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Kingdom was closer to the technological frontier than West Germany, and (2) 
because it lacked the potential for reconstruction growth that, according to many, 
was the engine of the German Wirtschaftswunder. I found a high correlation 
between the estimated labour-productivity gaps in 1935 and my extrapolated 
labour-productivity gaps for 1960. I believe that reconstruction indeed played a 
significant role in West Germany’s fast growth rates after the Second World War. 
However, West Germany continued to exhibit extraordinary growth rates after the 
end of the 1950s, when it should be expected that West Germany was back on its 
long run growth trajectory. Hence, reconstruction growth can be used as an 
explanation for the comparatively faster growth of West Germany as compared to 
the United Kingdom during the 1950s. However, reconstruction growth does not 
explain the growth dynamics during the 1960s.  
 Another important contribution of this dissertation to the literature is that my 
new data can be used to resolve an important debate in the economic history 
literature. My new data and findings shed more light on the big questions 
concerning the economic performance of Britain, and I am able to demonstrate 
that some of the arguments used in the debate should be reconsidered. My 
conclusion on the timing of the West-German overtaking of the British labour-
productivity level are different from what previously has been argued in the 
literature. In the 2003 debate in the ‘Economic History Review’ between Booth 
(2003a) and Broadberry and Crafts (2003), Booth concludes that almost two-third 
of West Germany’s relative productivity performance over the course of the 
Golden Age was secured by 1952. However, this calculation relied on a labour-
productivity estimate by Broadberry which was extrapolated from a distant 
benchmark year.  With use of my novel data I am able to show that this claim of 
Booth is highly exaggerated. I find that less than a quarter of the West-German 
improvement over the period 1951-1968 was secured by 1952. Hence, the 
remainder of the 1950s and 1960s are still of crucial importance to explain the 
shifting fortunes of West Germany and the United Kingdom.   
 The final part of Chapter 3 focused on possible underlying causes of Britain’s 
relative economic decline, such as failure in Americanisation and mass production 
techniques, and human capital. Due to the historical commitment of the United 
Kingdom to craft production, attempts to switch to mass-production techniques 
were resisted by the shop floor workers. British managers were also not very eager 
to adopt these methods since they had no experience with the type of shop floor 
control needed to operate these methods. Although after the war the Anglo-
American Council on Productivity was set up to promote American production 
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techniques in the United Kingdom, the effect of this organisation was very limited. 
I have constructed so-called manufacturing footprints to evaluate whether large 
plants in British industry had a different productivity than the average level in the 
industrial branch. The new data have revealed that in many cases the large plants 
were more productive than average. In that sense I can agree with the conclusion 
from Booth (2003a), who argued that there is not really any failure in large-scale 
operations. 
 Although there were problems in the United Kingdom related to 
Americanisation and mass production techniques, I do not believe we should 
necessarily call the British performance in this area as failure. Given the situation, 
the different demand structure and the historical dependence on craft production it 
was simply not possible to copy American techniques.  
 Chapter 4 focuses on the role of international trade and openness on Britain’s 
relative economic decline. The United Kingdom was once the first major, 
dominant trading country of the world. After the Second World War, the United 
States became the biggest exporter of manufactured goods in the world, and by 
1958 West Germany overtook Britain’s position as the world’s second largest 
exporter of manufacturing goods. The Golden Age of economic growth was in 
essence a period of protectionism in Britain, with high tariffs. According to 
Broadberry and Leunig (2013) an important reason for Britain’s sluggish 
productivity growth in the post-war period, as compared with for example West 
Germany, was the isolation of British firms from foreign competition. European 
nations had relatively similar economic structures during this era, which means 
that firms in each country could compete with each other in a potentially vigorous 
manner. Britain however, was still trading with the Commonwealth, but these 
economies were complementary to each other, and hence intra-industry 
competitive pressure was lowered.  
 I examine at the disaggregate manufacturing level whether there was an effect 
of trade and openness on Britain’s labour productivity for the period 1951-1970. I 
use behavioural measures of openness to examine the relationship between 
openness and labour-productivity growth.  My research contributes to the debate 
on British failure in manufacturing by providing a detailed account of Britain’s 
trade performance over the course of the Golden Age. The main contribution of 
this chapter is the quantification of the relationship between openness and 
productivity during the post-war era in the United Kingdom. Although the 
literature has mentioned Britain’s trade patterns and its export performance as a 
cause of its relative economic decline, there is not much quantitative evidence 
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available to support this claim. My estimations showed that indeed openness 
affects labour-productivity growth. Especially the level of exports has a 
pronounced effect on labour-productivity growth.  
 The second part of chapter 4 is concerned with the geographical origin of 
trade. The Sterling Area was still the single most important trading area of the 
United Kingdom in 1950. Over the course of the Golden Age the importance of 
the Sterling Area declined. I investigate at the disaggregate industry level whether 
the geographical origin of imports, and destination of exports had an effect on 
labour-productivity growth in manufacturing. I find that exports to the United 
States had a bigger impact on labour-productivity growth rates than exports to the 
Sterling Area, Canada and Eastern Europe. This is in line with the expectation 
from the theory. Firms, and industries, which exported to the United States faced 
competition from local firms that operated in a well-developed technological 
regime. Hence, in order to be able to compete with these firms, a certain minimum 
productivity level was required.   
 The second question stated in my introduction “How large were the effects of 
the British focus on trade with the Commonwealth nations on manufacturing 
labour-productivity levels?”. I found that international trade indeed had a 
pronounced effect on labour-productivity growth rates.  
 The geographical origin of trade was also relevant. Britain’s trading partners 
were important for the positive externalities from trade on labour-productivity 
growth rates. This finding implies that scholars, such as Panić and Seward (1966) 
and Wells (1966) who already in the 1960s argued that Britain could have 
benefitted from trading more with well-developed countries made a valid point. 
My analysis provides quantitative evidence in support of their claims. This finding 
strengthens the idea that Britain’s relative economic decline is partly the result of 
its trading policies. Therefore, I believe that it might have been more beneficial to 
the United Kingdom to become a member of the European Community in a much 
earlier stage, rather than sticking to Commonwealth trade. 
 Overall this dissertation has contributed to the ongoing debate on Britain’s 
relative economic decline during the Golden Age of economic growth. With new 
data I am able to show more precisely when West Germany overtook the British 
labour-productivity lead in manufacturing. I have also been able to pinpoint which 
industries contributed most to the aggregate manufacturing gap. In the second part 
of this dissertation I have shown that openness and trade were important for 
Britain’s labour-productivity growth. Hence, scholars who have identified trade as 
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a potential cause of British decline do have a point. Future research should indeed 
take Britain’s trading position into account.   
 To conclude: failure is an overrated concept in the discussion on British 
manufacturing. As I have demonstrated, with for example the case of textiles, 
there is sometimes good economic reason not to adopt novel modes of production. 
Therefore, I argue that we should not state that British entrepreneurs have failed. 
However, when we consider the economic climate and the role of government 
policies the situation is different. In particular when it comes to education and 
trade policies different decisions could have been made, such as opening up to the 






Abelshauser, W 1975, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948: Rekonstruktion 
und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone, 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart. 
Abelshauser, W 1983, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(1945-1980), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. 
Abelshauser, W 2004, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945, CH Beck, 
Munich. 
Abramovitz, M 1986, ‘Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind’, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 385-406. 
Aghion, P & Howitt, P 1992, ‘A model of growth through creative destruction’, 
Econometrica, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 323-351. 
Aghion, P & Howitt, P 2009, The economics of growth, MIT press, Massachusetts. 
Alcock, JP 2008, ‘Food in time of war: food rationing in Britain during World 
War II’ in Food and Morality, ed. SF Friedland, Cromwell Press, 
Trowbridge, pp. 9-19. 
Alford, BWE 1973, W.D. & H.O. Wills and the development of the U.K. tobacco 
industry, Methuen, London.  
Allen, RC 2013, ‘American Exceptionalism as a problem in global history’, 
Oxford Economics Discussion Paper, 689, pp. 1-63.  
Ambrosius, G 1993, ‘Wirtschaftlicher Strukturwandlung und Technikentwicklung’ 
in Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 
fünfziger Jahre, eds. A Schildt & A Sywottek, Dietz, Bonn, pp. 107-128. 
Ames, E & Rosenberg, N 1968, ‘The enfield arsenal in theory and history’, The 
Economic Journal, vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 827-842. 
Arrow, KJ 1962, ‘The economic implications of learning by doing’, The Review of 
Economics Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 155-173.  
Baldwin, RE 1958, ‘The commodity composition of trade: selected industrial 
countries, 1900-1954’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 40, 
no. 1, pp. 50-68.   
Banking 1968, ‘The currency devaluations of 1949’, Banking, vol. 60, no. 7, p. 43. 
178 British failure? 
 
 
Bannock, G 1981, The economics of small firms: return form the wilderness, 
Blackwell, Oxford.  
Barro, R 1991, ‘Economic growth in a cross section of countries’, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. 106, no. 2, pp. 407-443. 
Baumol, WJ 1986, ‘Productivity growth, convergence and welfare: what the long-
run data show’, The American Economic Review, vol. 76, no. 5, pp. 1072-
1085. 
Bean, C & Crafts, NFR 1996, ‘British economic growth since 1945: relative 
economic decline…and Renaissance?’ in Economic growth in Europe 
since 1945, eds. NFR Crafts & G Toniolo, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 131-162. 
Berghoff, H 2006, ‘The end of family business: the Mittelstand and German 
capitalism in transition, 1949-2000’, The Business History Review, vol. 
80, no. 2, pp. 263-295. 
Birkenfeld, W 1964, Der Synthetische Treibstoff, 1933-1945; ein Beitrag zur 
nationalsozialistischen Wirtschafts-und Rüstungspolitik, Munster-
Schmidt, Göttingen. 
Bolthom, A 1982, The European economy: growth and crisis, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Bombach, G 1985, Post-war economic growth revisited, de Vries lecture in 
Economics 6, Amsterdam. 
Booth, A 2003a, ‘The manufacturing failure hypothesis and the performance of 
British industry during the long boom’, The Economic History Review, 
vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 1-33.  
Booth, A 2003b, ‘The Broadberry-Crafts view and the evidence: a reply’, The 
Economic History Review, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 736-742. 
Booth, A, Melling, J & Dartmann, C 1997, ‘Institutions and economic growth: the 
politics of productivity in West Germany, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, 1945-1955’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 57, no. 2, 
pp. 416-444. 
Bornemann, FO & Linhoff, H 1958, Die seit der Währungsreform begebenen 
Industrie-Anleihen, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin. 
Braun, HJ 1990, The German economy in the twentieth century: the German Reich 
and the Federal Republic, Routledge, London.  
Briscoe, L 1975, ‘The growth and structure of international trade since the Second 




Broadberry, SN 1997a, The productivity race: British manufacturing in 
international perspective, 1850-1990, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.  
Broadberry, SN 1997b, ‘Anglo-German productivity differences, 1870-1990: a 
sectoral analysis’, The European Review of Economic History, vol. 1, no. 
2, pp. 247-267. 
Broadberry, SN 1998, ‘How did the United States and Germany overtake Britain? 
A sectoral analysis of comparative productivity levels, 1870-1990’ The 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 375-407.  
Broadberry, SN 2004, ‘Explaining Anglo-German productivity differences in 
services since 1870’, Centre for Economic Policy Research, discussion 
paper no. 4597. 
Broadberry, SN & Crafts, NFR 1990, ‘Explaining Anglo-American productivity 
differences in the mid-twentieth  century’, The Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 375-402.  
Broadberry, SN & Crafts, NFR 1992, ‘Britain's productivity gap in the 1930s: 
some neglected factors’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 52, no. 3, 
pp. 531-558. 
Broadberry, SN & Crafts, NFR 1996, ‘British economic policy and industrial 
performance in the early postwar period’, Business History, vol. 38, no. 4, 
pp. 65-91. 
Broadberry, SN & Crafts, NFR 2001, ‘Competition and innovation in 1950s 
Britain’, Business History, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 97-118.  
Broadberry, SN & Crafts, NFR 2003, ‘UK productivity performance from 1950 to 
1979: a restatement of the Broadberry-Crafts view’, The Economic 
History Review, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 718-735. 
Broadberry, SN & Fremdling, R 1990, ‘Comparative productivity in British and 
German industry 1907-37’, The Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 403-421. 
Broadberry, SN & Leunig, T 2013, ‘The impact of government policies on UK 
manufacturing since 1945’, Future of Manufacturing Project: Evidence 
Paper 2, Foresight, Government Office for Science.  
Broadberry, SN & O’Mahony, M 2004, ‘Britain's productivity gap with the United 
States and Europe: a historical perspective’, National Institute Economic 
Review, vol. 189, no. 1, pp. 72-85. 
Broadberry, SN & Wagner, K 1996, ‘Human capital and productivity in 
manufacturing during the twentieth century: Britain, Germany and the 
United States’ in Quantative aspects of post-war European economic 
180 British failure? 
 
 
growth, eds. B Van Ark and NFR Crafts, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 244-270. 
Brown, CJF & Sheriff, TD 1979, De-industrialisation in the UK: background 
statistics, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.  
Buchheim, C 1993, ‘Marshall Plan and currency reform’ in American policy and 
reconstruction of West Germany 1945-1955, eds. J Diefendorf, A Frohn & 
H Rupierer, German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 
Washington D.C./Cambridge, pp. 69-83.  
Cairncross, A 1951, ‘The economic recovery of Germany’, Lloyd Bank Review, 
vol. 22, October.  
Cairncross, A 1985, Years of recovery, British economic policy 1945-51, Methuen, 
London. 
Cameron G, Proudman, J & Redding, S 1997, ‘Productivity convergence and 
international openness’, Bank of England, ISSN 1368-5562. 
Cameron, G, Proudman, J & Redding, S 1998, ‘Deconstructing growth in UK 
manufacturing’ in Openness and Growth, eds. J Proudman & S Redding, 
Bank of England. 
Cameron, G, Proudman, J & Redding, S 1999, ‘Technological convergence, R&D, 
trade and productivity growth’, European Economic Review, vol. 49, no. 
3, pp. 775-807. 
Cameron, G, Proudman, J & Redding, S 1999, ‘Openness and its association with 
productivity growth in UK manufacturing industry’, Bank of England, 
working paper no. 104. 
Carew, A 1987, Labour under the Marshall Plan, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester.  
Carew, A 1991, ‘The Anglo-American Council on productivity (1948-1952): the 
ideological roots of the post-war debate on productivity in Britain’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 46-69.  
Carter SB, Gartner SS, Haines MR, Olmstead AL, Sutch R & Wright G (eds.) 
2006, Historical statistics of the United States, volume 4, economic 
sectors, Cambridge University Press, New York.  
Carter SB, Gartner SS, Haines MR, Olmstead AL, Sutch R & Wright G (eds.) 
2006, Historical statistics of the United States, volume 3, economic 
structure and performance, Cambridge University Press, New York.  
Castellani, D, Serti, F & Tomasi, C 2010, ‘Firms in international trade: importers 
and exporters heterogeneity in Italian manufacturing industries’, The 
World Economy, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 424-457. 
Bibliography 181 
 
Castles, FG & Dowrick, S 1990, ‘The impact of government spending levels on 
medium-term economic growth in the OECD, 1960-85’, Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 173-204. 
Chalmin, P 1990, The making of a sugar giant Tate & Lyle 1859-1989, Harwood 
Academic Publishers, Chur. 
Chandler, AD 1992, ‘Organizational capabilities and the economic history of the 
industrial enterprise’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 3, 
pp. 79-100.   
Clark, C 1962, British trade in the common market: plain facts about the common 
market, Stevens & Sons Limited, London. 
Coe, DT & Helpman, E 1995, ‘International R&D spillovers’, The European 
Economic Review, vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 859-887. 
Conference Board 2011, Total economy database. Available from: 
http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/>. [24 February 
2011]. 
Crafts, NFR 1992, ‘Productivity growth reconsidered’, Economic Policy, vol. 7, 
no. 15, pp. 387-426.  
Crafts, NFR 1993, ‘Adjusting from war to peace in 1940s Britain’, The Economic 
and Social Review, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 1-20. 
Crafts, NFR 1994, ‘Managing decline? 1870-1990’, History Today, vol. 44, no. 6, 
pp. 37-42.  
Crafts, NFR 1995a, ‘The Golden Age of economic growth in Western Europe’, 
The Economic History Review, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 429-447.  
Crafts, NFR 1995b, ‘‘You’ve never had it so good?’ British economic policy and 
performance, 1945-1960’ in Europe’s post-war recovery, ed. B 
Eichengreen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 246-270. 
Crafts, NFR 1996, ‘Deindustrialization and economic growth’, The Economic 
Journal, vol. 106, no 434, pp. 172-183.  
Crafts, NFR 2012, ‘British relative economic decline revisited: the role of 
competition’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 17-29.  
Crafts, NFR & Mills TC 1996, ‘Europe's Golden Age: an econometric evaluation 
of changing trend rates of growth’ in Quantitative Aspects of Europe's 
Postwar Growth, eds. B van Ark and NFR Crafts, Centre for Economic 
Policy research, Cambridge, pp. 415-431. 
Crafts, NFR & Toniolo, G 1995. ‘Postwar growth: an overview’ in Economic 
growth in Europe in 1945, eds. NFR Crafts & G Toniolo, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1-37. 
182 British failure? 
 
 
Dalgaard, E & Sørensen HS 2002, ‘Consistency between PPP benchmarks and 
national price and volume indices’, Paper prepared for the 27th General 
Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and 
Wealth, Stockholm, August. 
Davies, S & Caves, RE 1987, Britain’s productivity gap, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  
De Jong, HJ 2003, Catching up twice. The nature of Dutch industrial growth 
during the 20
th
 century in a comparative perspective, Akademie Verlag, 
Berlin. 
De Jong, HJ & Woltjer PJ, 2011, ‘Depression dynamics: a new estimate of the 
Anglo-American productivity gap in the interwar period’, The Economic 
History Review, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 471-492.  
De Loecker, J 2007, ‘Do export generate higher productivity? Evidence from 
Slovenia’, Journal of International Economics, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 69-98. 
Denison, F 1967, Why growth rates differ: postwar experience in nine western 
countries. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 
Dintenfass, M 1992, The Decline of Industrial Britain 1870-1980, Routledge, 
London. 
Dowrick, S & Nguyen, DT 1989, ‘OECD comparative economic growth 1950-
1985: catch-up and convergence’, The American Economic Review, vol. 
79, no. 5, pp. 1010–1030. 
Dumke, RH 1990, ‘Reassessing the Wirtschaftswunder: reconstruction and 
postwar growth in West Germany in an international context’, The Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 451-491. 
Dunning, JH 1958, American investment in British manufacturing industry, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London.  
Easterly, W 2005, ‘National policies and economic growth a reappraisal’ in 
Handbook of Economic Growth, eds. P Aghion & SN Durlauf, Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, pp. 1015-1059.  
Edgerton, D 1994, ‘The rise and fall of British technology’, History Today, vol. 
44, no. 5, pp. 43-48. 
Edwards, S 1992, ‘Trade orientation, distortions, and growth in developing 
countries’, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 31-57.   
Edwards, S 1993, ‘Openness, trade liberalization and growth in developing 
countries’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 1358-1393. 
Eichengreen, B 2006, The European economy since 1945, coordinated capitalism 
and beyond, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
Bibliography 183 
 
Eichengreen, B (ed.), 2007, Europe's postwar recovery, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  
Eichengreen, B & Ritschl, AO 2009, ‘Understanding West German economic 
growth in the 1950s’, Cliometrica, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 191-219. 
Elbaum, B 1989, ‘Why apprenticeships persisted in Britain but not in the United 
States’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 337-349. 
Elbaum, B 1991, ‘The persistence of apprenticeships in Britain and its decline in 
the United States’ in Industrial training and technology innovation, ed. 
HF Ghospel, Routledge, London, pp. 194-212.  
Elbaum, B & Lazonick, W 1984, ‘The decline of the British Economy: an 
institutional perspective’, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 44, no. 2, 
pp. 567-583. 
Elliot, DC & Gribbin JD 1977, ‘The abolition of cartels and structural change in 
the United Kingdom’ in Welfare aspects of industrial markets, eds. AP 
Jacquemin & HW de Jong, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp. 345-365.   
Feinstein, CH 1972, National income, expenditure and output of the United 
Kingdom 1855-1965, The University Printing House, Cambridge.  
Feinstein, CH 1994, ‘Success and failure: British economic growth since 1948’ in 
The Economic History of Britain since 1700’, eds. RC Floud & DN 
McCloskey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 95-122. 
Fischer, W 1978, ‘The role of science and technology in the economic 
development of modern Germany’ in Science, technology, and economic 
development: a historical and comparative study, eds. W Beranek, & G 
Ranis, Praeger, New York, pp. 71-113.  
Flux, AW 1933, ‘Industrial productivity in Great Britain and the United States’, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 1-38. 
Foreign news, 1953, Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, vol. 1, no. 15, 
pp. 919.  
Frankel, M. 1955, ‘Anglo-American productivity differences: their magnitude and 
some causes’, The American Economic Review, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 94-112.  
Frankel, M. 1957, British and American Manufacturing Productivity, University 
of Illinois, Urbana. 
Fremdling, R, de Jong, HJ & Timmer, MP 2007a, ‘British and German 
manufacturing productivity compared: a new benchmark for 1935/36 
based on double deflated value added’, The Journal of Economic History, 
vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 350-578.   
184 British failure? 
 
 
Fremdling, R, de Jong, HJ & Timmer MP 2007b, ‘Censuses compared: a new 
benchmark for British and German manufacturing 1935/1936’, Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre Memorandum 90, pp. 1–36. 
Gaitskell, H 1952, ‘The Sterling Area’, International Affairs, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 
170-176. 
Gareau, FH 1961, ‘Morgenthau’s plan for industrial disarmament in Germany’, 
The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2 , pp. 517-34.  
Gerschenkron, A 1955, ‘Soviet heavy industry: a dollar index of output’, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 120-130.  
Gerschenkron, A 1962, Economic backwardness in historical perspective, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA.   
Giersch, H, Paqué, KH & Schmieding, H 1992, The fading miracle, four decades 
of market economy in Germany, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.  
Gospel, HF 1995, ‘The decline of apprenticeship training in Britain’, Industrial 
Relations Journal, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 32-44.  
Grant, W, Nekkers, J & van Waarden, F (eds.) 1991, Organising business for war: 
corporatist economic organization during the Second World War, Berg 
Publishers, New York.   
Griffith R, Redding S & van Reenen J 2004, ‘Mapping the two faces of R&D: 
productivity growth in a panel of OECD industries, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 883-895. 
Griliches, Z 1988, ‘Productivity puzzles and R&D: another nonexplanation’, The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 9-21.   
Grossman, GM & Helpman, E 1991a, ‘Quality ladders in the theory of growth’, 
The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 43-61.  
Grossman, GM & Helpman, E 1991b, Innovation and growth in the global 
economy, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Hall, RE & Jones, CI 1999, ‘Why do some countries produce so much more output 
per worker than others?’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114, 
no. 1, pp. 83-116. 
Hannah, L 1983, The rise of the corporate economy, Methuen, London.  
Harrison, M (ed.) 1998, The economics of World War II: six great powers in 
international comparison, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Harley, CK 1974, ‘Skilled labour and the choice of technique in Edwardian 
industry’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 391-414.  
Helpman, E 1993, ‘Innovation, imitation and intellectual property rights’, 
Econometrica, vol. 61, no. 6, pp. 12470-1280.  
Bibliography 185 
 
Helpman, E 2004, The mystery of economic growth, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Hill, RC, Griffiths, WE & Lim, GC 2012, Principles of econometrics, John Wiley 
& sons, New York. 
Hoffmann, E 1962, Zur Geschichte der Berufsausbildung in Deutschland, W. 
Bertelsmann Verlag, Bielefeld.  
Hsiao, MW 1987, ‘Test of causality and exogeneity between exports and 
economic growth: the case of Asian NICs’, Journal of Economic 
Development, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 143-159. 
Huberman, M & Minns, C 2007, ‘The times they are not changin’: days and hours 
of work in old and new worlds, 1870-2000’, Explorations in Economic 
History, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 538-567. 
Hutchison, M & Singh, N 1992, ‘Exports, non-exports and externalities: a Granger 
causality approach’, The International Economic Journal, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 
79-94. 
International Comparison Program 2005, ‘Global purchasing power parities and 
real expenditures, methodological handbook’, International Comparison 
Project.   
Jánossy, F 1969, The end of the economic miracle: appearance and reality in 
economic development, International Arts and Sciences Press, White 
Plains, New York.  
Jorgenson, DW, Gollop, FM & Fraumeni, BM 1987, Productivity and U.S. 
economic growth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Imlah, AH 1958, Economic elements in the Pax Britannica, studies in British 
foreign trade in the nineteenth century, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Kaldor, N 1966, Causes of the slow growth in the United Kingdom, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Keller, W 2002, ‘Trade and the transmission of technology’, Journal of Economic 
Growth, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 5-24. 
Kindleberger, CP 1967, Europe’s postwar growth: the role of labour supply, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
King, G 1696, ‘Natural and political observations and conclusions upon the state 
and condition of England’ in Two tracts by Gregory King, ed. G. Barnett, 
John Hopkins University Press.  
Kirby, MW 1992, ‘Institutional rigidities and economic decline: reflections on the 
British experience’, The Economic History Review, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 637-
660. 
186 British failure? 
 
 
Kitson, M & Michie J 1996, ‘Britain’s industrial performance since 1960: 
underinvestment and relative decline’, The Economic Journal, vol. 106, 
no. 434, pp. 196-212.  
Kravis, IB & Lipsey, RE 1991, ‘The International Comparison Program: current 
status and problems’ in International economic transaction: issues in 
measurement & empirical research, eds. P Hooper & JD Richardson, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 437-468. 
Krengel, R 1958, Anlagevermogen, Produktion und beschäftigung im Gebiet der 
Bundesrepublik von 1924 bis 1956, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin.  
Krijnse-Locker, H. 1984, ‘On the estimation of purchasing power parities on the 
basic heading level’, Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 
135-152. 
Krugman, P 1994, The age of diminished expectations (revised and updated 
edition), MIT Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Krugman, P, Cooper, RN & Srinivasan, TN 1995, ‘Growing world trade: causes 
and consequences’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1995, 
no. 1, pp. 327-377. 
Landes, DS 1965, ‘Factor costs and demand: determinants of economic growth. A 
critique of professor Habakkuk’s thesis’, Business History, vol. 7, no. 1, 
pp. 15-33.  
Landes, DS 1969, The unbound Prometheus: technological change and industrial 
development in western Europe from 1750 to the present, Press Syndicate 
of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge. 
Lazonick, W 1981, ‘Competition, specialization, and industrial decline’, The 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 31-38.  
Lazonick, W 1986, ‘The cotton industry’ in The decline of the British economy, 
eds. Elbaum, B and Lazonick, W, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 
18-50.  
Lee, S 1996, ‘Manufacturing’ in Industrial policy in Britain, ed. D Coates, 
MacMillan Press Ltd, London, pp. 33-61. 
Lewchuk, W 1987, American technology and the British vehicle industry, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Lomax, KS 1959, ‘Production and productivity movements in the United 
Kingdom since 1900’, Journal or the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 122, 
no. 2, pp. 185-220.  
Lucas, RE Jr. 1988, ‘On the mechanics of economic development’, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 3-42.  
Bibliography 187 
 
Ludlow, NP 1997, Dealing with Britain: the six and the first UK application to the 
EEC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Maddison, A 1987, ‘Growth and slowdown in advanced capitalist economies: 
techniques of quantitative assessment’, Journal of Economic Literature, 
vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 649-698.  
Maddison, A 1991, Dynamic forces in capitalist development, Oxford University 
Press, New York.  
Maddison, A 1995, Monitoring the world economy 1820-1991, Development 
Centre of the Organisations for the Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris.  
Maddison, A 2001, The world economy: a millennial perspective, Organization for 
Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
Maddison, A & van Oostroom, H 1993, The international comparison of value 
added, productivity and purchasing power parities in agriculture, GGDC 
Research Memorandum 199301. 
Mansell, K 1980, ‘UK visible trade in the post-war years’, Office for National 
Statistics: Economic Trends, October, pp. 136-143. 
Mass, W & Lazonick, W 1990, ‘The British cotton industry and international 
competitive advantage: the state of debates’, Business History, vol. 32, no. 
4, pp 9-65.  
McCloskey, D 1970, ‘Did Victorian Britain fail?’, The Economic History Review, 
vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 446-459.  
Melitz, MJ 2003, ‘The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and 
aggregate industry productivity’, Econometrica, vol. 71, no. 6, pp. 1695-
1725. 
Millward, R 1994, ‘British industry since the Second World War’, History Today, 
vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 49-54. 
Milward, AS 1977, War, economy and society 1939-1945, Penguin Books Ltd., 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex.  
Milward, AS 1984, The reconstruction of western Europe, 1945-51, Methuen, 
London. 
Milward, AS & Brennan, G 1996, Britain’s place in the world, a historical 
enquiry into import controls 1945-1960, Routledge, London. 
Moore, L 1964, ‘Factors affecting the demand for British exports’, Bulletin of the 
Oxford Institute of Economics & Statistics, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 343-359.  
Moore, L 1985, The growth and structure of international trade since the second 
world war, Wheatsheaf Books LTD, Brighton. 
188 British failure? 
 
 
Moore, L 1988, ‘Agricultural protection in Britain and its economy-wide effects, 
The World Economy, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 249-266. 
Morgan, AD & Martin, D 1975, ‘Tariff reductions an UK imports of 
manufactures: 1955-1971’, National Institute Economic Review, vol. 72, 
no. 1, pp. 38-54.  
National Institute Economic Review 1963, Fast and slow-growing products in 
world trade, National Institute Economic Review, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 22-39. 
Nelson, RR & Wright, G 1992, ‘The rise and fall of American technological 
leadership: the post-war era in historical perspective’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 1931-1964.  
Nickell, S & van Reenen J 2001, ‘Technological innovation and economic 
performance in the United Kingdom, Centre for Economic Performance, 
Discussion Paper no. 488. 
Olson, M 1963, The economics of wartime shortage: a history of British food 
supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II, Duke 
University Press, Durham, North Carolina.  
Olson, M 1982, The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation and 
social rigidities, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
O’Mahony, M 1998, The national institute sector productivity dataset: sources 
and methods, mimeo, National Institute for Economic and Social 
Research, London. 
O’Mahony, M 1999, Britain’s productivity performance 1950-1996, National 
Institute for Economic and Social Research, London.  
Oulton, N 1995, ‘Supply side reform and UK economic growth: what happened to 
the miracle?’, National Institute Economic Review, vol. 154, no. 1, pp. 53-
79. 
Oulton, N & O’Mahony, M 1994, Productivity and growth: a study of British 
industry: 1954-1968, The National Institute of Economics and Social 
Research, London.  
Paige, D & Bombach, G 1959, A comparison of national output and productivity 
of the United Kingdom and the United States, Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation, Paris.  
Panić, M & Seward, T 1966, ‘The problem of UK exports’, Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Economics & Statistics, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 19-32. 
Paqué, KH 1987, ‘Labour surplus and capital shortage: German unemployment in 
the first decade after the currency reform’, Kiel Working papers, no. 290, 
Kiel Institute of World Economics.  
Bibliography 189 
 
Paqué KH 1993, ‘How clean was the slate? Some notes on the Olsonian view of 
the postwar German economic miracle’, Kiel Working Papers, No. 588, 
Kiel Institute of World Economics.  
PEP 1962, Atlantic tariffs and trade, Political and Economic Planning, London.  
Petty, W 1690, Political arithmetick or discourse. Reprinted in CH Hull 1963, The 
economics writing of Sir William Petty, Augustus M. Kelly, New York. 
Plumpe, W 1999, ‘Die Reparationsleitungen Westdeutschlands nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg’ in Die Wirtschaft im geteilten und vereinten Deutschland, eds. 
K Eckart & J Roesler, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pp. 31-46. 
Prais SJ 1976, The evolution of giant firms in Britain 1909-70, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  
Prais, SJ 1981, Productivity and industrial structure, a statistical study of 
manufacturing industry in Britain, Germany and the United States, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Prais, SJ 1988, ‘Two approaches to the economics of education: a methodological 
note’, Economics of Education Review, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 257-260. 
Prais, SJ 1993, Economic performance and education: the nature of Britain’s 
deficiencies. National Institute Discussion paper, no. 52.  
Proudman, J & Redding, S 1998, ‘Persistence and mobility in international trade’, 
in Openness and growth, eds. J Proudman & S Redding, Bank of England, 
London, pp. 
Radkau, J 1993, ‘Wirtschaftswunder ohne technologische Innovation? Technische 
Modernität in den 50-er Jahren’ in Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: die 
westdeutsche Gesellschaft der fünfziger Jahre, eds. A Schildt & A 
Sywottek, Dietz, Bonn, pp. 129-154. 
Ránki, G 1993, The economics of the Second World War, Bohlau, Vienna.  
Redding, S 1998, Openness and Growth: theoretical links and empirical 
estimation, in Openness and growth, eds. J Proudman & S Redding, Bank 
of England, London, pp. 
Reichel, R 2002, ‘Germany’s postwar growth: economic miracle or reconstruction 
boom? Cato Journal, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 427-441.  
Robertson, PL & Singleton, J 2001, ‘The Commonwealth as an economic 
network’, Australian Economic History Review, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 241-
266. 
Rodrik, D 1999, The new global economy and developing countries: making 
openness work, Overseas Development Council, Washington DC. 
Romer, PM 1987, ‘Growth based on increasing returns due to specialization’, The 
American Economic Review, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 56-62. 
190 British failure? 
 
 
Romer, PM 1990, ‘Endogenous technological change’, The Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 98, no. 5, pp. 71-102. 
Rostas, L 1948, Comparative productivity in British and American industry, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Sachs, JD & Warner, A 1995, ‘Economic reform and the process of global 
integration’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1995, no. 1, pp. 
1-18. 
Sandberg, LG 1974, Lancashire in decline: a study in entrepreneurship, 
technology, and international trade, Ohio State University Press, 
Columbus.  
Schenk, CR 2010, The decline of sterling: managing the retreat of an 
international currency 1945-1992, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Schröter, HG 2005, Americanization of the European economy: a compact survey 
of American economic influence in Europe since the 1880s, Springer, 
Dordrecht.  
Schudlich, E 1987, Die Abkehr vom Normalarbeitstag: Entwicklung der 
Arbeitszeiten in der Industrie der Bundesrepublik seit 1945, Campus 
Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. 
Schumpeter, JA 1943, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, Allen Unwin, 
London. 
Singleton, J 1991, ‘Showing the white flag: the Lancashire cotton industry, 1945-
1965’ in International competition and strategic responds in the textile 
industry since 1870, ed. MB. Rose, F Cass & Co Ltd, London, pp. 129-
149.  
Sleifer, J 1999, Separated unity: the East and West German industrial sector in 
1936, Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Research 
Memorandum, GD 46. 
Sleifer, J 2006, Planning ahead and falling behind: the East German economy in 
comparison with West Germany 1936-2002, Akademie Verlag GmbH, 
Berlin.  
Smith, AD, Hitchens DMWN & Davies SW 1982, International industrial 
productivity: a comparison of Britain, America and Germany, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  
Smolny, W 2000, ‘Post-war growth, productivity convergence and reconstruction’, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 589-606.  
Solow, RM 1956, ‘A contribution to the theory of economic growth’, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 65-94. 
Bibliography 191 
 
Stokes, RG 1991, ‘Technology and the West-German Wirtschaftswunder, 
Technology and Culture, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 1-22. 
Storchmann, K 2005, ‘The rise and fall of German coal subsidies, Energy Policy, 
vol. 33, no. 11, pp. 1469-1492.  
Supple, B 1994, ‘Fear of failing: economic history and the decline of Britain’, The 
Economic History Review, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 441-458. 
Temin, P 2002, ‘The Golden Age of European growth reconsidered. European 
Review of Economic History, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 3-22. 
Temple, J 2001, ‘Structural change and Europe’s Golden Age’, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper, no. 2861.  
Timmer, MP, The dynamics of Asian manufacturing: a comparative perspective, 
1963-1993, Eindhoven Centre for Innovation Studies, Eindhoven. 
Timmer, MP, Inklaar, R, O’Mahony, M & van Ark, B 2010, Economic growth in 
Europe: a comparative industry perspective, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.  
Tomlinson, J 1991, ‘The failure of the Anglo-American council on productivity’, 
Business History, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 82-92.  
Tomlinson, J 1996, ‘Inventing ‘decline’: the falling behind of the British economy 
in the postwar years’, The Economic History Review, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 
731-757.   
Tomlinson, J 2009, ‘Thrice denied: ‘declinism’ as a recurrent theme in British 
history in the long twentieth century’, Twentieth Century British History, 
vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 227-251.   
Tomlinson, J & Tiratoo N 2002, ‘The American Productivity Gospel in Britain, 
1948-1960’ in Catching up with America. Productivity missions and the 
diffusion of American economics and technological influence after the 
Second World War, ed. D Barjot, Presses de L’Université de Paris-
Sorbonne, Paris, pp. 149-156.  
Tuckman, A 1996, ‘Manufacturing’ in Industrial policy in Britain, ed. D Coates, 
MacMillan Press Ltd., London, pp. 33-61. 
Turner, I 1985, ‘Das Volkswagenwerk – ein deutschen Unternehmen under 
britischen Kontrolle’ in Britische Deutschland- und Besatzungspolitik, 
1945-1949, eds. J Foschepoth & R Steininger, Schöningh, Paderborn, pp. 
281-300. 
Turnheim, B & Geels, FW 2012, ‘Regime destabilisation as the flipside of energy 
transitions: lessons from the history of the British coal industry (1913–
1997)’, Energy Policy, vol. 50, pp. 35-49. 
192 British failure? 
 
 
Turnheim, B & Geels, FW 2012, ‘The destabilisation of existing regimes: 
confronting a multi-dimensional framework with a case study of the 
British coal industry (1913-1967)’, Research Policy, vol. 42, no. 10, pp. 
1749-1767. 
Tyszynski, H 1951, ‘World trade in manufactured commodities, 1899-1950’, 
Manchester school of Economic and Social Studies, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 
272-304. 
Van Ark, B 1990, ‘Comparative levels of manufacturing in postwar Europe: 
measurement and comparison’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 343-374. 
Van Ark, B 1993, International comparison of output and productivity. 
Manufacturing productivity performance of ten countries from 1950 to 
1990, Groningen Growth and Development Centre Monograph Series, No 
1, Groningen. 
Van Ark, B 1996, ‘Sectoral Growth Accounting and Structural Change in Post-
War Europe’ in Quantitative Aspects of Post-War European Economic 
Growth, eds. B van Ark and NFR Crafts, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 84-164.  
Van der Meer, CLJ & Yamada, S 1990, Japanese agriculture, a comparative 
economic analysis, Routledge, London. 
Veblen, T 1915, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, Macmillan, 
London. 
Veenstra, J 2014, Missed opportunities? Germany and the transatlantic labor-
productivity gap, 1900-1940, PhD dissertation, NUniversity of Groningen, 
Groningen.  
Vejarano, CP & Ramírez MT 2002, ‘Technological education in England, 
Germany and France in the nineteenth century: a comparison’, 
Universidad del Rossario, Borrodores de Investigación, nr. 30. 
Verspagen, B 1996, ‘Technology indicators and economic growth in the European 
area: some empirical evidence’ in Quantitative aspects of post-war 
European economic growth, eds. B van Ark & NFR Crafts, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge pp. 215-243. 
Von Delhaes-Guenher, L, 2003, Erfolgsfaktoren des westdeutschen Exports in den 
1950er und 1960er Jahren, Gesellschaft für westfälische 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Dortmund. 
Vonyó, T 2008, ‘Post-war reconstruction and the golden age of economic growth’, 
European Review of Economic History, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 221-241. 
Bibliography 193 
 
Vonyó, T 2012, ‘The bombing of Germany: the economic geography of war-
induced dislocation in West German industry’, European Review of 
Economic History, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 97-118. 
Wallich, HC 1955, Mainsprings of the German revival, Yale University Press, 
New Haven.   
Weimer, W 1998, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte von der Währungsreform bis 
zum Euro, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg.  
Wells, SJ 1966, Trade policies for Britain, Oxford University Press, London 
Wells, SJ 1964, British export performance a comparative study, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Wildt, M 1993, ‘Privater Konsum in Westdeutschland in den 50-er Jahren’ in 
Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 
fünfziger Jahre, eds. A Schildt & A Sywottek, Dietz, Bonn, pp. 275-289. 
Woltjer, PJ 2013, The roaring thirties: productivity growth and technological 
change in Great Britain and the Unites States during the early twentieth 
century, PhD dissertation, University of Groningen, Groningen.   
Wooldridge 1995, ‘Score diagnostics for linear models estimated by two stage 
least squares’ in Advances in Econometrics and Quantitative Economics: 
Essays in Honor of Professor C. R. Rao, eds. GS Maddala, PCB Phillips 
& TN Srinivasan, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 66–87. 
Yanikkaya, H 2003, ‘Trade openness and economic growth: a cross-country 
empirical investigation’, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 72, no. 
1, pp. 57-89. 
Zeitlin, J 2004, ‘Introduction: Americanization and its limits: reworking US 
technology and management in post-war Europe and Japan’ in 
Americanization and its limits: reworking US technology and management 
in post-war Europe and Japan, eds. J Zeitlin & G Herrigel, Oxford 
University Press, New York, pp. 1-50. 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I 1994, ‘Austerity and the conservative party recovery 
after 1945’, The Historical Journal, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 173-197. 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I 2000, Austerity in Britain, rationing, controls, and 











Anglo-American Council on Productivity 1952, The final report of the Anglo-
American council on productivity.  
Board of Trade (1950-1970), Report on overseas trade, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, London.    
Board of Trade 1954, The report on the census of production for 1951, Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, London. 
Board of Trade 1952, Accounts relating to trade and navigation of the United 
Kingdom for each month during the year 1951, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, London. 
Board of Trade 1938-1944, Final report on the fifth census of production and the 
import duties act inquiry 1935, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London. 
Business Statistics Office 1978, Historical record of the census of production 
1907 to 1970, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London.  
Central Statistical Office 1958, Annual abstract of statistics.  
Central Statistical Office 1960, Annual abstract of statistics.  
Central Statistical Office 1966, Annual abstract of statistics. 
Central Statistical Office 1976, Annual abstract of statistics. 
Department of Employment and Productivity 1971, British labour statistics: 
historical abstract 1886–1968, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London. 
Department of Industry Business Statistics Office 1976, Report on the census of 
production, summary tables, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London.  
structure and performance, Cambridge University Press, New York.  
International Labour Office 1939, Yearbook of labour statistics 1939, Geneva. 
Office for National Statistics online: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase [5 
July 2011]. 
Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [Kultusministerkonferenz], 1969 (Bonn), Der Ausbau der 
Ingenieurschulen 1958 bis 1968, Dokumentation, No. 28. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1954a, Die Verdienste der Arbeiter in der gewerblichen 
Wirtschaft im November 1951: Ergebnisse der Gehalts- und 
Lohnstrukturerhebung 1951/52, Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
vol. 90. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1954b, Die Verdienste der Angestellten in der 
gewerblichen Wirtschaft im November 1951: Ergebnisse der Gehalts- und 
Lohnstrukturerhebung 1951/52, Statistik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, vol. 91. 
Bibliography 195 
 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1954c, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland im Jahre 1953. Chapter XIV: Außenhandel. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1956a, Der Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Teil 1: Zusammenfassende Übersichten. Jahrgang 1955, 
Jahresheft. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1956b, Die Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Reihe 4: Die industrielle Produktion, 1951/55. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1956c, Die Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Reihe 4: Sonderveröffentlichungen, Nr. 12. Beschäftigung und Umsatz, 
Brennstoff- und Energieversorgung 1951bis 1955. Jahreszahlen der 
Industrieberichterstattung. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1956d, Die Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Reihe 4: Sonderveröffentlichungen, No. 11 1956, p. 6. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1956e, Die Industrie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Reihe 4: Sonderveröffentlichungen, Nr. 8. Neuberechnung des Index der 
industriellen Nettoproduktion. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1956f, Der Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Teil 1: Zusammenfassende Übersichten. Jahrgang 1955. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1959, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland im Jahre 1958.  
Statistisches Bundesamt  1960, Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. 
246.1. Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 1957: Verdienste der Arbeiter 
in der Industrie im Oktober 1957.  
Statistisches Bundesamt 1973, Lange Reihen zur Wirtschaftsentwicklung. Stuttgart 
und Mainz: W Kohlhammer. 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1975, Fachserie D: Industrie und Handwerk, Reihe 2. 
Indizes der industriellen Produktion, Produktion ausgewählter industrieller 
Erzeugnisse. Sonderbeitrag: Neuberechnung der Indizes auf Basis 1970 
Statistisches Bundesamt 1991, Fachserie 18: Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe S: Sonderbeiträge, vol. 15. Revidierte 
Ergebnisse 1950 bis 1990.  
Statistisches Bundesamt 1973. Lange Reihen zur Wirtschaftsentwicklung, W 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart und Mainz. 
Statistisches Reichsamt 1940, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutschen Reich, 
1939/40. 
Statistisches Reichsamt 1938, Wirtschaft und Statistik, vol. 1, no. 5. 
United States Strategic Bombing Survey 1945, the effects of strategic bombing on 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































202 British failure? 
 
 
Table A-1.2: Annual hours worked in the manufacturing sector in West Germany and the 
United Kingdom 1950 
 Industry  Sector   









Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
Total 2042 2325 1.14 
  Chemicals 2027 2345 1.16 
  Rubber & Plastic 2075 2257 1.09 
Basic Metals & Fabricated 
Metal Products 
Total 2095 2356 1.12 
  Basic Metals 2137 2374 1.11 
  Metal Products 2032 2313 1.14 
Motor Vehicles and 
Engineering 
Total  2079 2323 1.12 
  
Office & Mech. 
Engineering  
2127 2420 1.14 
  Mechanical Engineering 2130 2433 1.14 
  Office Machinery  2077 2138 1.03 
  Electrical Engineering  2007 2214 1.10 




2117 2378 1.12 
  Instrument Engineering  1996 2321 1.16 
Textiles, Clothing and Leather Total 1941 2145 1.11 
  Textiles 1994 2164 1.09 
  
Leather, Footwear & 
Clothing 
1880 2124 1.13 
Food Drink and Tobacco Total 1998 2422 1.21 




2194 2497 1.14 
  Wood & Furniture 2099 2462 1.17 




1962 2246 1.14 
Mining and Oil Refining  Total  2259   
Total Manufacturing   2070 2327 1.14 
Number of vacation and 
holiday days 
 24 29  





Table A-1.3: Detailed information data sources and adjustments to data for the 1951 
benchmark 
Description of censuses 1951 
In the British census, establishments were classified to trades according to the nature of 
their output. An establishment engaged in multiple activities, e.g. a firm engaged in 
machine-tool production and casting, was classified to a trade if the principal products 
of that trade accounted for a greater proportion of the value of its output than did the 
principal products of any other trade. Offices, warehouses, laboratories and other 
ancillary places of business, which were separated apart from the producing work, were 
not regarded as separate establishments, and the persons employed were included on the 
return for the works. If firms with more than one establishment were unable to make 
separate returns for each establishment, they were generally allowed to make one return 
covering all establishments in one trade. In Britain, proprietors employing an average of 
less than eleven people were not required to report detailed returns. However, small 
firms were required to provide information on the annual average number of male and 
female workers and the nature of their business. In trades in which the output of small 
firms was thought to have accounted for a relatively high proportion of the total output, 
small firms were required to complete a simplified form. 
In the German census firms active in multiple industries were placed in the industry 
group where the core of their business was, as measured by the number of employees 
engaged in production. This method of classification differs from the British method, 
where the value of output was used to determine the core of the business. However, it 
seems reasonable to expect that these methods will not deviate too much, since output 
value and employment are highly correlated.a In the German census information is 
provided only for those firms that employed at least ten persons. The German census 
provides no information when there are less than three firms operating in an industry for 
confidentiality reasons.  
 
Data adjustments  
In a few industries adjustments were needed in order to construct a consistent 
benchmark. Below the adjustments are explained in detail:  
- One problem in the engineering sector is that in the British census most 
products are quoted in numbers, whereas in the German census products are 
quoted in tons. Since I have no information on the products, besides a 
description, I cannot compare these two types of quantities. To overcome this 
problem I have used the British trade statistics, in which export is quoted in 
tons.  I deducted five per cent of the value of export, since export prices are 
quoted f.o.b., and I want to use a proxy for ex-factory prices. Comparing tons 
of machines with tons of machines is still problematic, since I have no 
information on the quality of products, and machinery is less homogenous than 
other products in this comparison. Given that there is no other method of 
comparing that is preferable, I will use this approach. However, caution has to 
be taken in interpreting these results.  
- In the vehicle branch I was not able to match cars, since Britain provides 
numbers and West Germany tons of cars. I was able to match motorcycles and 
engines. I took the PPP from mechanical engineering as a proxy for the PPP for 
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Description of censuses 1951 
cars, and weighted this PPP with the motorcycle/engines PPP to obtain a PPP 
for the whole vehicle branch.  
- For footwear and leather I took the weighted average of the footwear and 
leather branch as a proxy for the PPP in these two branches. 
 
Note: a). The correlation coefficient between the net value of production and the number 
of employees is 0.83 for West Germany and 0.97 for the United Kingdom. Both 
coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level.      
Sources: Board of Trade (1954), ‘The Report on the Census of Production for 1951’; Board of 
Trade (1951). Board of Trade (1952), ‘Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the United 
Kingdom for Each Month during the Year 1951’. Statistisches Bundesamt (1956b) Industrie der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe 4, Die industrielle Produktion 1950/55; Statistisches 
Bundesamt (1954) Statistisches Jahrbuch 1953, pp. 311-4; Statistisches Bundesamt (1956f), 
Aussenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Teil 1: Zusammenfassende Übersichten. 
Jahrgang 1955, Jahresheft, p. 4; Statistisches Bundesamt (1956e). Die Industrie der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Reihe 4: Sonderveröffentlichungen, Nr. 12. Beschäftigung und 
Umsatz, Brennstoff- und Energieversorgung 1951 bis 1955. Jahreszahlen der 
Industrieberichterstattung; Statistisches Bundesamt (1965). Fachserie D: Industrie und Handwerk, 
Reihe 4: Sonderbeiträge zur Industriestatistik. Neuberechnung des Index der industriellen 







Table A-1.4: List of products and corresponding value of output and unit value ratios for 













101 Coal  465390 2595971 16.65 
201 Carpets 61554 184155 8.15 
201 Furniture fabrics 16355 235859 23.06 
201 Bed covering and quilt cloth  2318 134284 22.22 
201 Cotton yarn (single and doubled)  369542 1711496 11.10 
201 Jute yarn 16439 44320 12.81 
201 Woollen yarn  21395 776587 13.23 
201 Worsted yarn  135909 531663 11.00 
201 Yarn of flax and ramie 2377 59381 16.10 
201 Yarn of soft hemp  840 163551 10.56 
201 Sewing, hand knitting yarn 20158 470688 13.72 
201 Woven cotton cloth  256639 1257604 4.96 
201 Woven wool cloth  60418 1203659 16.66 
301 Upper leather - calf 15449 102000 16.72 
301 Upper leather sheep/goat 1466 46223 20.98 
301 Upper leather other  65094 283790 5.13 
301 Gloving leather 4511 26945 14.79 
401 Working shoes and sporting shoes 12039 134834 24.80 
401 Leather street shoes 120641 1069740 15.66 
401 Sandals, slippers, surgical shoes 18793 179371 11.55 
401 Woodwork shoes 160 1590 7.56 
402 Men’s' and boys - suits  46612 270111 13.35 
402 Men’s' and boys - jacket  51284 328623 31.41 
402 Women’s and girls’ - suit 22207 19884 31.11 
402 Women’s and girls’ - jacket 40955 352123 13.30 
402 
Women’s and girls’ - skirts and trousers, 
shorts 
25783 19451 6.33 
402 Women’s and girls’ - blouses 11559 52639 10.32 
402 Women’s and girls’ - dresses 41781 148291 13.06 
402 Work/service clothing  9997 138695 5.26 
402 Men’s' and boys underwear - shirts 33191 277199 12.86 
402 Men’s' and boys underwear - nightwear 9113 32553 24.29 
402 Women’s' and girls and children- apron  3774 24399 18.71 
402 BH 4627 44554 9.71 
402 Corsets 9478 42187 13.91 















402 Hats of wool felt 6278 47244 23.32 
402 Hats of fur felt  5855 53985 16.11 
402 Caps (including uniform) 2141 25027 13.77 
402 Umbrella 1600 37406 11.62 
402 Scarfs 466 14154 3.62 
402 Ties 1334 33510 9.55 
402 Dressed skins 1312 5012 4.97 
402 Dyed skins 916 8223 4.36 
402 Fur coats 3279 20785 10.14 
501 Tinplate and cushion  42101 183484 11.36 
501 Steel sheet (thick) 46078 372196 13.02 
501 
Sheeting and cushion, galvanised and 
leaded 
8229 122177 16.36 
501 Steel bars 162540 932708 12.98 
501 Pig iron incl. blast furnaces and ferroalloy 119216 1711984 13.14 
502 Iron casting  27538 1473623 5.00 
503 Aluminium  41490 18648 15.00 
503 Aluminium alloy  16604 16330 14.07 
503 Copper 69872 1149834 17.89 
503 Lead 33872 463622 10.59 
503 Tin 40426 37168 13.96 
503 Zinc dust 2153 12917 9.13 
503 Zinc   11734 255213 10.93 
504 Razors 1446 1860 6.03 
504 Scissor (small)  364 18950 13.11 
504 Scissor (large) 481 3990 13.61 
504 Railway rail 11029 153648 14.58 
601 
Motor cycles (including auto cycles, 
miniature motor cycles and motorised 
bicycles) 
16063 452656 8.06 
601 Combustion engines 21905 107877 6.67 
602 Refrigerator machines  31179 3852 12.97 
602 Gas compressor 1297 93584 9.45 
602 Machines for preparations for spinning 13632 44394 14.35 
602 Textile machinery (other)  24528 155088 11.20 
602 Preparatory machines for weaving 3674 37390 11.84 















602 Knitting machines  6809 67356 8.69 
602 Sewing machines  9282 258150 25.73 
602 Paper making machinery  7160 162931 12.59 
602 Boring machines 685 71910 12.59 
602 Rolling mill (metal working) machinery  7093 101853 12.80 
602 Steam turbines  10765 79287 11.55 
602 Water turbines  1310 34961 17.39 
602 Air compressors  4510 93584 14.19 
602 Cement making machinery  934 16737 18.28 
602 Milking machines  2267 14300 10.18 
602 Sugar making and refining machinery  2926 34207 16.91 
602 
Tobacco, cigar and cigarette-making 
machinery 
3895 10535 8.80 
602 Gas and chemical machinery  25300 86046 17.74 
602 
Water softeners, water filters, and water 
sterilizing equipment  
2368 4894 13.51 
602 Washing/laundry  machines  5784 40775 10.93 
602 Sweet making machinery  1542 17584 15.40 
602 Boots and shoe making machinery  2245 36039 9.84 
602 Centrifugal pumps 10808 43930 13.26 
602 Disc harrow  770 2732 10.65 
602 Earthmoving machines  1154 12755 7.09 
602 Threshers 474 53409 10.37 
602 Insecticide sprayers and similar machines  651 13784 7.16 
602 Ploughs  2492 37968 7.26 
602 Potato harvest machine 253 12305 7.67 
602 Planters, drills and seeders 1241 14194 7.86 
602 Addressing machine (office)  805 7420 4.85 
602 Typewriters  4177 122092 16.72 
602 Calculators (office)  2262 38182 10.49 
602 Accounting and bookkeeping machines  3300 56540 3.79 
603 Generators  14971 759000 12.00 
603 Batteries and accumulators  31916 124415 17.05 
603 Radio receiving sets 14382 419661 19.77 
603 Light bulbs 10092 80768 24.34 
604 Wrist and pocket watch clocks 2619 109746 16.33 
604 Clocks 5035 108442 10.05 















604 Eyeglasses (of all kinds) 1962 22608 10.08 
701 Wheat and flour  102590 1348754 26.08 
701 Semolina  1376 55727 18.90 
701 Bran 18751 145911 11.62 
701 Oatmeal, oat flakes  7217 33347 18.20 
702 Milk powder full cream  4272 42168 6.68 
702 Milk powder skimmed 441 10779 6.34 
702 Milk bottled  142357 21338 7.56 
703 Cocoa powder 5158 28083 14.76 
703 Cocoa butter 2691 29322 9.37 
703 Chocolate bars  33781 522680 3.21 
703 Sugar confectionary 48549 270060 12.35 
704 Fruit conserves  7396 25883 6.78 
704 Vegetables conserves 21172 116627 12.57 
704 Marmalade, jams and jellies  32727 98352 10.53 
705 Margarine 1253 918605 16.92 
706 Fish  11745 235931 13.36 
707 Cigarettes 24733 762605 19.66 
707 Cigars 68 362084 5.05 
708 Preserved meat 12703 147918 12.98 
709 Flour confectionary  45321 35802 16.41 
710 Mineral water and soft drinks  29593 63150 9.51 
801 Dilution, oil paint and synthetic paint 8707 279064 12.09 
801 Water based paint and oil based paint 46147 2390 6.11 
801 Nitrocellulose, synthetic resin 8457 166173 12.35 
801 Other paints, varnish and coating  21677 117753 7.58 
801 Putty 1256 10500 9.34 
801 Scouring powder 12263 9030 4.98 
801 Candles 2099 16500 22.08 
801 Shoe and leather maintenance product 2958 44977 13.32 
801 Floor and furniture polisher 4254 60706 10.71 
801 Animal oils and fats 7237 311 9.80 
801 Tallow 1575 357 4.88 
801 Fish oil  3392 1780 6.88 
801 Oil fat 23543 5389 30.60 















801 Oleine  2104 5389 12.19 
801 Stearine  2658 6605 14.15 
801 Vegetable adhesives 2923 28400 14.91 
801 Oxygen 4388 47744 16.75 
801 Carbon 3266 9846 6.23 
801 Phosphorus  325 54737 5.04 
801 Acetylene  2885 37291 7.80 
801 Inorganic and organic pigments  8925 921142 10.36 
901 Bottles for drinks  10706 118338 18.79 
901 Flat glass 1150 137360 2.73 
902 Cement and cement binder 43975 616130 11.55 
902 Limestone or dolomite 14531 241219 28.36 
903 Porcelain - for industrial purposes 24 9600 16.93 
903 
Electrical ware of porcelain, earthenware 
and stoneware 
4718 90244 15.18 
1001 Chairs  833 115179 8.55 
1001 Kitchen tables 201 14044 19.07 
1001 Wardrobes 13629 48715 10.30 
1001 Kitchen cabinets 2477 98287 26.88 
1001 Bureaux furniture 2404 98786 8.67 
1002 Sawn hardwood 18743 203444 9.97 
1101 Wallpaper from paper 8688 56677 8.85 
1101 Paper sacks 15176 287553 13.22 
1101 Paper backs 24271 144520 11.43 
1101 Corrugated fibreboard packing 3102 63460 19.03 
1201 Brake and clutch linings 8045 20204 8.95 
1201 Outer covers - pedal cycle 4622 62069 17.87 
1201 Inner tubes - pedal cycle  1688 18721 13.48 
1201 Outer tube motor cycle  2078 28736 15.87 
1201 Inner tube motor cycle  347 4846 14.03 
1201 Outer tube car 28257 217319 17.25 
1201 Inner tube car 3353 23614 14.14 
1201 Outer tube tractor and dumper 8818 188209 17.75 
1201 Inner tube tractor and dumper 1007 15929 16.74 
1201 Outer tubes - giant tyres (trucks) 55671 232431 31.23 
1201 Inner tubes - giant tyres (trucks)  3523 13503 25.57 
















Outer covers new  for barrow, trolley and 
other tyres 
1656 18176 27.44 
1201 
Inner tubes - for barrow, trolley and other 
tyres 
266 1754 16.94 
1201 Mats, matting, flooring and tilling of rubber 2318 14570 11.92 
1201 Rubber threats  1618 76816 6.11 
1201 
Rubber valves, washers and rings for 
industrial purposes  
1978 85480 5.75 
1201 Rubber sheeting (with a textile backing) 116 21932 20.08 
1201 Conveyor belt  18535 70958 16.21 
1201 Fan belts, V-belts  4263 39291 9.19 
1202 Piano  1829 7188 18.14 
1202 Plastic buttons  1320 19748 10.60 
1202 
Electrical insulating material of synthetic 
resins  
1132 2597 11.29 
1202 
Plastic materials for preparation and serving 
of food and drink  
244 4036 11.51 




Table A-1.5: Coverage ratios and purchasing power parities by industry, United Kingdom and 







Purchasing Power Parities 
(DM/£) 












1 Total Industry   186 0.26 0.33 11.88 12.16 
1.1 Total Manufacturing  185 0.24 0.32 11.92 11.31 
100 Mining 1 0.9 0.51 16.65 16.65 
200 Textiles  12 0.4 0.53 9.96 9.96 
300 Leather  4 0.59 0.32 7.48 7.48 
400 Clothing and Footwear  26 0.72 0.71 14.85 14.91 




44 0.11 0.19 10.66 11.09 
700 
Food, Drink and 
Tobacco  
21 0.18 0.3 12.6 12.53 
800 Chemicals  22 0.18 0.2 10.99 10.99 
900 
Clay and Building 
Materials  
6 0.2 0.28 13.13 13.18 
1000 
Timber and 
Woodworking   
6 0.11 0.14 10.18 10.22 
1100 Paper trades 4 0.06 0.09 12.24 12.24 
1200 Miscellaneous 23 0.27 0.51 17.32 17.3 
101 Coal Mining 1 0.9 0.51 16.65 16.65 
201 Textiles  12 0.4 0.53 9.96 9.96 
301 Leather  4 0.59 0.32 7.48 7.48 
401 Footwear 4 0.88 0.99 15.67 15.67 
402 Clothing  22 0.67 0.59 14.54 14.54 
501 Iron and Steel  6 43 57 11.71 12.15 




4 0.04 0.07 13.87 13.87 




35 0.19 0.2 12.51 12.51 
603 Electrical Engineering 4 0.09 0.27 15.99 15.99 
604 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering 
3 0.1 0.22 11.98 11.98 
701 Tobacco  2 0.03 a 0.34 14.13 14.13 
702 Beverages 1 0.06 0.14 12.77 11.77 
703 Food 18 0.41b 0.46 12.77 11.77 
801 Chemicals    22 0.18 0.2 10.99 10.99 









Purchasing Power Parities 
(DM/£) 












901 Glass 2 0.15 0.37 8.82 8.82 




2 0.07 0.14 15.26 15.26 
1001 Woodwork   5 0.09 0.17 11.61 11.61 
1002 Timber 1 0.13 0.11 9.97 9.97 
1101 Paper and Board 4 0.1 0.13 12.24 12.24 
1201 Rubber and Asbestos  19 0.49 0.73 17.4 17.4 
1202 Miscellaneous  4 0.02 0.05 12.8 12.8 
Notes: a) The coverage for tobacco in Britain seems to be very low, this is the result of the fact that 
two types of cigarettes are included in the British production statistics, cigarettes sold duty free, and 
cigarettes sold including duties. In the German data only duty-free cigarettes are presented. Thus, to 
get a correct price estimate for the British products, I could only include the products that were sold 
without duties. Therefore, I calculate the unit value based on duty-free cigarettes. However, this 
represents only a small part of British output. Thus the three per cent does not mean I only cover 
three per cent of the production, but the product ‘duty-free cigarettes’ I took is three per cent of 
production. If I assume the value of all cigarettes is the same, whether it is these ‘without duty’ and 
‘with duty’ I cover around 90 per cent of British tobacco. The total amount of duties in the tobacco 
industry was up to 58 per cent, (rates applicable to unstrapped leaf tobacco containing no less than 
ten per cent of moisture, Alford (1973), Table XV, p. 438). With the information on total amounts of 
duties paid in the summary tables in the census I could adjust value added for duties. However, I do 
not have enough information about the cigarettes and their weight and quality as presented in the 
census. Therefore, I rely on the duty free sold cigarettes in the calculating process.  
b) The coverage for food products is lower for Britain than for West Germany. Part of the reason is 
that the coverage ratio for margarine is very low in my estimation, which might be suprising since 
this industry only contains a few products. Margarine, compound lard and compound cooking fats 
for home consumption were produced by the margarine industry for the Ministry of Food in 1948, 
1949, 1950 and 1951. Output of the industry appeared in gross output as amounts charged for work 
done and not as selling value, the corresponding materials supplied by the Ministry of Food were 
also not included in the total of materials purchase and used. I controlled for this. In Table 8 (Sales 
of the Principal Product) of the British Production census (Board of Trade 1954) margarine is split 
up in margarine for domestic and trade use. The price for the domestic use is not a market price, and 
hence I could only rely on the sales price of the products for trade use, since these are market prices. 
In the coverage ratio I take the sales value as a percentage of gross output, and hence the coverage 
appears much lower than in West Germany.   
 
Source: own calculations, see Table A-1.3 for the underlying sources.  
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Table A-1.6: Comparative labour-productivity in manufacturing in the UK and West Germany 
1951, (UK = 100) 
 
Per worker Per hour 
 
Gross output Value added Gross output Value added 
Textiles   90 114 83 105 
Leather  75 103 66 91 
Clothing and Footwear  96 100 85 89 
Metallurgy (incl. Non-Ferrous) 78 97 70 86 
Engineering and Vehicles  93 87 83 77 
food, Drink and Tobacco  91 89 75 73 
Chemicals  98 120 85 104 
Clay and Building Materials  78 92 68 81 
Lumber and Woodworking  99 123 81 100 
Paper and Printing 105 131 91 113 
Miscellaneous  50 77 44 69 
Total Manufacturing  84 94 75 83 
Coal Mining 82 81 89 88 
Total Industry  84 93 75 84 
Sources: see Table 2.1 for underlying sources. 
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Table A-1.7: Detailed information on data sources and adjustments to data for 1935 
benchmark 
Description of censuses 1935 
The British census covered Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Industry was classified 
into 123 different sub-industries. The classification was chosen to match as closely as 
possible to the classification system of other Government Departments involved in the 
compilation of statistics. Proprietors employing ten or more employees were required to 
report detailed returns. However, small firms were required to provide information on 
the annual average number of male and female workers and the nature of their business. 
Gross output is defined as the net selling value of all goods manufactured in the year 
(both sold and unsold goods). Net selling value was defined as the actual amount 
charged to customers, after deduction of discounts and payment to transport companies. 
Thus, the goods were valued when they passed out the hands of employees of the firm.  
Net output, which represents value added, is obtained after deducting the aggregate 
costs of materials and fuel used and the amount for work given out from gross output. 
Establishments reported refer to a single factory or workshop or other place of business 
were ‘some process involving transformation of materials was carried on. Offices, 
warehouses, packing establishments, motor garages and such like ancillary places of 
business situated apart from the processing works were note regarded as separate 
establishments, but the persons employed therein and the value of their services were 
included in the returns for the work.’  (Board of Trade, Final Report on the Fifth Census 
of Production and the Import Duties Act Inquiry, p. a 4) 
The German census data comprises the German Empire within the borders of 1937, thus 
Saarland is included but Austria and Sudetenland are excluded. The census covers all 
production units with five employees or more. In industries where material inputs were 
considered to be important, information for all establishments was presented. This was 
for example the case in mining, fuel, iron and steel and chemicals. For other industries, 
such as bakeries and printing offices, the cut-off point for reporting was not five but ten 
employees.  
Data adjustments  
In some industries there were some difficulties in the matching of products, since the 
data set of Jaap Sleifer on West Germany provided information on a different level of 
aggregation than was presented for the whole of Germany. This problem manifested 
itself especially in the weaving mill industry, where I have only information on the 
aggregate sector for West Germany. At the more disaggregate level, the Sleifer data set 
presents gross output for the whole of Germany. Since part of the industries belonging 
to weaving mills working with cotton, and part of them with other materials such as jute 
etc., I need to attribute these parts to the cotton and jute sector respectively. To make a 
fair division of gross output and value added for West and East Germany, I assume that 
the weaving mills will have the same division of gross output over the two parts of the 
country as the cotton and jute sector, for which I do have this information. I assume that 
the division of employment between East and West Germany in the sectors belonging to 
weaving mills will be the same as the division in employment in the industries to which 
these sectors belong. Thus, I take the employment division of cotton for the cotton 
weaving mills, and the employment division of the wool industry for the wool weaving 
mills. That is, I assume that the production of cotton and jute goods is locally 
concentrated. Additionally I have to assume that the input-output ratio of the sub-
industries of the sector are identical to the input-output coefficient of the total industry.  
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Description of censuses 1935 
Excises and duties 
I adjusted the data for excises and duties. In the British case I adjusted silk, drugs, 
matches, printing, aerated waters, tobacco, sugar and beer. The duties are mentioned in 
the General Report of the census. In West Germany the sources included taxes for 
margarine and edible oils.  
Sources: Board of Trade (38-1944), ‘Final Report on the Fifth Census of Production and the 
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Table A-1.9: The construction of industry Fisher PPPs for British and West-German industry 
in 1935 
   
Coverage ratio 
Purchasing Power Parities 
(DM/£) 















1 Manufacturing  229 0.42 0.43 17.80 18.20 
100 Textiles  12 0.51 0.43 20.93 21.18 
200 Leather  6 0.36 0.35 25.45 25.85 
300 Clothing and footwear  5 0.28 0.38 21.92 21.94 
400 Metallurgy  45 0.47 0.45 14.91 15.09 
500 Engineering and Vehicles 45 0.30 0.27 17.16 17.25 
600 Food Drink and Tobacco  23 0.62 0.68 23.46 24.21 
700 Chemicals  57 0.41 0.52 16.50 16.76 
800 Building Materials 13 0.43 0.38 15.54 15.57 
900 Lumber and Woodworking  3 0.16 0.26 10.21 10.21 
1000 Paper and Printing  10 0.21 0.20 14.42 14.45 
1100 Miscellaneous industries  7 0.16 0.13 18.66 18.62 
1200 Coal  3 0.08 0.98 19.32 19.32 
101 Cotton Spinning and 
Doubling 
1 0.72 0.70 20.17 20.17 
102 Cotton Weaving 1 0.77 0.67 25.40 25.40 
103 Woollen and Worsted 3 0.58 0.71 22.70 22.70 
104 Silk and Artificial Silk 1 0.41 0.36 15.64 15.64 
105 Jute 3 0.48 0.62 20.05 20.05 
106 Hosiery 3 0.55 0.63 18.69 18.69 
201 Leather (tanning and 
dressing)  
5 0.37 0.48 29.12 29.12 
202 Leather Goods  1 0.49 0.10 18.56 18.56 
301 Clothing  4 0.09 0.19 21.02 21.02 
302 Footwear  1 0.90 0.84 24.04 24.04 
401 Iron and Steel (Blast 
Furnaces) 
3 0.91 0.93 18.67 18.67 
402 Iron and Steel (Smelting, 
refining  and Rolling) 
4 0.30 0.59 14.69 14.69 
403 Iron and Steel Foundries 
incl. Hardware, Wrought 
Iron etc. 
5 0.45 0.44 14.02 14.02 
404 Tinplate 2 0.63 0.38 16.87 16.87 
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Coverage ratio 
Purchasing Power Parities 
(DM/£) 















405 Chain, Nail, Screw and 
Miscellaneous Forgings 
7 0.21 0.22 15.38 15.38 
406 Wire 4 0.27 0.26 15.47 15.47 
407 Tool and Implement 2 0.20 0.19 14.97 14.97 
408 Cutlery 3 0.56 0.75 15.29 15.29 
409 Non Ferrous Metals  15 0.67 0.46 15.40 15.40 
501 Motor Vehicles  7 0.54 0.55 18.48 18.48 
502 Mechanical Engineering  24 0.18 0.25 17.47 17.47 
503 Electrical Engineering 8 0.22 0.19 13.99 13.99 
504 Shipbuilding 2 0.36 0.31 17.19 17.19 
505 Aircraft  1 0.14 0.03 17.70 17.70 
506 Railways  3 0.16 0.44 20.84 20.84 
601 Tobacco  2 1.01 0.85 32.20 32.20 
602 Grain Milling 1 0.74 0.92 29.59 29.59 
603 Bread, Cakes, etc. 1 0.87 1.00 21.46 21.46 
604 Biscuit and Cocoa 5 0.85 0.75 21.87 21.87 
605 Preserved Foods and Bacon 7 0.41 0.47 19.15 19.15 
606 Butter, Cheese, Condensed 
Milk and Margarine 
1 0.22 0.79 26.00 26.00 
607 Sugar and Glucose 2 0.76 0.91 31.99 31.99 
608 Cattle. Dog and Poultry 
Foods 
2 0.63 0.68 25.50 25.50 
609 Brewing and Malting 2 0.89 0.66 18.71 18.71 
701 Chemicals, Dyestuffs and 
Drugs 
32 0.45 0.26 17.22 17.22 
702 Fertiliser, Disinfectant, 
Glue, etc. 
6 0.43 0.37 15.76 15.76 
703 Soap, Candle and 
Perfumery 
5 0.54 0.46 17.00 17.00 
704 Paint, Colour and Varnish 6 0.35 0.43 13.36 13.36 
705 Seed Crushing 3 0.58 0.47 18.11 18.11 
706 Petroleum 2 0.71 0.41 25.40 25.40 
707 Starch and Polishes 1 0.10 0.47 10.47 10.47 
708 Explosives 1 0.32 0.09 15.08 15.08 
709 Matches 1 0.97 0.99 8.96 8.96 
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Coverage ratio 
Purchasing Power Parities 
(DM/£) 















801 Brick and Fireclay 4 0.66 0.69 14.84 14.84 
802 China and Earthenware 4 0.22 0.54 15.86 15.86 
803 Glass 4 0.35 0.24 17.59 17.59 
804 Cement 1 0.91 0.96 14.80 14.80 
901 Timber and crates 3 0.35 0.54 10.21 10.21 
1001 Paper 5 0.75 0.40 14.40 14.40 
1002 Wall Paper 1 1.00 1.00 12.01 12.01 
1003 Manufactured Stationery 3 0.25 0.22 15.08 15.08 
1004 Pens and Pencils 1 0.16 0.53 13.81 13.81 
1101 Asbestos  2 0.19 0.08 17.11 17.11 
1102 Rubber 3 0.43 0.18 18.75 18.75 
1103 Plastic Materials, Buttons 
and Fancy Articles 
1 0.12 0.17 15.08 15.08 
1104 Musical Instruments 1 0.29 0.10 24.66 24.66 
1201 Coke and By-Products 3 0.08 0.98 19.32 19.32 
Note: the coverage ratio applies to West Germany as a whole (East and West). 











Annual hours United 
Kingdom 
1 Total manufacturing 2133.57 2255.00 
100 Coal mining 2051.15 2037.00 
200 Textiles 1981.38 2250.01 
300 Leather 2075.04 2301.90 
400 Clothing 2058.65 2141.52 
500 Metallurgy 2225.83 2274.68 
600 Engineering, Shipbuilding and 
Vehicles1 
2228.40 2265.61 
700 Non-Ferrous Metals 2232.85 2273.59 
800 Food, Drink and Tobacco 2108.75 2287.75 
900 Chemicals 2159.33 2257.76 
1000 Clay and Building Materials1 2197.43 
 
2264.16 
1100 Paper, Printing and Stationery 2124.74 2292.46 
1200 Lumber and Woodworking 2163.55 2278.31 
1300 Miscellaneous2 2088.62 2263.00 
101 Coal Mining 2051.15 2037.00 
201 Textiles 1981.38 2250.01 
301 Leather 2075.04 2301.90 
401 Footwear 1981.38 2141.52 
402 Clothing 2199.14 2141.52 
501 Blast Furnaces 2225.83 2274.68 
502 Iron Foundries 2225.83 2274.68 
504 Fabricated Metal Products 2140.13 2274.68 
601 Non-Ferrous Metals 2232.85 2274.68 
701 Vehicles 2145.28 2265.61 
702 Mechanical Engineering 2294.67 2265.61 
703 Electrical Engineering 2160.27 2265.61 
704 Optical and Precision Engineering3 2160.27 2265.61 
801 Beverages 2108.75 2287.75 
802 Tobacco 2108.75 2287.75 
803 Food 2108.75 2287.75 
901 Chemicals 2159.33 2257.76 
1001 Glass 2211.78 2264.16 
1002 Building Materials 2218.81 2264.16 
1003 China and Earthenware 2073.16 2264.16 
1101 Lumber and woodworking 2163.55 2278.31 
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1201 Paper and Board 2124.74 2292.46 
1301 Rubber and Asbestos 2088.62 2263.00 
 
 
1302 Miscellaneous 2088.62 2263.00 
1. For engineering, shipbuilding and vehicles trade I took the weighted average (based on 
employment shares) of the annual hours of the sub-industries: vehicles, mechanical engineering 
and electrical engineering.  For building materials I took the weighted average (based on 
employment shares) of the annual hours worked of the sub-industries: building materials, glass 
and china and earthenware.  
2. The number of hours worked in the industry ‘miscellaneous’ is based on the number of hours 
worked in rubber and asbestos since this is the biggest industry within this group, and not separate 
hourly information is available for the miscellaneous group.  
3. the hours worked for optical and precision engineering is the same as in electrical engineering, 
there is no separate entry for the former in the data. 
British industry was operating on a six-day workweek. 
Sources: own calculations. For Britain based on International Labour Office (1939), ‘Year Book of 
Labour Statistics 1939’ p. 44; Department of Employment and Productivity (1971), ‘British labour 
statistics: historical abstract 1886-1968’, pp. 96-97, 104-107. Information on Germany is obtained 
from Statistisches Reichsamt (1940), ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch 1939/40’, p. 384. Data on holidays 




Table A-1.11: Comparative labour-productivity in manufacturing, in the United Kingdom and 
West Germany 1935, (UK = 100) 
 
Per worker Per hour 
 
Gross output Value added Gross output Value added 
Textiles  85 109 97 124 
Leather  58 84 64 93 
Clothing and Footwear  88 90 93 95 
Metallurgy (incl. Non-Ferrous)  129 128 132 131 
Engineering and Vehicles  103 120 105 122 
food, Drink and Tobacco  60 65 65 71 
Chemicals  116 111 121 116 
Clay and Building Materials  85 96 88 99 
Lumber and Woodworking 140 151 147 159 
Paper and Printing 115 100 124 108 
Miscellaneous  81 96 89 105 
Total Manufacturing  98 107 105 115 
Coal Mining 159 119 158 119 
Total Industry  101 108 109 115 
Sources: see Table 2.4. 
  




Figure A-2. 1: The Jánossy model of post-war reconstruction 
 
Source: Jánossy (1969), p. 10. 
 
Note: The Hungarian Ferenc Jánossy formulated the reconstruction thesis as indicated in 
Figure A1 below (Jánossy 1969). The trend line of normal growth is shown by segment 
AF. Segment BC illustrates the war-induced drop in output and segment CD represents the 
very rapid growth path towards recovery of pre-war levels in point D, which can be seen as 
recovery or rebuilding. Segment DE represents reconstruction, with higher than normal 
growth rates, which continues until the economy is back on its long term normal growth 
path.  
Figure A2 shows GDP per capita for West Germany and the United Kingdom for the 
period 1935 till 1975. The German line clearly shows the same pattern as the 
reconstruction line in Figure A1. West Germany witnessed a large decrease in GDP per 














Figure A-2. 2 GDP per capita in the United Kingdom and West Germany (international Geary-
Khamis dollars) 1935-1975 
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Table A-2.1: Industry information based on the size of establishments 1935 





















11- 24 1185 20.7 0.28 3.01 2.37 1.96 121 
25-49  1398 50.6 0.34 5.60 5.35 4.79 112 
















400-499 173 76.9 0.33 6.81 6.34 7.29 87 
500-749 166 99.5 0.36 8.47 8.63 9.44 91 
750-999 76 64.6 0.41 5.23 6.02 6.12 98 
1000-1499 41 49.3 0.36 4.68 4.76 4.68 102 
1500 and over 33 83.6 0.45 7.51 9.60 7.92 121 
Leather 
11-24 285 5.0 0.34 8.60 9.41 9.94 95 












200-299 20 4.9 0.30 10.21 9.90 9.74 102 
300-399 9 3.0 0.32 6.77 6.92 5.88 118 
400 and over  9 4.3 0.30 7.83 7.67 8.46 91 
Iron and Steel 
11-24 997 17.5 0.55 2.12 2.79 3.25 86 
25-49 995 34.4 0.51 4.57 5.66 6.38 89 
50-99 740 52.2 0.49 7.27 8.59 9.67 89 








300-399 125 43.1 0.37 8.98 8.07 8.00 101 
400-499 74 32.9 0.36 6.77 5.92 6.09 97 




750-999 42 35.6 0.43 6.86 7.05 6.60 107 
1000-1499 38 46.8 0.38 10.09 9.25 8.68 107 




Engineering, Shipbuilding and Vehicles 
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11-24 2670 44.1 0.60 2.86 3.36 4.00 84 
25-49 1764 60.6 0.55 4.45 4.85 5.48 88 
50-99 1056 73.8 0.54 5.75 6.09 6.68 91 
100-199 745 104.9 0.53 8.62 8.93 9.50 94 
200-299 291 70.7 0.54 5.89 6.28 6.40 98 
300-399 170 58.8 0.52 5.18 5.29 5.30 100 
400-499 97 43.6 0.50 4.08 3.99 3.95 101 
500-749 152 93.8 0.50 8.41 8.37 8.50 99 
750-999 86 74.3 0.53 5.99 6.29 6.73 93 
1000-1499 92 112.0 0.50 10.03 9.96 10.14 98 





11-24 484 8.3 0.36 4.74 6.22 6.80 91 
25-49 373 13.1 0.41 6.20 9.07 10.77 84 












300-399 29 9.8 0.23 11.58 9.73 8.03 121 
400-499 15 6.7 0.40 3.20 4.66 5.49 85 




750-999 7 6.3 0.06 21.95 4.95 5.14 96 




Food, Drink and Tobacco 
11-24 3185 52.9 0.32 6.83 7.12 10.15 70 
25-49 1732 59.8 0.29 10.10 9.51 11.49 83 








200-299 176 42.6 0.30 9.21 9.19 8.18 112 
300-399 92 31.6 0.27 7.22 6.46 6.08 106 
400-499 38 17.3 0.27 3.21 2.85 3.32 86 
500-749 57 34.0 0.35 6.23 7.22 6.54 110 
750-999 33 28.5 0.36 4.91 5.84 5.47 107 
1000-1499 25 29.2 0.39 3.89 5.03 5.61 90 
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11-24 614 10.7 0.41 5.51 4.99 5.53 90 
25-49 481 16.6 0.42 8.16 7.45 8.54 87 








200-299 56 13.6 0.48 7.67 8.02 7.01 114 
300-399 40 13.9 0.41 8.49 7.66 7.16 107 
400-499 22 9.8 0.50 5.07 5.55 5.06 110 
500-749 29 17.3 0.44 9.75 9.43 8.93 106 
750-999 12 10.4 0.52 4.97 5.69 5.38 106 
1000-1499 6 7.2 0.39 3.96 3.43 3.70 93 





11-24 555 9.4 0.54 3.58 4.03 5.14 78 
25-49 422 14.8 0.52 5.85 6.39 8.12 79 








200-299 67 16.1 0.43 9.65 8.67 8.82 98 
300-399 36 12.4 0.55 6.14 7.11 6.77 105 
400-499 30 13.1 0.49 5.94 6.10 7.18 85 
500-749 15 9.3 0.54 5.28 5.97 5.08 118 
750-999 9 7.5 0.52 4.31 4.72 4.09 115 








Clay and Building Materials 
11-24 861 14.9 0.54 6.93 5.91 5.96 99 
















300-399 57 19.6 0.67 6.56 6.94 7.84 89 
400-499 31 13.7 0.68 4.90 5.27 5.47 96 




750-999 9 7.4 0.66 2.14 2.22 2.97 75 
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1000-1499 7 8.5 0.69 2.52 2.72 3.39 80 
1500 and over 6 14.0 0.73 5.96 6.80 5.63 121 
Timber 
















200-299 71 17.1 0.49 8.49 8.84 8.76 101 
300-399 30 10.1 0.45 4.98 4.77 5.17 92 
400-499 15 6.6 0.53 3.56 4.00 3.39 118 
500-749 10 6.0 0.48 3.28 3.32 3.10 107 
750 and over  6 6.7 0.53 3.30 3.71 3.42 108 
Paper, Printing and Stationary 
11-24 1540 26.4 0.67 4.12 4.58 6.45 71 
25-49 1281 44.9 0.65 7.63 8.18 10.97 75 












300-399 81 27.8 0.58 6.31 6.07 6.79 89 
400-499 41 18.1 0.53 4.64 4.06 4.42 92 




750-599  23 19.8 0.58 5.88 5.62 4.84 116 
1000-1499 15 18.8 0.66 6.58 7.16 4.59 156 





11-24 13850 235.6 0.42 4.67 4.69 5.10 92 
25-49 10756 375.1 0.42 7.58 7.60 8.12 94 








200-299 2002 488.5 0.40 10.25 9.94 10.57 94 
300-399 1030 354.7 0.38 7.73 7.12 7.68 93 
400-499 545 242.9 0.40 4.80 4.65 5.26 89 
500-749 644 391.6 0.43 8.24 8.59 8.47 101 
750-599  303 261.0 0.40 5.91 5.68 5.65 101 
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1000-1499 245 297.6 0.46 6.16 6.76 6.44 105 




Source: own calculations based on Board of Trade (1938-1944), ‘Final Report of the Fifth Census of 




Table A-2.2: Industry information based on the size of establishments 1951 





























Treatment of Non-Ferrous Mining Products other than Coal 
11-24 734 13.2 0.47 373 4.55 4.17 4.54 92 
25- 99 1395 68.4 0.50 381 22.57 22.18 23.56 94 
100-299 476 80.3 0.49 379 28.38 27.43 27.67 99 
300-399 68 23.6 0.48 364 8.99 8.46 8.12 104 
400-499 43 18.9 0.55 356 5.59 6.03 6.50 93 
500-749 46 27.9 0.54 353 9.46 9.95 9.63 103 
750-999 14 12.0 0.50 389 5.12 5.06 4.14 122 
1000-
1499 
8 9.1 0.55 371 2.74 2.94 3.14 94 
1500-
1999 
9 45.7 0.57 400 5.37 5.95 5.42 110 
2000 and 
over 
7 21.1 0.55 392 7.24 7.81 7.27 107 
Chemicals 
11-49 1128 29.6 0.29 411 8.08 8.14 7.88 103 
50-99 445 31.0 0.31 403 8.13 8.59 8.26 104 
100-199 330 46.9 0.31 401 12.20 12.95 12.48 104 
200-299 133 32.4 0.30 391 7.85 8.21 8.64 95 
300-399 62 21.8 0.32 400 5.72 6.29 5.80 108 
400-499 47 21.2 0.30 412 6.54 6.77 5.65 120 
500-749 68 40.7 0.25 402 10.59 9.24 10.84 85 
750-1000 29 25.2 0.31 423 6.38 6.76 6.71 101 
1000-
1499 
28 32.9 0.30 454 10.51 10.77 8.76 123 
1500-
1999 
7 11.9 0.24 450 4.01 3.26 3.17 103 
2000-
2499 
8 18.0 0.40 425 3.17 4.41 4.79 92 
2500 and 
over 
14 63.8 0.25 459 16.84 14.60 17.00 86 
Metal Manufacturers 
11-49 800 22.1 0.32 416 3.58 3.88 4.11 94 
50-99 382 27.0 0.29 422 4.95 4.85 5.02 97 
100-299 463 78.4 0.32 427 13.61 14.30 14.59 98 
300-399 89 30.9 0.25 422 7.35 6.22 5.75 108 
400-499 64 28.9 0.28 434 5.65 5.26 5.38 98 
500-749 104 63.2 0.30 427 11.29 11.21 11.76 95 
750-999 43 36.4 0.30 446 6.55 6.51 6.77 96 
1000- 46 5.2 0.29 443 10.67 10.36 10.27 101 
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25 43.2 0.36 431 8.10 9.82 8.03 122 
2000-
2499 
16 35.9 0.26 449 7.78 6.77 6.67 101 
2500-
2999 
11 30.1 0.26 460 6.38 5.58 5.59 100 
3000-
3999 
11 35.9 0.31 436 5.95 6.12 6.69 91 
4000-
4999 
4 17.4 0.31 471 2.97 3.05 3.25 94 
5000 and 
over 
5 32.9 0.35 440 5.18 6.08 6.12 99 
Engineering, Shipbuilding and Electrical Goods 
11-24 2081 36.7 0.55 366 1.83 2.05 2.17 95 
25-49 1993 69.3 0.52 376 3.87 4.10 4.09 100 
50-99 1500 105.5 0.51 379 5.97 6.23 6.22 100 
50-399 3203 440.7 0.50 387 26.50 27.17 25.99 105 
400-499 167 74.2 0.48 387 4.66 4.54 4.37 104 
500-749 223 135.6 0.47 393 8.65 8.36 8.00 105 
750-999 127 109.6 0.48 377 6.68 6.55 6.46 101 
1000-
1499 
143 173.6 0.44 391 11.83 10.68 10.24 104 
1500-
1999 
73 126.0 0.46 382 7.99 7.56 7.43 102 
2000-
2499 
36 79.0 0.47 391 4.93 4.73 4.66 102 
2500-
2999 
27 72.9 0.45 409 4.72 4.36 4.30 101 
3000-
3999 
24 81.0 0.48 405 4.79 4.73 4.78 99 
4000-
4999 
7 31.8 0.51 407 1.90 1.99 1.87 106 
5000-
7499 
14 88.2 0.50 381 4.49 4.62 5.20 89 
7500-
9999 
7 62.2 0.47 394 2.98 2.85 3.67 78 
10000 and 
over 
5 114.7 0.66 421 4.20 5.69 6.77 84 
Vehicles 
100-199 355 49.5 0.47 390 4.91 5.77 6.50 89 
300-399 73 25.3 0.51 406 2.54 3.18 3.32 96 
total 11-
399 
3214 198.1 0.48 385 19.21 22.88 26.03 88 
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400-749 119 56.0 0.42 396 8.36 8.62 8.54 101 
750-1499 88 94.4 0.42 421 12.49 13.01 12.40 105 
1500-
2499 
52 102.4 0.45 409 11.50 12.83 13.46 95 
2500-
3999 
29 89.8 0.37 433 11.66 10.75 11.80 91 
4000 and 
over 
30 211.3 0.35 457 36.77 31.90 27.77 115 
Metal Goods not elsewhere specified 
11-24 1310 23.1 0.50 343 4.57 5.13 5.64 91 
25-49 1229 43.7 0.48 345 9.08 9.88 10.65 93 
50-99 824 57.4 0.46 345 12.69 13.25 13.99 95 
100-199 455 63.0 0.46 352 14.49 15.15 15.35 99 
200-299 182 44.4 0.44 341 10.97 10.91 10.81 101 
300-399 99 33.7 0.42 359 9.22 8.77 8.21 107 
300-749 228 103.6 0.42 357 27.76 26.25 25.25 104 
750-999 31 25.8 0.40 317 6.39 5.72 6.30 91 
1000-
1499 
20 24.3 0.41 361 6.81 6.30 5.92 106 
1500 and 
over 
12 25.0 0.45 376 7.25 7.41 6.09 122 
Scrap Metal Processing 
11-24 107 1.82.5 0.16 381 24.44 21.91 19.54 112 
25-49 72 1.4 0.12 390 37.01 24.55 26.56 92 
50-99 19 2.4 0.16 371 16.91 15.30 14.59 105 
100-199 17 1.3 0.27 364 17.44 26.37 25.51 103 
200-299 5 9.4 0.50 356 4.20 11.88 13.80 86 
Precision Instruments, Jewellery etc. 
11-24 477 8.3 0.49 342 5.18 6.24 7.03 89 
25-199 713 46.2 0.44 348 32.74 35.26 38.96 90 
200-399 67 18.1 0.35 341 16.99 14.47 15.25 95 
400-499 12 5.2 0.57 357 3.86 5.46 4.42 124 
500-749 18 11.2 0.33 353 12.06 9.95 9.44 105 
750-1499 19 19.3 0.38 388 19.69 18.30 16.30 112 
1500 and 
over 
4 10.2 0.44 441 9.48 10.32 8.61 120 
Textiles 
11-24 1263 22.2 0.20 302 2.85 2.24 2.40 93 
11-199 5611 368.3 0.23 309 43.39 38.32 39.84 96 
200-299 633 154.6 0.26 311 15.96 16.06 16.73 96 
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300-399 308 105.7 0.26 306 10.90 10.96 11.44 96 
400-499 146 65.4 0.27 307 6.60 6.79 7.07 96 
500-749 134 80.9 0.28 323 8.03 8.54 8.75 98 
750-999 38 32.2 0.26 317 3.07 3.14 3.49 90 
1000-
1499 
24 27.2 0.26 303 2.70 2.75 2.94 93 
1500-
1999 
18 30.7 0.29 351 3.12 3.44 3.32 104 
2000-
2499 
11 24.4 0.37 327 2.30 3.28 2.63 124 
2500 and 
over 
9 35.0 0.45 390 3.91 6.72 3.79 177 
Leather, Leather Goods and Fur 
11-49 674 17.1 0.29 339 21.62 26.59 28.75 92 
100-199 105 14.3 0.23 354 25.04 24.55 24.02 102 
50-299 342 34.7 0.23 354 61.27 60.34 58.37 103 
300-499 13 5.0 0.18 369 12.08 9.24 8.36 111 
500-999 4 2.7 0.18 414 5.03 3.83 4.51 85 
Clothing 
11-24 2560 43.6 0.44 270 6.58 8.16 8.14 100 
25-49 2144 74.9 0.38 278 12.97 14.14 13.97 101 
50-99 1392 96.8 0.35 268 18.03 17.92 18.07 99 
100-199 738 101.8 0.34 268 19.65 19.07 18.99 100 
200-499 415 123.2 0.34 268 24.52 23.43 22.98 102 
500-1499 104 79.8 0.34 262 15.37 14.71 14.88 99 
1500 and 
over 
7 15.9 0.31 278 2.88 2.57 2.97 86 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 
11-49 4121 107.7 0.21 310 10.99 13.30 16.68 80 
50-99 1241 86.8 0.20 328 10.27 11.99 13.45 89 
100-199 693 96.3 0.21 331 11.56 14.03 14.92 94 
200-299 267 65.9 0.20 340 8.96 10.29 10.21 101 
300-399 152 52.5 0.20 345 8.15 9.47 8.14 116 
400-499 59 26.1 0.18 337 4.30 4.52 4.05 112 
500-749 82 51.2 0.19 328 7.95 8.69 7.93 110 
750-999 36 30.8 0.17 334 5.19 5.23 4.77 110 
10000-
1499 
37 43.2 0.26 334 4.67 6.96 6.69 104 
1500-
1999 
10 17.3 0.11 351 5.95 3.71 2.67 139 
2000- 5 11.5 0.21 334 1.83 2.25 1.79 126 
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6 16.4 0.08 411 6.99 3.36 2.55 132 
3000 and 
over 
8 38.9 0.13 333 8.23 6.01 6.02 100 
unclassifie
d 
579 0.9 0.01 546 4.95 0.19 0.13 145 
Manufactures of Wood and Cork 
11-24 1614 28.1 0.39 341 11.07 11.12 11.62 96 
25-49 1373 47.5 0.37 352 19.66 18.75 19.63 96 
50-99 786 54.4 0.37 356 22.68 21.95 22.49 98 
100-399 485 82.6 0.39 374 33.46 33.97 34.16 99 
400 and 
over 
49 29.3 0.42 422 13.13 14.22 12.11 117 
Paper and Printing 
11-24 1557 26.8 0.50 332 3.52 4.02 5.81 69 
25-49 1213 42.6 0.51 346 6.07 6.96 9.22 75 
50-99 836 58.8 0.49 354 9.77 10.82 12.74 85 
100-299 686 116.6 0.44 374 24.88 24.57 25.27 97 
300-399 99 33.7 0.41 399 9.05 8.38 7.30 115 
400-499 46 20.5 0.43 384 5.06 4.98 4.45 112 
500-999 115 79.9 0.40 402 20.16 18.45 17.31 107 
1000-
1499 
29 35.2 0.44 450 8.07 7.99 7.62 105 
1500-
1999 
10 17.5 0.56 496 3.86 4.94 3.80 130 
2000-
2499 
5 11.5 0.37 453 4.63 3.92 2.50 157 
2500 and 
over 
5 18.4 0.44 522 4.94 4.96 3.98 125 
Other Manufacturing Industries 
11-24 470 8.2 0.46 313 2.36 3.17 3.82 83 
25-199 898 62.5 0.43 335 21.29 26.54 29.09 91 
200-299 69 17.4 0.43 326 6.00 7.52 8.09 93 
300-399 41 14.2 0.45 319 4.72 6.09 6.61 92 
400-499 24 10.9 0.48 392 3.82 5.33 5.07 105 
500-749 26 15.3 0.39 357 6.53 7.38 7.14 103 
750-999 12 10.1 0.42 379 4.03 4.92 4.72 104 
1000-
1499 
18 21.3 0.37 386 9.99 10.68 9.94 107 
1500-
1999 
4 6.7 0.26 422 4.99 3.74 3.10 121 
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4 9.5 0.29 341 4.27 3.58 4.43 81 
2500-
2999 
3 8.5 0.26 430 6.80 5.21 3.98 131 
3000 and 
over 
6 30.1 0.22 404 25.20 15.83 14.01 113 
Total Manufacturing 
11-24 16671 291.1 0.35 332 3.22 3.43 4.00 86 
25-49 15457 541.4 0.33 340 6.49 6.60 7.44 89 
50-99 10792 757.4 0.33 343 9.64 9.61 10.41 92 
100-199 6849 956.0 0.33 349 12.76 12.65 13.13 96 
200-299 2722 664.3 0.32 350 9.17 9.06 9.13 99 
300-399 1415 487.1 0.32 356 7.29 7.07 6.69 106 
400-499 795 354.7 0.33 362 5.11 5.08 4.87 104 
500-749 1005 609.9 0.33 367 8.65 8.68 8.38 104 
750-999 442 378.2 0.34 380 5.36 5.48 5.20 106 
1000-
1499 
435 522.4 0.36 391 6.99 7.68 7.18 107 
1500-
1999 
201 346.7 0.33 395 5.20 5.31 4.76 111 
2000-
2499 
115 257.8 0.36 399 3.43 3.81 3.54 108 
2500-
2999 
72 196.7 0.23 427 4.11 2.93 2.70 109 
3000-
3999 
66 223.3 0.33 409 3.07 3.11 3.07 101 
4000-
4999 
35 155.9 0.27 421 2.66 2.23 2.14 104 
5000-
7499 
36 226.6 0.38 423 2.75 3.17 3.11 102 
7500-
9999 
14 120.4 0.41 408 1.17 1.47 1.65 89 
10000 and 
over 
10 188.2 0.44 446 1.94 2.62 2.59 101 
unclassifie
d 
579 0.9 0.01 546 1.00 0.02 0.01 174 
Note: the average net output per employee is set to 100. 
Source: own calculations based on Board of Trade (1954) ‘The report on the census of Production 




Table A-2.3: Industry information based on the size of establishments 1971 



























Food, Drink and Tobacco 
1-10 1870 9.7 






} 88 11-24 1513 26 3.27 
25-99 1295 68.7 8.65 
100-199 452 62.9 0.23 1169 9.00 7.68 7.92 97 
200-499 493 157.6 0.27 1202 17.87 18.47 19.83 93 
500-999 199 140.6 0.31 1209 15.77 18.12 17.69 102 
1000-
1499 
50 62.2 0.28 1199 6.57 6.99 7.83 89 
1500 and 
over 
79 266.9 0.26 1356 37.36 37.17 33.59 111 
Coal and Petroleum Products 
1-10 82 0.4 
} 0.23 } 1500 } 4.21 } 5.76 
1.07 
} 63 11-24 55 0.9 2.41 
25-99 39 2.1 5.63 
100-199 21 3.2 0.19 938 5.70 6.69 8.58 78 
200-499 34 10.4 0.12 1154 30.92 22.85 27.88 82 
500-999 10 7.2 0.25 1167 10.72 16.32 19.30 85 
1000 and 
over 
6 13.1 0.17 1221 48.46 48.38 35.12 138 
Chemicals 
1-10 1166 5.5 





} 86 11-24 673 11.6 2.81 
25-99 475 25 6.07 
100-199 212 29 0.39 786 7.15 6.32 7.04 90 
200-499 196 62.1 0.40 776 16.39 15.11 15.07 100 
500-999 97 65.7 0.44 752 16.65 16.52 15.94 104 
1000-
1499 
32 37.4 0.48 802 6.34 6.95 9.08 77 
1500 and 
over 
56 175.8 0.47 907 43.07 46.35 42.66 109 
Metal Manufactures 
1-10 822 4.5 
} 0.36 } 996 } 7.97 } 8.81 
0.82 
} 100 11-24 719 12.4 2.27 
25-99 581 31.4 5.75 
100-199 265 37 0.34 1024 6.70 7.02 6.78 104 
200-499 224 70.2 0.34 1060 12.70 13.58 12.86 106 
500-999 76 54.1 0.31 1079 11.46 11.13 9.91 112 
1000- 39 46.5 0.26 1090 11.52 9.21 8.52 108 
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62 289.9 0.33 1130 49.64 50.26 53.10 95 
Mechanical Engineering 
1-10 5817 29.5 0.50 953 18.81 19.60 2.93 92 
11-24 3789 64.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.44 n.a. 
25-99 2231 119.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.86 n.a. 
100-199 688 97.7 0.47 905 9.36 9.13 9.71 94 
200-499 563 174 0.45 867 17.81 16.68 17.29 96 
500-999 250 169 0.47 869 18.89 18.27 16.80 109 
1000-
1499 
72 87.9 0.47 931 9.42 9.22 8.74 106 
1500 and 
over 
95 264 0.51 963 25.69 27.10 26.24 103 
Instrument Engineering 
1-10 1001 4.7 






} 102 11-24 521 8.8 5.06 
25-99 317 18 10.34 
100-199 112 15.6 0.54 712 9.06 9.11 8.97 102 
200-499 94 29.2 0.57 699 15.93 16.73 16.78 100 
500-999 53 39 0.56 687 22.80 23.56 22.41 105 
1000-
1499 
17 20.3 0.53 522 11.26 10.97 11.67 94 
1500 and 
over 
14 38.4 0.51 732 22.34 21.17 22.07 96 
Electrical Engineering 
1-10 1582 71 
} 0.46 } 722 } 6.93 } 6.83 
0.94 
} 88 11-24 995 17 2.24 
25-99 621 34.5 4.55 
100-199 275 40.4 0.49 752 4.67 4.85 5.33 91 
200-499 273 85.3 0.45 661 11.22 10.67 11.26 95 
500-999 156 105.9 0.45 743 16.01 15.35 13.98 110 
1000-
1499 
50 64.4 0.44 716 8.69 8.13 8.50 96 
1500 and 
over 
107 402.9 0.49 758 52.48 54.17 53.19 102 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering 
1-10 568 3.2 
} 0.51 } 1131 } 9.34 } 9.56 
1.80 
} 97 11-24 282 4.9 2.76 
25-99 173 9.4 5.30 
100-199 51 7.4 0.60 1189 3.79 4.60 4.17 110 
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200-499 42 14.3 0.49 1266 7.60 7.51 8.07 93 
500-999 18 13.8 0.53 1304 8.32 8.81 7.78 113 
1000-
1499 
12 12.8 0.47 1250 7.02 6.71 7.22 93 
1500 and 
over 
22 111.5 0.49 1109 63.94 62.82 62.89 100 
Vehicles 
1-10 853 4.9 
} 0.42 } 911 } 3.68 } 4.39 
0.62 
} 91 11-24 616 10.5 1.33 
25-99 421 22.6 2.86 
100-199 180 24.4 0.46 967 2.34 3.07 3.09 99 
200-499 151 47.8 0.48 956 5.08 6.93 6.06 114 
500-999 79 54.8 0.42 987 5.76 6.91 6.94 100 
1000-
1499 
42 50.7 0.40 1055 6.96 7.81 6.42 122 
1500 and 
over 
102 573.5 0.33 1103 76.19 70.89 72.67 98 
Metal Goods not elsewhere specified 
1-10 5677 26.8 






} 97 11-24 3442 58.4 10.68 
25-99 1972 103.9 19.00 
100-199 524 71.1 0.42 858 13.79 12.74 13.00 98 
200-499 336 102.8 0.45 895 19.95 19.59 18.80 104 
500-999 118 84.9 0.42 885 16.99 15.70 15.53 101 
1000-
1499 
37 43.9 0.44 918 8.10 7.84 8.03 98 
1500 and 
over 
26 55 0.45 936 10.84 10.71 10.06 106 
Textiles 
1-10 1244 6.7 








11-24 1259 22.4 3.66 
25-99 1342 74.8 12.21 
100-199 644 91 0.38 769 13.72 12.97 14.86 87 
200-499 505 152.6 0.39 798 22.44 22.19 24.91 89 
500-999 126 87.3 0.42 795 14.46 15.19 14.25 107 
1000-
1499 
36 42.9 0.41 807 6.20 6.40 7.00 91 
1500 and 
over 
44 134.8 0.43 992 25.74 28.01 22.01 127 
Leather, Leather Goods and Fur 
1-10 711 3.9 } 0.37 } 794 } } 8.65 } 98 
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11-24 373 6.2 54.42 53.76 13.75 
25-99 299 14.7 32.59 
100-199 65 9.2 0.40 859 20.44 21.55 20.40 106 
200-499 31 8.7 0.37 828 21.50 21.10 19.29 109 
500 and 
over 
4 2.4 0.37 750 3.64 3.59 5.32 67 
Clothing and Footwear 
1-10 2472 12.8 






} 97 11-24 1973 34 7.48 
25-99 1649 84.3 18.54 
100-199 523 73.5 0.46 634 15.11 15.01 16.16 93 
200-499 335 105.3 0.46 635 22.37 21.99 23.15 95 
500-999 95 63 0.48 641 13.37 13.71 13.85 99 
1000-
1499 
24 26.1 0.48 674 5.94 6.11 5.74 107 
1500 and 
over 
17 55.8 0.52 758 13.61 15.17 12.27 124 
Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement 
1-10 2649 12.9 






} 98 11-24 722 12.6 4.39 
25-99 742 38 13.24 
100-199 229 31.5 0.48 1057 12.06 11.25 10.98 102 
200-499 175 53.1 0.55 1026 16.43 17.35 18.50 94 
500-999 69 45.2 0.54 1024 14.72 15.35 15.75 97 
1000-
1499 
18 22.6 0.60 1062 6.95 8.06 7.87 102 
1500 and 
over 
20 71.1 0.56 1076 24.41 26.30 24.77 106 
Timber, Furniture etc. 
1-10 4795 24.6 






} 92 11-24 2066 34.7 13.25 
25-99 1522 76 29.02 
100-199 334 44.9 0.41 935 17.47 17.68 17.14 103 
200-499 167 51 0.42 996 20.27 20.72 19.47 106 
500-999 33 21.5 0.44 1014 8.08 8.71 8.21 106 
1000 and 
over 
7 9.2 0.52 1185 4.11 5.25 3.51 149 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 
1-10 5164 27.8 






} 87 11-24 2259 37.9 6.40 
25-99 1871 94 15.87 
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100-199 518 69.5 0.49 882 11.19 10.87 11.73 93 
200-499 422 132.7 0.48 937 23.04 21.88 22.40 98 
500-999 138 95.1 0.48 962 16.24 15.43 16.05 96 
1000-
1499 
38 44.9 0.46 1067 8.96 8.13 7.58 107 
1500 and 
over 
32 90.5 0.56 1148 18.24 20.28 15.28 133 
Other Manufacturing Industries 
1-10 2148 11.1 






} 87 11-24 1075 18.3 5.45 
25-99 821 42.9 12.79 
100-199 274 40.3 0.49 797 11.60 11.60 12.01 97 
200-499 219 67.8 0.46 832 20.98 19.84 20.21 98 
500-999 71 49.7 0.49 869 14.77 14.88 14.81 100 
1000-
1499 
13 16.8 0.50 875 3.97 4.06 5.01 81 
1500 and 
over 
26 88.6 0.51 991 29.42 30.90 26.41 117 
Total Manufacturing 
1-10 38621 196 






} 88 11-24 22332 381.7 4.87 
25-99 16371 859.6 10.98 
100-199 5367 748.8 0.39 1208 8.88 8.81 9.56 92 
200-499 4260 1325 0.39 1261 16.78 16.44 16.92 97 
500-999 1592 1099 0.41 1326 14.30 14.92 14.04 106 
1000-
1499 
487 588.3 0.39 1384 7.50 7.49 7.51 100 
1500 and 
over 
708 2632 0.39 1513 36.92 36.10 33.61 107 
Note: the number of establishments, and total number of employees is provided for size 
classes 1-10; 11-24; 25-99, however, no separate information is provided on value added 
and gross output for these three size classes. Therefore the Value added/gross output, the 
share in gross output, the share in value added and the productivity measure are provided 
for the total size class 1 – 99.  
Source: own calculations based on Business Statistics Office (1976), ‘Report on the census of 
production – summary tables’, Table 3. 
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Appendix A3: gaps in the trade statistics  
Due to changes in the classification system, and missing values, there are some gaps in the 
export and import data. This Appendix explains how these gaps were filled. In total there 
are nine industries for which data is either incomplete for imports, exports or both. The 
most obvious way of filling gaps is by assuming that exports are closely related to home 
production, and hence gross output. Of course the volume of exports will also depend on 
demand side conditions, but considering that there is no easy accessible data for the 
demand side at the industry level, the most practical solution is to use production 
information. In most cases I therefore assumed that as a proxy for the missing value, a 
fixed percentage of gross output could be used. Table A1 below shows for seven industries 













































1949 0.09 3.99 1.01 - - 0.16 - - 
1950 0.10 4.24 1.08 - - 0.13 - - 
1951  0.16 3.54 1.61 - - 0.15 - - 
1952 0.15 4.50 1.33 - - 0.16 - - 
1953 0.24 4.79 1.23 - - 0.22 - - 
1954 0.21 3.38 1.62 11.32 27.95 0.64 105.01 18.81 
1955 0.24 3.79 1.71 11.51 27.46 0.80 112.38 21.02 
1956 0.31 3.82 2.16 11.66 27.83 0.97 99.29 16.59 
1957 0.31 3.74 2.58 11.33 27.69 0.93 93.17 11.73 
1958 0.41 4.02 2.48 13.56 26.89 0.97 72.05 9.40 
1959 0.42 3.19 1.71 13.76 22.89 1.39 79.71 12.56 
1960 0.40 3.39 1.74 17.20 24.09 1.78 79.02 9.54 
1961 0.34 3.78 1.88 18.37 23.96 2.05 72.26 8.74 
1962 0.37 4.09 1.82 17.12 24.12 1.98 59.26 9.53 
1963 - - - 18.44 25.70 - 63.14 11.50 
1964 - - - 19.48 26.09 - 74.42 8.04 
1965 - - - 19.42 27.09 - 84.81 8.80 
1966 - - - 18.47 26.87 - 80.84 7.76 
1967 - - - 21.10 26.06 - 77.54 7.39 
1968 - - - 21.20 28.47 - 83.93 8.91 
1969 - - - 19.52 31.83 - 90.83 11.55 
1970 - - - 21.77 32.09 - 118.45 10.93 





























0.4 4 1.8 11 27 2 100 18 
a) Information is provided on the correlation between exports and gross output or imports 
and gross output. Which correlation is presented is depending on whether the heading 
specifies imports or exports as a share of gross output. 
The years in between census years have been interpolated using the annual index of production 
from the ‘Annual Abstract of Statistics’, for more detail see Appendix Table A-3.7. 
Sources: different volumes from the ‘Report on overseas trade’ published by the Board of Trade; 
Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical Record of the Census of Production 1907-1970’, Table 
1.   
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Based on information on the exports to gross output, and imports to gross output ratio I 
constructed a guesstimate percentage to fill the gaps for the missing years. For wood 
(basic), wood (manufacturing), optical, precision and instrument engineering, and rubber, 
the correlation between exports (and/or imports) and gross output in that industry is very 
high and highly significant. This implies that it seems plausible to use a fixed percentage 
of gross output as a guesstimate for the missing values in the trade data. The last row 
shows the percentage used to construct the guesstimate for the missing years.  
 
Leather (basic materials)  
For leather (basic materials) the correlation between gross output and exports was very low 
and insignificant. Therefore, I choose to use a different approach here. Figure A1 below 
shows gross output and exports in the leather (basic materials) industry. Clearly, there are 
some severe changes in gross output over the years, whereas exports are growing at a slow 
but constant rate. There is no direct relation between the movement in exports and the 
movement in gross output. There is also no significant correlation between imports and 
exports of leather (basic materials) There is a significant correlation however between 
exports of leather (manufactured) and exports of leather (basic materials) (0.9023, p-value 
<0.001). Table A2 shows exports of leather (basic materials) as a percentage of exports of 
leather (manufacturing). I use a fixed percentage of exports of leather (manufactured) to 
estimate the missing values for leather (basic materials).  
 
Figure A-3. 1: Gross output and exports in the leather (basic materials) industry 
 
 
Sources: own calculations based on Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical Record of the 
Census of Production 1907-1970’, Table 1. ‘Report on overseas trade’ different volumes. The years 
in between census years have been interpolated using the annual index of production derived from 

































































Table A-3.2: Exports of leather (basic materials) as a percentage of exports of leather 
(manufactured) 
Year 
Exports of leather (basic materials) as a percentage 















Correlation between exports leather (basic 
materials) and exports leather 
(manufactured); p-value between brackets) 
0.902 
(<0.001) 
Percentage used to guesstimate the gap 19 
Source: own calculation based on ‘Report on overseas trade’, different volumes. 
 
Clothing and footwear  
From 1954 to 1963 the industry classification in the trade statistics clothing and footwear are 
combined. Table A3 below shows the share of gross output, value added and exports and imports of 
footwear in the industry footwear and clothing from 1949 till 1970. The share of footwear in the 
exports of the branch clothing and footwear seems to be reasonably constant around 24-25 per cent 
per annum. Therefore, I assume that for the years 1954 till 1962 the share of footwear in exports of 
this group of products was also 25 per cent. For imports constructing a proxy is slightly more 
difficult, since in 1953, the last year we have separate information for footwear and clothing, the 
ratio of footwear in total imports is much higher than the years before, 36 per cent instead of the 24 
per cent in 1952. In 1963, the first year we have information on the industries after the data gap; the 
ratio is back to 23 per cent, which seems in line with the years following. There was no change in the 
share of footwear in value added or gross output of clothing and footwear from domestic production. 
Therefore, I assume that the 36 per cent of 1953 might be a positive outlier, and imports of footwear 
are assumed to be 25 per cent of the total value of imports of clothing and footwear.  
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footwear in value 












1949 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.17 
1950 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.21 
1951 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.23 
1952 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 
1953 0.23 0.24 0.36 0.27 
1954 0.23 0.24 - - 
1955 0.22 0.23 - - 
1956 0.22 0.25 - - 
1957 0.22 0.25 - - 
1958 0.23 0.24 - - 
1959 0.23 0.25 - - 
1960 0.24 0.25 - - 
1961 0.24 0.26 - - 
1962 0.24 0.26 - - 
1963 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.25 
1964 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.25 
1965 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.24 
1966 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.24 
1967 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.24 
1968 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.24 
1969 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.24 
1970 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.22 
The years in between census years have been interpolated using the annual index of production 
from the Annual Abstract of Statistics, for more detail see Appendix Table A-3.7. 
Source: own calculations based on Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical Record of the 
Census of Production 1907-1970’, Table 1 and ‘Report on overseas trade’, different volumes.  
Paper pulp 
The trade statistics offer two entries for the paper industry; the first is paper (manufactured), and the 
second paper pulp. Export data for paper pulp for the period 1963-1970 is not provided in the trade 
statistics. The census of production, however, does not allow a distinction between these two paper 
industries. Therefore I combined the two paper industries to form the complete paper industry. We 
cannot rely on a percentage of gross output in the paper pulp industry to construct an estimate of the 
missing data. Therefore, I instead use the ratio of paper pulp exports to paper (manufactured) 
exports. Table A4 below shows this ratio for the period 1949 to 1962.  
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Exports of paper pulp as a 
















Correlation between exports of 
paper *manufactured) and exports 




Percentage used to guesstimate the 
gap 
4 
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Table A-3. 5: Gaps in the wholesale price index 
Sources: Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical record of the Census of Production 1907-
1970’, ‘Annual Abstract of Statistics’, different volumes.  
Industry  Missing 
year(s) 
Data used to interpolate Detail 
Food Industry  1950  Retail price index 
number for Food, 
(Appendix II, iii, part 2, 
Historical record of the 
census of production 
1907 to 1970) 
Between 1949 and 1951 growth in the 
wholesale prices was 18 per cent, and 
growth in the retail prices was 18.9 
per cent. The missing value for 1950 
is interpolated using the same 
interpolation  technique as used for 
value added, gross output, and 
employment, which is described in 
detail im Table A-3.7. 
Mechanical 
Engineering  
1949-1953 Wholesale price index 
numbers for 
‘mechanical 
engineering’ are taken 
from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics 
(1958) 
For the overlapping period (1954-
1956) the index numbers in the 
annual abstract of statistics show the 
exact same growth patterns as the 





1949-1953 Wholesale price index 
numbers for ‘electrical 
machinery’ are taken 
from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics 
(1958) 
Electrical machinery is only a subset 
of electrical engineering. In 1951, 
electrical machinery composed 30 per 
cent of value added in electrical 





1949-1953 I approximate the index 
for engineering and 
allied industries by 
taking 50% of the 
mechanical engineering 
index, and 50% of the 
electrical engineering 
index. 
Engineering and allied industries 
contains more than just electrical and 
mechanical engineering. However, 
there only exists an index for those 
two industries. The approximation 
works very precise for the years 
1954-1970. The deviation between 
the constructed index and the actual 
index is never more than 3 per cent. 
The constructed index is only used 
for 1949 to 1953. 
Textiles 1949-1963 Wholesale price index 
numbers for ‘textiles’ 
are taken from the 







Timber  1949-1953 The wholesale number 
for ‘products other than 
food’ is used 
 
Notes: a. own calculation from Business Statistics Office (1978). 
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Table A-3.6: Reclassification of industries from the ‘Historical Record of the Census of 
Production 1907-1970’ 
1 Dairy Industry 
 
Milk and Milk Products 
2 Fruits and Vegetables  
 
Fruit and Vegetable Products  
3 Meat Industry 
 
Bacon Curing, Meat and Fish Products 
4 Tobacco  
 
Tobacco  
5 Beverages  
 
Brewing and Malting; Soft Drinks; Spirit Distilling and Compounding; British Wines, 
Cider and Perry 
6 Textiles (basic materials)  
 
Production of Man-made Fibre; Spinning and Doubling on the Cotton and Flax Systems; 
Weaving of Cotton, Linens and Man-made Fibres; Woollen and Worsted; Jute; Rope, 
Twine, Net 
7 Textiles (manufacturing)  
 
Hosiery and Other Knitted Goods; Lace; Carpets; Narrow Fabrics; Made-up Household 
Textiles; Canvas Goods and Sacks; Textile Finishing; Asbestos; Miscellaneous Textiles 
8 Clothing 
 
Weatherproof Outerwear; Men's and Boys’ Tailored Outerwear; Women's and Girl's 
Tailored Outerwear; Overalls and Men's Shirts, Underwear etc.; Dresses, Lingerie, 





10 Leather (basic materials)  
 
Leather (tanning and dressing) and Fellmongery  
11 Leather and fur (manufactured)  
 
Leather Goods; Fur 
12 Chemicals  
 
Chemicals and Allied Industries (general chemicals, inorganic, organic and other); Drugs 
and Pharmaceutical Preparations; Toilet Preparations and Perfumery; Paint and Varnish; 
Soap and Detergent; Synthetic  Resins and Plastic Materials and Synthetic Rubber; 
Dyestuffs and Pigments; Fertilizers; Polishes; Formulated Adhesives, Gelatine etc.; 
Explosives and Fireworks; Formulated Pesticides and Disinfectants; Printing Ink; Surgical 
Bandages; Photographic Chemical Materials 
13 Lubricating oil and greases 
 
Lubricating Oil and Greases 
14 Transport equipment  
 
Wheeled Tractor Manufacturing; Motor Vehicle Manufacturing; Motor Cycle, Tricycle 
and Pedal Cycle Manufacturing; Aerospace Equipment Manufacturing and Repairing; 
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Locomotive and Railway Tract Equipment; Railway Carriages, Wagons and Trams; 
Shipbuilding 
15 Iron and steel (manufactured)  
 
Iron and Steel;  Steel Tubes; Iron Castings etc.; Engineer's Small Tools and Gauges; Hand 
Tools and Implement; Cutlery; Bolts, Nuts, Screws, Rivets, etc.; Wire and Wire 
Manufacturing; Cans and Metal Boxes; Metal Furniture; Drop Forging etc.; Metal 
Hollow-ware; Miscellaneous Metal Goods 
16 Non-ferrous metals  
 
Aluminium and Aluminium Alloys; Copper, Brass and other Copper Alloys 
17 Rubber  
 
Rubber 
18 Mechanical Engineering 
 
Agricultural Machinery; Metal Working Machine Tools; Pumps, Valves and 
Compressors; Industrial Engines; Textile Machinery and Accessories; Construction and 
Earthmoving Equipment; Mechanical Handling Equipment; Office Machinery; Mining 
Machinery; Printing and Bookbinding Machinery; Refrigerator Machinery; Space 
Heating, Ventilating and Air-conditioning Equipment; Food and Drink Processing 
Machinery; Miscellaneous Machinery; Industrial Plant and Steel Work; Ordnance and 
Small Arms; General Mechanical Engineering 
19 Electrical Engineering 
 
Electrical Machinery; Insulated Wires and Cables; Telegraph and Telephone Apparatus 
and Equipment; Radio and Electronic Components; Broadcasting Receiving and Sound 
Reproducing Equipment; Electronic Computers; Radio, Radar and Electronic Capital 
Goods; Electric Appliances Primarily for Domestic Use; Miscellaneous Electrical Goods 
20 Optical and precision engineering  
 
Photographic and Document Copying Equipment; Watch and Clock; Surgical Instrument 
and Appliances; Scientific and Industrial Instruments and Systems 
21 Wood (basic materials)  
 
Timber; Miscellaneous Wood and Cork 
22 wood (manufactured)  
 
Shop and Office Fittings; Wooden Containers and Baskets 
23 Paper   
 
Paper and Board; Cardboard Boxes, Cartons and Fibre-board Packing Cases; Packaging 
Products of Paper and associated Materials; Manufactured Stationery; Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing of Paper and Board 
Source: own reclassification, industries from the Business Statistics Office (1978), ‘Historical record 




Table A-3.7: Interpolation method 
The missing data for the years in between the census years, point t0 and tn, are interpolated 

































∗ 𝑉𝐴𝑡)  (A.3)  
 
Were VA is value added, GO is gross output, L is employment, I is the industrial index of 
production and IE is the index of employment.  
 
This method takes both the growth rate of the yearly index, and the total growth rate of 
the actual data into account.  
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Table A-3.8: Reclassifying the 1950 labour-productivity estimates US/UK 








Meat Industry 2010. Bacon, Sausage , and Canned 
Meat 
157 150 
Dairy Industry 2020. Dairy products 183 176 
Fruits and vegetables  2030. Canning and Preserving of 
Fruits and Vegetables  
235 226 
Tobacco  22. Tobacco Manufactures  251 240 
Beverages  21. Beverage 266 255 
Leather and fur (manufactured)  2920. Leather Products, except 
Footwear and Apparel 
192 194 
Paper (manufactured)  27. Paper and Paper Products 389 405 
Wood (basic materials)  2510. Lumber and Timber (basic 
products) 
298 306 
Wood (manufactured)1  2610. Furniture and Upholstery  254 261 




Non-ferrous metals (manufactured 
goods)  
3420. Non-Ferrous Metal Basic 
Industries 
264 274 
Animal oils and vegetable oils, fats, 
greases and derivatives (basic 
materials)  
3120. Oils, Fats and Greases 235 240 
Textile fibres (basic materials)  2311/12. Cotton Spinning and 
Weaving; 2313. Woollen and 
Worsted; 2314. Rayon, Nylon and 
Silk 
225 220 
Rubber (manufactured)  3010. Tires and Tubes; 3020. Other 
Rubber Products  
246 250 
Clothing 2431/33.Men’s, Boys’, Women’s 
and Girls’; Outerwear and 
Underwear, Infants’ Wear; 2435. 
Gloves; 2437. Hats, Caps and 
Millinery   
176 177 
Footwear 2410. Footwear Except Rubber; 
3020. Rubber Footwear 
167 168 
Iron and steel (manufactured)  3411. Blast Furnaces; 3412. Steel 
Works and Rolling Mills; 3413.Iron 
and Steel Foundries; 3430. Wire 
Drawing; 3510.  Metal Cans; 3521 
Cutlery; 3522. Tools and 
Implement; 3530. Heating, Cooking 
and Plumbing Equipment; 3541. 




Steel Metal Work and Metal 
Stampings; 3571. Wirework; 3572. 
Needles, Pins, and Metal Small-
Ware; 3581. Bolts, Nuts, Rivets, 
etc. 
Electrical Engineering  37. Electrical Machinery, 
Apparatus, Appliances and Supplies 
321 328 
Mechanical Engineering  36. Machinery, except Electrical 
Machinery 
322 345 
Chemicals  3111. Basic Industrial Chemicals, 
Including Fertilizers and Plastic 
Materials; 3191. Medicinal and 
Pharmaceutical Preparations; 3192. 
Soap, Candles and Glycerine; 3194.  
Paint and Varnish; 3197. Matches  
374 381 
Textiles (manufactured)  2317. Carpets; 2320. Knitting Mills 188 184 
Transport equipment  38A. Automobiles, Trucks and 
Tractors; 38B. Transport 
Equipment other than Automobiles, 
Trucks and Tractors 
349 367 
Optical and precision engineering2   322 323 
1. There is no separate entry for manufactured wood, other than furniture, thus the gap for furniture 
and upholstery is taken here to represent and proxy also the gap for manufactured wood excluding 
furniture.   
2. Paige and Bombach do not provide an estimate for optical and precision engineering, as a proxy 
for this gap the gap for mechanical engineering is used. 
Source: own reclassification and calculation based on Paige and Bombach (1959), Table 7, p. 30, 
Table 9, p. 33, and Appendix pp. 130-186. 
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Table A-3.9: First stage estimation results, industry and year dummies included 










nr. obs.  437  
Adj. R-squared 0.9622  










nr. obs.  437  
Adj. R-squared 0.972  










nr. obs.  437  
Adj. R-squared 0.878  





Table A-3.10: First stage estimation results, industry and year dummies included (Moving 
averages) 
Dependent variable MS  t-statistic 
L2.moving average - MS 0.918*** 
(0.061) 
15.04 






nr. obs.  437  
Adj. R-squared 0.974  
Dependent variable XGO  t-statistic 
L2.moving average - MS 0.075*** 
(0.024) 
3.19 






nr. obs.  437  
Adj. R-squared 0.979  
Dependent variable DTF  t-statistic 
L2.moving average - MS 0.332 
(0.305) 
1.09 






nr. obs.  437  
Adj. R-squared 0.878  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates marked ***/**/* are significant at the 1/5/10 per 
cent level. 
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Table A-3.11: Instrumental variable estimation. Three- and four-year moving averages 
Dependent variable: LP growth rate 















































N 414 391 414 391 
Results of time and fixed effects are suppressed. The reported R-squared is obtained by 
performing a dummies regression. Estimates marked ***/**/* are significant at the 1/5/10 per 
cent level.  
Column 1: three-year moving average of LP growth rate, MS, XY and, DTF as instruments  
Column 2: three-year moving average of LP growth rate, and a three-year moving average of MS 
and XY as instruments) 
Column 3: four-year moving average of LP growth rate, MS, XY and, DTF as instruments  
Column 4: four-year moving average of LP growth rate, and a three-year moving average of MS 
and XY as instruments) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates marked ***/**/* are significant at the 













Rest of the 
world 
Exports 1950 
Tobacco Industry 76.35 0.19 0.19 0.12 23.16 
Chemicals  34.07 3.99 2.61 1.58 57.75 
Paper and Board (manufactured)  66.99 3.68 1.70 0.24 27.39 
Textiles (manufactured)  55.64 6.11 8.11 2.17 27.97 
Leather (manufactured)  20.71 19.74 10.69 0.37 48.49 
Mechanical Engineering  49.02 1.21 2.88 6.03 40.85 
Electrical Engineering  36.37 0.58 1.36 1.21 60.48 
Rubber (manufactured)  46.19 3.53 2.12 1.27 46.89 
Iron and Steel  56.44 1.98 5.86 2.63 33.09 
Non-Ferrous Metals  46.45 21.10 14.64 3.89 13.92 
Transport Equipment  48.63 2.44 7.84 1.04 40.05 
Clothing and Footwear 47.71 9.98 7.93 0.42 33.96 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering  
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Exports 1955 
Tobacco Industry 73.57 0.30 0.40 0.05 25.67 
Chemicals  50.48 3.27 3.35 0.58 42.33 
Paper and Board (manufactured)  73.72 3.94 1.61 0.19 20.55 
Textiles (manufactured)  53.39 8.19 7.12 0.31 30.98 
Leather (manufactured)  21.31 14.78 8.71 0.00 55.21 
Mechanical Engineering  47.56 3.18 4.02 1.64 43.60 
Electrical Engineering  60.77 2.79 4.35 2.33 29.76 
Rubber (manufactured)  50.14 0.99 1.29 1.19 46.39 
Iron and Steel  54.80 2.24 4.97 0.08 37.91 
Non-Ferrous Metals  26.64 14.43 2.57 14.06 42.30 
Transport Equipment  54.70 5.27 3.91 0.13 35.99 
Clothing and Footwear 46.95 14.86 9.70 0.08 28.42 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering  
48.58 3.78 2.76 0.31 44.58 
Exports 1960 
Tobacco Industry 65.04 0.79 0.59 0.07 33.51 
Chemicals  43.87 3.35 2.97 3.54 46.27 
Paper and Board (manufactured)  63.69 3.39 2.12 0.85 29.95 
Textiles (manufactured)  47.66 8.08 8.22 0.75 35.29 
Leather (manufactured)  17.80 19.50 8.90 0.26 53.54 
Mechanical Engineering  35.84 6.90 5.67 3.95 47.63 
Electrical Engineering  51.72 5.41 5.61 1.38 35.89 
Rubber (manufactured)  45.79 2.76 2.51 1.04 47.90 
Iron and Steel  37.90 6.24 5.79 4.77 45.31 









Rest of the 
world 
Non-Ferrous Metals  24.55 11.38 2.37 7.64 54.06 
Transport Equipment  43.26 13.76 8.67 0.13 34.18 
Clothing and Footwear 38.26 19.87 9.96 1.89 30.01 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering  
38.58 7.41 4.68 2.07 47.27 
Exports 1965 
Tobacco Industry 45.56 1.38 0.84 0.18 52.04 
Chemicals  36.92 4.20 2.58 4.63 51.68 
Paper and Board (manufactured)  52.49 2.53 1.55 1.64 41.80 
Textiles (manufactured)  37.38 8.36 6.25 2.14 45.87 
Leather (manufactured)  14.67 18.30 7.81 0.71 58.52 
Mechanical Engineering  35.52 6.55 4.74 3.50 49.70 
Electrical Engineering  47.76 3.79 4.17 1.87 42.40 
Rubber (manufactured)  39.51 2.77 2.51 1.77 53.44 
Iron and Steel  32.12 13.48 5.66 3.10 45.63 
Non-Ferrous Metals  16.05 10.41 3.96 5.64 63.94 
Transport Equipment  40.59 13.07 3.23 0.24 42.86 
Clothing and Footwear 27.83 20.11 6.27 3.63 42.15 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering 
29.73 7.51 4.03 2.40 56.33 
Exports 1970 
Tobacco Industry 32.21 1.17 0.69 0.42 65.52 
Chemicals  30.64 4.12 2.24 4.63 58.37 
Paper and Board (manufactured)  42.80 2.47 1.68 2.26 50.79 
Textiles (manufactured)  29.73 5.73 6.14 4.28 54.12 
Leather (manufactured)  15.92 15.11 8.32 1.18 59.46 
Mechanical Engineering  26.67 9.73 3.95 5.04 54.61 
Electrical Engineering  35.81 6.91 3.97 2.71 50.60 
Rubber (manufactured)  29.23 4.55 3.21 1.59 61.42 
Iron and Steel  24.69 14.17 3.95 3.68 53.51 
Non-Ferrous Metals  9.43 9.89 1.28 7.37 72.04 
Transport Equipment  32.75 13.13 2.74 0.46 50.91 
Clothing and Footwear 22.08 16.09 5.25 6.57 50.00 
Optical and Precision 
Engineering  
20.08 10.91 5.54 3.95 59.53 














Tobacco Industry  38.61 51.19 4.46 0.02 5.72 
Meat Industry  34.59 0.04 4.72 6.43 54.22 
Fruits and Vegetables Industry  20.96 0.43 1.36 0.26 76.99 
Leather (basic materials)  41.97 4.99 3.56 8.65 40.83 
Wood  (basic materials)  11.64 3.27 11.22 37.35 36.52 
Textiles (basic materiasl)  54.54 10.35 0.07 0.23 34.81 
Paper   0.87 2.20 6.42 22.05 68.45 
Iron and Steel  1.74 17.90 7.91 0.92 71.54 
Chemicals  6.35 15.29 2.36 0.40 75.60 
Textile (manufactured)  35.16 1.10 0.53 3.23 59.99 
Leather (manufactured)  87.21 0.26 2.05 0.00 10.49 
Mechanical Engineering 3.36 53.13 1.64 0.52 41.35 
Imports 1955 
Tobacco Industry  29.95 53.27 10.53 0.00 6.25 
Meat Industry  44.74 0.97 0.13 3.66 50.50 
Fruits and Vegetables Industry  43.06 3.78 1.02 0.63 51.51 
Leather (basic materials)  39.08 11.72 5.06 11.30 32.83 
Wood  (basic materials)  8.17 1.77 22.23 16.20 51.62 
Textiles (basic materials)  62.67 8.82 0.16 2.27 26.08 
Paper   1.71 9.73 17.65 2.14 68.78 
Iron and Steel  1.24 37.76 5.44 5.54 50.02 
Chemicals  9.20 23.16 7.67 2.94 57.02 
Textile (manufactured)  41.20 1.25 0.37 0.37 56.81 
Leather (manufactured)  72.53 0.68 3.54 6.75 16.50 
Mechanical Engineering 5.09 34.46 2.10 0.46 57.90 
Imports 1960 
Tobacco Industry  36.89 51.76 8.14 
 
3.20 
Meat Industry  37.71 1.56 0.49 4.71 55.54 
Fruits and Vegetables Industry  37.50 7.14 1.41 0.96 52.99 
Leather (basic materials)  32.95 8.41 5.24 23.42 29.98 
Wood  (basic materials)  10.72 2.87 16.14 20.73 49.54 
Textiles (basic materials)  55.84 13.62 0.59 2.17 27.78 
Paper   2.89 11.79 20.41 1.99 62.92 
Iron and Steel  5.16 24.63 13.09 1.76 55.35 
Chemicals  5.68 28.76 6.42 3.76 55.37 
Textile (manufactured)  37.37 6.55 1.21 1.51 53.36 
Leather (manufactured)  
   










Mechanical Engineering 5.93 33.35 3.33 0.54 56.85 
Imports 1965 
Tobacco Industry  42.04 40.51 12.13 0.01 5.30 
Meat Industry  43.88 1.83 0.53 5.16 48.61 
Fruits and Vegetables Industry  38.74 6.23 2.91 1.58 50.54 
Leather (basic materials)  34.45 9.10 11.12 16.28 29.05 
Wood  (basic materials)  8.50 1.72 21.85 29.28 38.66 
Textiles (basic materials)  50.55 6.41 0.22 2.70 40.13 
Paper   3.87 10.41 17.53 1.71 66.48 
Iron and Steel  7.00 9.88 5.99 8.44 68.69 
Chemicals  5.75 25.39 5.53 3.34 59.99 
Textile (manufactured)  36.28 7.77 2.79 2.45 50.72 
Leather (manufactured)  62.44 6.48 2.51 7.35 21.22 
Mechanical Engineering 3.24 34.20 2.61 0.75 59.21 
Imports 1970 
Tobacco Industry  23.28 51.35 14.82 0.00 10.55 
Meat Industry  42.39 2.01 0.73 5.21 49.66 
Fruits and Vegetables Industry  35.75 5.06 2.43 1.98 54.78 
Leather (basic materials)  39.83 7.90 4.09 13.08 35.09 
Wood  (basic materials)  7.79 2.28 16.83 25.26 47.83 
Textiles (basic materials)  45.22 5.23 0.03 2.79 46.74 
Paper   3.79 11.25 17.75 0.60 66.59 
Iron and Steel  2.42 22.82 6.11 3.67 64.98 
Chemicals  7.66 20.62 6.19 2.53 63.00 
Textile (manufactured)  28.42 7.51 3.46 2.13 58.47 
Leather (manufactured)  57.07 2.59 2.51 7.72 30.11 
Mechanical Engineering 6.72 55.11 4.49 1.59 32.09 




Table A-3.14: Pairwise correlations 
 XY – Sterling 
Area 
XY-US XY – Canada 
XY – Eastern 
Europe 
XY – Sterling Area 1.000    
XY-US 0.296*** 1.000   
XY – Canada 0.650*** 0.848*** 1.000  








MS-US MS – Canada 
MS – Eastern 
Europe 
MS – Sterling Area 1.00    
MS-US -0.254*** 1.00   
MS – Canada -0.156** -0.068 1.00  
MS – Eastern Europe 0.168*** -0.215*** 0.578*** 1.00 
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De wetenschappelijke literatuur over de economische prestaties van het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk zowel voor als na de tweede wereldoorlog wordt gekenmerkt door één 
terugkerend onderwerp: relatieve economische achteruitgang. Vooral in de 
literatuur over de naoorlogse periode wordt relatieve economische achteruitgang 
gezien als het resultaat van pathologisch falen van het Verenigd Koninkrijk, en 
niet als het onvermijdelijke resultaat van globaal kapitalisme en economische 
groei in andere naties.  
 Tijdens de golden age of economic growth, de periode 1950-1973, was 
economische groei in Engeland ongewoon laag in vergelijking met de groei in 
andere ontwikkelde landen. Dit is een indicatie dat Engeland werd geconfronteerd 
met relatieve economische achteruitgang. 
 De verklaringen hiervoor lopen uiteen van institutionele oorzaken tot 
verklaringen met betrekking tot de effecten van macro-economisch beleid en 
catch-up- en convergentie-theorieën. De meest bekende verklaring van Engelands 
relatieve economische achteruitgang heeft zich ontwikkeld rond het standpunt van 
Stephen Broadberry en Nick Crafts, de zogeheten ‘manufacturing failure 
hypothesis’.  
 In hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift wordt een aantal belangrijke vragen gesteld 
over de oorzaak en de aard van Engelands relatieve economische achteruitgang. 
De eerste vraag is of er sprake was van falen in de maakindustrie. Om antwoord 
op deze vraag te kunnen geven heb ik onderzocht welke industrieën het meest 
hebben bijgedragen aan de relatieve economische achteruitgang.  
 Dit proefschrift begint met een gedetailleerd overzicht van de ontwikkeling 
van de comparatieve arbeidsproductiviteit in Engeland en West-Duitsland 
gedurende de periode 1935-1968. In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik een gedesaggregeerde 
vergelijking van de arbeidsproductiviteit opgesteld van deze landen voor 1951. Ik 
heb een bestaande schatting voor 1935 van Fremdling et al (2007a) substantieel 
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herzien om deze direct vergelijkbaar te maken met een nieuwe schatting voor de 
naoorlogse periode. Tenslotte heb ik gebruik gemaakt van een bestaande 
arbeidsproductiviteitsschatting van Smith et al (1982) om te evalueren hoe de 
posities van Engeland en West-Duitsland zich tot elkaar verhielden aan het einde 
van de golden age of economic growth. Door deze drie schattingen tezamen te 
evalueren is het mogelijk om een compleet beeld te vormen van Engelands 
relatieve prestaties vanaf het interbellum tot aan het einde van de jaren zestig.  
 De gegevens wijzen uit dat West-Duitsland een substantieel hoger niveau van 
arbeidsproductiviteit had ten opzichte van Engeland tijdens het interbellum. In de 
periode na de Tweede Wereldoorlog is dit patroon compleet omgedraaid. 
Engeland was productiever in vrijwel alle industrieën. West-Duitsland behield 
echter wel haar leidende positie in de ijzer- en staal industrie. Het duurde echter 
maar tot het einde van de jaren vijftig voor West-Duitsland er in slaagde om de 
leidende positie in arbeidsproductiviteit weer over te nemen van Engeland. 
Volgens de schattingen van Smith et al. was West-Duitsland 23 procent 
productiever dan Engeland in 1968.  
 In hoofdstuk 3 wordt shift-share analyse toegepast om te onderzoeken of het 
totale verschil in arbeidsproductiviteit in de maakindustrie tussen Engeland en 
West- Duitsland het resultaat was van intra-sectorale effecten, of van het verschil 
in de structuur van de industrie. Voor zowel 1935 als 1951 wijst de analyse uit dat 
verschillen in arbeidsproductiviteit op het niveau van de afzonderlijke industrieën 
de belangrijkste oorzaak waren voor het totale verschil. De structuur van de 
industrie blijkt daardoor geen cruciale rol te spelen in het verklaren van het totale 
verschil in arbeidsproductiviteit.  
 Het grote voordeel van mijn nieuwe, sterk gedesaggregeerde dataset van de 
arbeidsproductiviteit is dat deze data ons in staat stellen om te onderzoeken wat 
het aandeel is van afzonderlijke industrieën in het totale verschil in 
arbeidsproductiviteit in de industrie. Het is cruciaal om het belang van individuele 
industrieën te begrijpen als we willen beargumenteren of Engeland faalde of niet. 
Voor West Duitsland vinden we met name een sterke achteruitgang van de 
belangrijke oorlogsindustrieën, zoals de ijzer en staalindustrie, de metaalproductie, 
machinale gereedschappen, transportmiddelen en elektrische apparaten en de 
chemische industrie. Maar de belangrijke en enigszins atypische tabaksindustrie 
was verantwoordelijk voor bijna de helft van het totale verschil in 
arbeidsproductiviteit in de totale maakindustrie in 1951. Engeland produceerde 
voornamelijk sigaretten, via een zeer kapitaalintensief productieproces, terwijl 
West-Duitsland zich vooral richtte op de veel arbeidsintensievere productie van 
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sigaren. Als gevolg hiervan was de Engelse arbeidsproductiviteit in tabakswaren 
veel hoger dan de Westduitse. 
 In het tweede deel van Hoofdstuk 3 richt ik mij op de verklaringen voor de 
relatieve economische prestatie van Engeland. De lagere groeivoeten in de Britse 
industrie werden veroorzaakt door het feit dat (1) Engeland zich dichter bij de 
technologische grens  bevond dan West-Duitsland en (2) er geen ruimte was voor 
reconstructie of herstelgroei zoals bij het Westduitse Wirtschaftswunder.  
 Er is een hoge correlatie tussen de verschillen in geschatte 
arbeidsproductiviteit in 1935 en de geëxtrapoleerde arbeidsproductiviteits-
verschillen voor het jaar 1960. Dit versterkt het idee dat reconstructie een 
belangrijke rol speelde in de hoge West-Duitse groeivoeten na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. Echter, West-Duitsland bleef hoge groeivoeten houden ook na het 
einde van de jaren vijftig. In deze periode was het te verwachten dat West-
Duitsland terug zou keren naar een lange termijn groei pad met lagere groeicijfers. 
Reconstructie kan gebruikt worden als een verklaring voor de snellere groei van 
West-Duitsland in vergelijking met Engeland tijdens de jaren vijftig, maar niet 
voor de groei dynamiek gedurende de jaren zestig.  
  Een andere belangrijke bijdrage van deze dissertatie is dat mijn nieuwe dataset 
gebruikt kan worden om een belangrijk debat in de economische historische 
literatuur op te helderen. Mijn nieuwe data en bevindingen werpen licht op de 
grote vragen aangaande de economische prestatie van Engeland, en stellen mij in 
staat om aan te tonen dat sommige argumenten die in het debat gebruikt zijn 
heroverwogen dienen te worden. Mijn conclusie over het moment waarop West-
Duitsland het Britse leiderschap in industriële arbeidsproductiviteit overnam 
verschilt van wat tot nu toe beargumenteerd wordt in de literatuur. In het debat dat 
in de ‘Economic History Review’ werd gevoerd tussen Booth (2003) en 
Broadberry and Crafts (2003) concludeerde Booth dat bijna twee-derde van de 
relatieve achterstand van West-Duitsland al in 1952 was ingehaald. Door gebruik 
te maken van mijn nieuwe dataset ben ik in staat om aan te tonen dat deze 
uitspraak van Booth onjuist is. De nieuwe cijfers tonen aan dat in 1952 slechts een 
kwart van de Westduitse verbetering in arbeidsproductiviteit gedurende de periode 
1951-1968 bereikt was. Dit betekent dat het vervolg van de jaren vijftig en de 
jaren zestig nog steeds van essentieel belang is voor het verklaren van de 
verschillen die er waren tussen de Engelse en Westduitse positie met betrekking 
tot arbeidsproductiviteit.  
 In het laatste gedeelte van Hoofdstuk 3 ligt de focus op de mogelijke 
onderliggende oorzaken van Engelands relatieve economische achteruitgang, zoals 
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het falen in Amerikanisering van management en massaproductie technieken, en 
het achterblijven van human capital.  
 Na de oorlog is de ‘Anglo-American Council on Productivity’ opgezet om 
Amerikaanse productietechnieken te promoten in Engeland. Het effect van deze 
inspanningen was echter minimaal. Vanwege de historisch bepaalde voorkeur voor 
ambachtelijk vakwerk werden pogingen om over te stappen op massaproductie 
technieken tegengewerkt op de werkvloer. Engelse managers hadden bovendien 
weinig ervaring met het type controle dat nodig is om met deze methoden te 
werken en stonden daarom ook niet open voor de adoptie van massaproductie 
technieken.  
 Ik heb zogeheten ‘manufacturing-footprints’ geconstrueerd om te onderzoeken 
of grote fabrieken, in termen van het aantal werknemers, in Engeland een ander 
niveau van productiviteit kenden dan een fabriek van gemiddelde grootte. De 
nieuwe data tonen aan dat in veel gevallen grote fabrieken een hogere 
arbeidsproductiviteit kenden dan fabrieken van gemiddelde omvang. Hierdoor kan 
ik me aansluiten bij de conclusie van Booth (2003a), die beargumenteerde dat er 
geen sprake lijkt te zijn van falen in large-scale operations. Ofschoon er 
problemen waren met betrekking tot Amerikanisering van de productie en de 
implementatie van massaproductie technieken geloof ik niet dat we kunnen stellen 
dat Engeland faalde. Gegeven de situatie, de afwijkende vraagstructuur van de 
economie en de historische afhankelijkheid van vakmanschap was het simpelweg 
niet mogelijk om de Amerikaanse technieken direct te kopiëren.  
 Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over de rol van internationale handel in de Britse relatieve 
achteruitgang. Engeland was ooit de grootste handelsnatie ter wereld. Na de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog werd Amerika echter de grootste exporteur van 
geproduceerde goederen in de wereld. Aan het einde van de jaren vijftig was 
Engeland zelfs niet meer de één na grootste exporteur van geproduceerde 
goederen, die rol werd overgenomen door West-Duitsland. Voor Engeland was de 
golden age een periode van protectionisme, gekenmerkt door hoge tarieven. 
Volgens Broadberry and Leunig (2013) is dit een belangrijke reden voor 
Engelands trage productiviteitsgroei in de naoorlogse periode. Wanneer we 
Engeland vergelijken met West-Duitsland dan valt op dat de Britse bedrijven meer 
verstoken bleven van internationale concurrentie. Europese landen hadden 
gedurende de naoorlogse periode economische structuren die sterk op elkaar leken. 
Dit betekende dat bedrijven uit verschillende landen krachtig met elkaar konden 
concurreren. Engeland handelde echter veelal met landen uit de Commonwealth. 
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De economieën van de Commonwealth waren echter complementair aan elkaar, 
als gevolg waarvan de intra-industriële concurrentiekracht laag was. 
 Ik heb op een gedesaggregeerd niveau onderzocht of er een effect was van 
internationale handel en openheid op de Britse arbeidsproductiviteit in de periode 
1951-1970. De belangrijkste bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is de kwantificering van 
de relatie tussen openheid en productiviteit in de naoorlogse periode in Engeland. 
Ofschoon de wetenschappelijke literatuur de Britse handelspatronen en 
exportpositie heeft genoemd als een verklaring voor relatieve economische 
achteruitgang is er weinig kwantitatief bewijs om deze bewering te onderbouwen. 
Mijn schattingen tonen aan dat openheid inderdaad een effect heeft op de groei 
van de arbeidsproductiviteit. Met name het niveau van export heeft een aanzienlijk 
effect op arbeidsproductiviteit.  
 Het tweede gedeelte van hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op de geografische afkomst van 
handel. In 1950 was het Sterling gebied nog steeds de belangrijkste handelspartner 
van het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Gedurende de golden age nam het belang van handel 
met het Sterling gebied langzaam af. Ik heb op een gedesaggregeerd niveau 
onderzocht of de geografische herkomst van handel een effect heeft gehad op 
arbeidsproductiviteitsgroei in de industrie. De Britse export naar de Verenigde 
Staten bleek een groter effect gehad te hebben op groei van de 
arbeidsproductiviteit dan de export naar het Sterling gebied, Canada en Oost-
Europa. Deze bevinding is conform de verwachting op basis van de 
handelstheorie. Bedrijven en industrieën die exporteren naar Amerika werden 
geconfronteerd met concurrentie van lokale bedrijven, die opereerden in een goed 
georganiseerd technologisch regime. Om te kunnen concurreren met deze 
bedrijven was dus een zeker productiviteitsniveau vereist.  
 Mijn conclusie is dan ook dat handel inderdaad een duidelijk effect blijkt te 
hebben gehad op de groei van de arbeidsproductiviteit. De geografische herkomst 
van handel bleek ook relevant. Deze bevinding impliceert ook dat wetenschappers 
als Panić and Seward (1966) en Wells (1966), die al in de jaren zestig beweerden 
dat Engeland had kunnen profiteren van meer handel met de goed ontwikkelde 
landen, een valide punt hadden. Mijn analyse biedt het kwantitatieve bewijs dat 
deze bewering ondersteunt. Deze bevindingen sterken het idee dat Engelands 
relatieve economische achteruitgang deels is veroorzaakt door de keuze voor het 
handelsbeleid.  
 Deze dissertatie wil bijdragen aan het voortgaande debat over Engelands 
relatieve economische achteruitgang gedurende de golden age of economic 
growth. Door middel van nieuwe data zijn we nu in staat om het precieze moment 
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aan te geven waarop West-Duitsland het Verenigd Koninkrijk passeerde in het 
niveau van arbeidsproductiviteit in de industrie. Ook zijn we nu in staat om aan te 
wijzen welke industrieën het meest hebben bijgedragen aan het totale verschil in 
arbeidsproductiviteit in de industrie. In het tweede deel van deze dissertatie heb ik 
aangetoond dat handel en openheid van bijzonder belang zijn bij de verklaring 
voor de matige Britse arbeidsproductiviteits-prestaties in de jaren zestig. Voortaan 
moet Engelands handelspositie worden meegenomen als potentiele 
verklaringsfactor.  
 Deze dissertatie kan samengevat worden met de volgende conclusie: Falen is 
een te subjectief concept in de discussie rondom arbeidsproductiviteit in de Britse 
industrie. Zoals ik heb aangetoond in deze dissertatie waren er vaak goede gronden 
voor ondernemers om geen nieuwe productiemethoden op te zetten. De casus rond 
de textielindustrie in hoofdstuk 3 is hier een goed voorbeeld van. De situatie is 
enigszins anders als we het hebben over de overheid. Ten aanzien van educatie en 
handelsbeleid moeten we concluderen dat betere beslissingen tot betere uitkomsten 
hadden geleid. Zo had een eerdere toetreding tot de EEC gunstiger kunnen 
uitpakken voor de productiviteitsprestaties van de Britse industrie en daarmee voor 
de levensvatbaarheid van de industrie op de lange termijn.  
 
  
 
 
 
